美國證券交易經(jīng)典案例教程

內(nèi)容概要

　　公正、公平、有序和高效的競爭性證券交易市場對充滿活力的經(jīng)濟(jì)必不可少。交易市場高度的流通性和高質(zhì)量、實(shí)時(shí)信息公開有益于交易價(jià)格充分反映上市公司內(nèi)在價(jià)值和供求關(guān)系，為投資管理提供基礎(chǔ)，給投資者帶來機(jī)會，建立他們的未來。企業(yè)通過證券市場融資擴(kuò)大生產(chǎn)，不管是IPO還是后續(xù)發(fā)行，依賴于公平和競爭性的交易市場給其證券進(jìn)行合理準(zhǔn)確定價(jià)。公平和競爭性的市場有助于投資者建立對該市場的信心。
　　這樣的交易市場的標(biāo)志是什么？證券交易市場監(jiān)管的作用又是什么？概而言之--透明。投資者決定買賣股票，需要瞬時(shí)報(bào)價(jià)信息。證券商履行其法律義務(wù)，為證券客戶指令提供最佳執(zhí)行，市場就必須瞬時(shí)向所有公眾同時(shí)發(fā)布成交價(jià)格、成交量、交易場所和其他交易信息。這有利于各交易市場間的競爭，也有益于投資者監(jiān)督券商的服務(wù)水平。再者，必須有公司業(yè)績、前景等方面信息的真實(shí)性和透明度。不然，即使有效資本市場論成立，股票價(jià)格也只能反映錯(cuò)誤信息而不能反映企業(yè)的真實(shí)內(nèi)在價(jià)值。此外，監(jiān)管必須要透明。比如，在賣空、金融衍生品和市場博弈等易受操縱的方面，應(yīng)采取預(yù)防性措施加以管理。對內(nèi)幕交易和其他證券欺詐行徑必須全面禁止，建立強(qiáng)有力的政府強(qiáng)行遏制機(jī)制，并為投資者獲得經(jīng)濟(jì)損失補(bǔ)償提供法律途徑。還應(yīng)加強(qiáng)對各種新金融產(chǎn)品的研究和監(jiān)管，以防范風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，保護(hù)投資者、交易對方和其他市場參與者，維護(hù)整個(gè)金融體系的穩(wěn)定。
　　一個(gè)管理良好的證券市場有助于國家經(jīng)濟(jì)繁榮富強(qiáng)。一個(gè)管理過度的市場將使競爭窒息，經(jīng)濟(jì)增長停頓。一個(gè)管理不善的市場則將摧毀財(cái)富。美國證券市場在近十幾年內(nèi)所歷盡的滄桑風(fēng)雨--喻示了這些真理。研究美國證券交易市場的監(jiān)管有助于我們防止類似市場創(chuàng)傷事件的再度發(fā)生。

作者簡介

　　姚承曦，現(xiàn)任中國廣東汕頭大學(xué)商學(xué)院金融與證券監(jiān)管學(xué)教授。姚承曦在美國證券業(yè)工作近二十年，包括證券監(jiān)管部門和證券業(yè)界工作經(jīng)歷.歷任美國全國證券交易商協(xié)會（NASD）法律顧問處律師，納斯達(dá)克股票市場（NASDAQ）國際市場法律顧問，紐約股票交易所（NYSE）券商監(jiān)管部高級法律顧問，和紐交所國際部亞太地區(qū)（包括中國上市公司）和加拿大國家上市公司經(jīng)理。正業(yè)界，姚承曦先后任大型綜合型券商公司監(jiān)察副總裁和資本市場法律顧問；其后在全球最大共同基金集團(tuán)Fidelity
Investments任國際資本市場監(jiān)管副總裁。姚承曦的監(jiān)管范圍包括：證券零售市場、資本市場、投資管理、美國國內(nèi)市場和國際市場。
　　姚承曦獲美國波士頓學(xué)院法學(xué)院法學(xué)博士學(xué)位（Juris Doctor），喬治敦大學(xué)法學(xué)研究中心金融與證券監(jiān)管學(xué)碩士學(xué)位（LLM in
Securities and Financial
Regulation）。期間獲喬治敦優(yōu)秀研究生獎(jiǎng)，及全美法學(xué)院國際金融研究獎(jiǎng)。此前，姚承曦在中華人民共和國獲聯(lián)合國譯員訓(xùn)練班研究生文憑，英美文學(xué)碩士學(xué)位，及英文本科文憑。姚承曦的英文專著，“Stock
Market and Futures Market in the People's Republic of
China.”由牛津大學(xué)出版社在美國、英國及中國香港發(fā)行。
　　David A．Sirignano，David A．Sirignano is a partner in
theWashington．D．C．offce of Morgan Lewis&Bockius LLP．a(chǎn)nd CO-Head
of the firm's SecuritiesPractice．Mr．Sirignano focuses on
internationaland domestic corporate finance，mergers
andacquisitions．a(chǎn)nd SEC regulation．He was formeLChair of the
Corporate Reporting and DisclosureSubcommiffee of the American Bar
Association，F(xiàn)ederal Regulation of Securities Committee．Hewas
Co-Chair of the ABA Task Force on CrossBorder。Offerings and
Acquisitions．He has alsoserved　on　the　Corporate　Finance
AdvisoryCommittee of FINRA．
　　Before joining the firm in 1999，he wasAssociate Director foL
0nternational CorporateFinance in the United States Securities
andExchange Commission’S Division of CorporationFinance．In that
position，he developed SEC policy0n cross-border
offerings，acquisitions，andlistings，including offshore Internet
offerings，international disclosure and accounting standards．a(chǎn)s well
as internationa0 corporate governanceguidelines．He also advised the
SEC Division ofEnforcement　on　financia0　fraud　cases　andcross-border
offering abuses．Mr．Sirignano wasan adjunct professor at Georgetown
University LaWCenter．where he taught the Course。n Mergersand
Acquisitions．

