公司法基礎(chǔ)

內(nèi)容概要

　　這十年經(jīng)歷了一場(chǎng)公司法革命。在這不同尋常的十年期間，業(yè)界創(chuàng)新了商業(yè)組織結(jié)構(gòu)和兼并行為模式，而公司法領(lǐng)域的理論也由于引進(jìn)了經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的組織理論和現(xiàn)代公司金融理論等分析方法而大為改觀。這種對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)理論的融合深刻影響了公司運(yùn)作方式以及公司法教學(xué)，而這種影響將持續(xù)下去。這本論文集著重介紹了公司法領(lǐng)域迥然對(duì)立的各種理論，以及這些理論得以產(chǎn)生的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)基本原理。此外，我們通過(guò)提供公司治理方面廣泛而繁茂的實(shí)證研究成果，努力用寫(xiě)實(shí)的手法給學(xué)子們描繪出對(duì)他們而言很陌生的公司法研究概況?！　∫虬⒌婪颉げ图拥录{·米恩斯二人對(duì)所有權(quán)和經(jīng)營(yíng)權(quán)分離帶來(lái)的問(wèn)題之深刻分析，公眾持股公司的重要特點(diǎn)變得明晰：公司經(jīng)營(yíng)業(yè)務(wù)的經(jīng)理層并不擁有該公司。伯利和米恩斯認(rèn)為這種分離產(chǎn)生了許多組織上的弊端，因?yàn)楣舅腥说睦娌⒉豢偸桥c經(jīng)理層一致。這類問(wèn)題被稱為代理問(wèn)題。正如這本論文集所闡釋的，公司法的大部分內(nèi)容就是在探討如何處理代理問(wèn)題。本書(shū)收集的論文運(yùn)用經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)組織理論和公司金融理論從不同角度對(duì)這一問(wèn)題展開(kāi)剖析，并分別提出了不同的解決方案?！　∥冶救嗽诠痉ê凸窘鹑诘日n堂上使用本書(shū)中的材料。編輯本書(shū)時(shí)我們有意將其做成供學(xué)生在公司法課堂討論的教材，同時(shí)，體例上我們?cè)诿恳徽鹿?jié)安排了要點(diǎn)與問(wèn)題，以便讀者能獨(dú)立閱讀并自我指導(dǎo)。論文均經(jīng)過(guò)多方面編輯加工，使其更好用。我們將初稿里的數(shù)學(xué)計(jì)算和公式進(jìn)行了壓縮，但要點(diǎn)里的數(shù)據(jù)原封不動(dòng)，以闡釋某些概念。當(dāng)然這種做法很危險(xiǎn)，因?yàn)槭s了學(xué)術(shù)著述的復(fù)雜性，而且留給人一種錯(cuò)誤的印象，即創(chuàng)建一個(gè)理論不會(huì)引起理解上的歧義。為盡量避免這種誤識(shí)，我有意將觀點(diǎn)大相徑庭的相關(guān)論文及隨后的要點(diǎn)并列編排在一起。此外，論文節(jié)錄中的參考書(shū)目和腳注均已省去——為增強(qiáng)可讀性和更適合教學(xué)，只好犧牲各論文節(jié)錄的精確性和查閱引文出處的便捷性了。讀者若對(duì)節(jié)錄感興趣，可以查找原論文。

作者簡(jiǎn)介

　　羅伯塔·羅曼諾于1975年獲得芝加哥大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)碩士學(xué)位，1980年獲耶魯大學(xué)法律博士學(xué)位，1985年起任耶魯大學(xué)教授，研究領(lǐng)域是公司法、公司金融和金融市場(chǎng)監(jiān)管。羅曼諾自1998年起承擔(dān)《法律經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)評(píng)論》的編輯工作，并于1998-1999年間擔(dān)任美國(guó)法律經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)協(xié)會(huì)主席。