書籍目錄

In Perspective：Securities and Financial Regulation
Foreword 序言
SUMMARY OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTs
　CHAPTER 1　REGULATORY STRUCTURE
　　Section 1.1 1　Competition and Regulation：The SEC and the
CFTC
　　　1.1.1　 Futures and Options on“Government Securities”:Securities
or Commodity?
　　　1.1.2　 Index Participations：Securities or Futures?
　　　1.1.3　 Futures and Options on Single Stock and on Stock
Indexes：Securities，F(xiàn)utures，Security Futures
　　Section 1.2　Regulation of Financial Gatekeepers
　　　1.2.1　 Auditor Independence and Oversight by PCAOB Board
　　　1.2.2　 Credit Rating Agency NRSRO Designation
　　Section 1.3　Securities Industry Self-Regulation
　　　1.3.1　 Concept of “Statutory Supervisor”
　　　1.3.2　The Shingle Theory
　　　1.3.3　 Suitability Doctrine：Application to Online
Brokerage
　CHAPTER 2　MARE：ET STRUCTURE
　　Section 2.1　Exchange Markets, OTC Markets, and Customer DMA
　　　2.1.1　 NASDAQ Competing Dealers Model；NYSE Hybrid Auction
Model；HN Liquidity Model
　　　2.1.2　 ATSs and Concept of “Exchange”
　　　2.1.3　 OTC Markets for Non-Listed Equities：OTCBB and Pink
Sheets
　　　2.1.4　 Customer Direct Market Access to Exchanges and ATSs
　　　2.1.5　 Multiple Trading of Standardized Options in Listed
Stocks
　　Section 2.2　 National Market system：Market Competition and Order
Competition
　　　2.2.1　 Concept of“Best Execution
　　　2.2.2　 Concept of “Customer Order Protection”
　　　2.2.3　 The NMS System：Transparency，Competition，F(xiàn)airness
Efficiency
　　　2.2.4　 Inter-Market Surveillance for Cross-Market Trading
Activities
　CHAPTER 3　PUBLIC COMPANY TRANSPARENCY
　　Section 3.1　Periodic Reporting and Other Disclosure by Public
Company
　　　3.1.1　 Periodic Reports by China. Based US Public Company
&IFRS as Global Accounting Standards
　　　3.1.2　 US Public Company Doing Business in China＆Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act
　　　3.1.3　 Issuer Selective Disclosure &Regulation FD（Fair
Disclosure）
　　Section 3.2　 Mandatory Disclosure by Certain Shareholders
　　　3.2.1　 Potential for Corporate Control：Disclosure by 5％
Threshold Beneficial Owner
　　　3.2.2　Decoupling by Derivatives：wh0 Is“Beneficial
Owner”?　　
　CHAPTER 4　PROPHYLACTIC REGULATION OF MANIPULATION
　　Section 4.1　Manipulation in Financial Markets
　　　4.1.1　 Concept of Manipulation
　　　4.1.2　 Market Gaming by NBBO Manipulation
　　Section 4.2　Transactions for Corporate Control
　　　4.2.1　 Tender Offer：ALL-Holders and Best-Price
Requirements
　　　4.2.2　 Takeover Battle：what Is Tender Offer?
　　Section 4.3　Trading during Securities Distribution
　　　4.3.1　 short Sale Restriction in Advance of Follow-on/Secondary
Offering
　　　4.3.2　 Market Making Restriction Section
　　　4.4　 Short Selling
　　　4.4.1　 Prohibition of Manipulative Naked Short Selling
　　　4.4.2　 Regulation of Short Sale：Order Marking；Locate；Circuit
Breaker Close-Out
　CHAPTER 5　FRAUD IN CONNECTION WITH THE PURCHASE OR SALE OF A
SECURITY
　　Section 5.1 Insider Trading Liability Theories
　　　5.1.1　 Classical Theory of Insider Trading Liability
　　　5.1.2　Tipper-Tippee Liability Theory；Temporary Insider
Concept
　　　5.1.3　Misappropriation Theory；Prophylactic Prohibition
Theory
　　Section 5.2　Private Damages Action for Fraud
　　　5.2.1　 Elements of Private Securities Fraud Action；Theory of
Economic Loss
　　　5.2.2　 In Pari Delicto Doctrine（Equal Fault Concept）
　　Section 5.3　Transnational Securities Fraud in Globalized
Securities Market
　　　5.3.1　 Reach of US Insider Trading Law Enforcement
　　　5.3.2　 Limit on Extraterritorial Application of US Securities
Laws to
　　Foreign-Cubed Private Action

章節(jié)摘錄

　　To state a claim for securities fraud under§10 of the Securities Act of 1 934 and Rule1 0b-5，plaintiffs must demonstrate：（1）a misrepreSentation or omission of a material fact inconnection with the purchase or sale of a security；（2）scienter on the part of the defendant；（3）reliance on the miSrepresentation：and（4）damage resulting from the misrepresentation．See Sowell v. Butcher&Singer，Inc．，926 F．2d 289，296（3d Cir．1991）．Because plaintiffs havedemonstrated that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to the elements of their securitiesfraud claim，we will reverse the district court．　?、蟆　he parties agree that a broker-dealer owes to the client a duty of best execution．，They further agree that a broker-dealer，by accepting an order without price instructions。impliedly represents that the order wm be executed in a manner consistent with the dutV ofbest execution and that a broker-dealer who accepts such an order while intending to breachthat duty makes a misrepreSentation that is material to the purchase or sale．The partiesdiffer，however，on whether a trier of fact could conclude from this record that the impliedrepresentation made by the de~ndants included a representation that they would not executeat the NBBO price when prices more favorable to the client were available from sources likeSelectNet and Instinet．　　As we explain hereafter，this difference can be resolved only by determining whether．during the class period or some portion thereof，it was feasible for the defendants to executetrades through SelectNet and Instinet when prices more favorable than the NBBO were beingquoted there．This is a matter concerning which the record reflects a material dispute offact．If such prices were reasonably available and the defendants，at the time of acceptingplaintiffs’orders，intended to execute them solely by reference to the NBBO，they made amaterial misrepresentation in connection with the purchase or sale of the securities involred．If a finder of fact could infer，in addition，that the defendants’implied representation wasknowingly false or made with reckless indifference，it would follow that summary]udgmentfor the defendants was inappropriate．　　The duty of best execution，which predates the federal securities laws，has its roots inthe common law agency obligations of undivided loyalty and reasonable care that an agentowes to his principal．‘Since it is understood by all that the client-principal seeks his owneconomic gain and the purpose of the agency is to help the client-principal achieve thatobjective，the broker-dealer，absent instructions to the contrary，is expected to use reasonable　　efforts to maximize the economic benefit to the client in each transaction．　　The duty of best execution thus requires that a broker-dealer seek to obtain for itscustomer orders the most favorable terms reasonably available under the circumstances．See，e．g.，Sinclair v．SEC，444 F．2d 399，400（2 Cir.1971）（fiduciary duty requires broker-dealer“toobtain the best available price”for customers’orders）；Arleen W.Hughes，27 S．E．C．629．636（1 948）（“A corollary of the fiduciary’S duty of loyalty to his principal is his duty to obtainthe best price discoverable in the exercise of reasonable diligence．"）．a(chǎn)ffd sub nom．Hughesv.SEC，174 F．2d 969（D．C．Cir．1 949）．Accord Order Execution Obligations，Exchange ActRelease No．37，619A，61 Fed．Reg．48290，48322（Sept．12，1996）（“Final Rules”）．That is，the duty of best execution requires the defendants to execute the plaintiffs’trades at the bestreasonably available price．2While ascertaining what prices are reasonably available in anyparticular situation may require a factual inquiry into all of the surrounding circumstances．the existence of a broker-dealer’S duty to execute at the best of those prices that arereasonably available is well-established and is not SO vague as to be without ascertainablecontent in the context of a particular trade or trades．　　As the SEC has recognized on a number of occasions，the scope of the dutV of bestexecution has evolved over time with changes in technology and transformation of thestructure of financial markets．’For example，before the creation of NASDAQ．a(chǎn) broker inan over-the-counter market satisfied her dutV of best execution by contacting at least threemarket makers prior to executing a client’S order．See Order Execution Obligations，ExchangeAct Release N0．36，310，60 Fed．Reg．52792，52793（Oct．10，1995）（“Proposed Rules”）．With the advent of NASDAQ and the NBBO computer system providing instant access to thebest bid and 0ffer aVailable nationwide．the standard for satisfying the duty of best executionnecessarily heightened．　　……

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