書(shū)籍目錄

ⅠTheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarkets,1A.TheoryoftheFirm,4TheoryoftheFirm:ManagerialBehavior,AgencyCosts,and　OwnershipStructure,4　MichaelC.JensenandWilliamH.MecklingTransactionCostEconomics,9　OliverE.WilliamsonOwnershipoftheFirm,15　HenryHansmannNotesandQuestions,22B.TheoryofCapitalMarkets,26FromARandomWalkDownWallStreet,26　BurtonG.Malkiel　FromCorporateFinance,43　StephenA.Ross,RandolphW.Westerfield,andJeffreyF.Jaffe　NotesandQuestions,57ⅡLegalCharacteristicsoftheCorporation:LimitedLiability,61　LimitedLiabilityandtheCorporation,62　FrankH.EasterbrookandDanielR.Fischel　LimitedLiabilityintheTheoryoftheFirm,70　SusanE.Woodward　TowardUnlimitedShareholderLiabilityforCorporate　Torts,73　HenryHansmannandReinierKraakman　NotesandQuestions,78ⅢTheProductionofCorporationLaws,82A.StateCompetitionforCorporateCharters,84　TheStateCompetitionDebateinCorporateLaw,84　RobertaRomano　TowardanInterestGroupTheoryofDelawareCorporate　Law,90　JonathanR.MaceyandGeoffreyP.Miller　NotesandQuestions,93B.TheStructureofCorporationLaws,96　TheCorporateContract,96　FrankH.EasterbrookandDanielR.Fischel　TheMandatoryStructureofCorporateLaw,104　JeffreyN.GordonTheMandatory/EnablingBalanceinCorporateLaw:AnEssay　ontheJudicialRole,111　JohnC.Coffee,Jr.　NotesandQuestions,113ⅣFinancingtheCorporation,119　OnFinancialContracting:AnAnalysisofBondCovenants,121　CliffordW.Smith,Jr.,andJeroldB.Warner　ContractualResolutionofBondholder－StockholderConflicts　inLeveragedBuyouts,128　KennethLehnandAnnettePoulsen　ActiveInvestors,LBOs,andthePrivatizationofBankruptcy,130　MichaelC.Jensen　TheStructureandGovernanceofVentureCapital　Organizations,132　WilliamA.Sahlman　TwoAgency-CostExplanationsofDividends,138　FrankH.Easterbrook　NotesandQuestions,140ⅤInternalGovernanceStructures,146A.BoardsofDirectorsandFiduciaryDuties,148　CorporateGovernance,148　OliverE.Williamson　IncentiveandTaxEffectsofExecutiveCompensationPlans,155　CliffordW.Smith,Jr.andRossL.Watts　TheShareholderSuit:LitigationWithoutFoundation?,162　RobertaRomano　Does"Unlawful"Mean"Criminal"?:Reflectionsonthe　DisappearingTort/CrimeDistinctioninAmericanLaw,173　JohnC.Coffee,Jr.,　NotesandQuestions,179B.ShareholderVotingRightsandtheExerciseofVoice,187　VotinginCorporateLaw,187　FrankH.EasterbrookandDanielR.Fischel　TiesthatBond:DualClassCommonStockandtheProblemof　ShareholderChoice,192　JeffreyN.Gordon　ProxyContestsandtheEfficiencyofShareholderOversight,197　JohnPound　APoliticalTheoryofAmericanCorporateFinance,206　MarkJ.RoeAgentsWatchingAgents:ThePromiseofInstitutional　InvestorVoice,210BernardS.BlackActiveInvestors,LBOs,andthePrivatizationofBankruptcy,　213MichaelC.JensenNotesandQuestions,214ⅥExternalGovernanceStructures:TheMarketforCorporateControl,221A.TheoriesandEvidence,223MergersandtheMarketforCorporateControl,223　HenryG.ManneTakeovers:TheirCausesandConsequences,225　MichaelC.JensenBreachofTrustinHostileTakeovers,228　AndreiShleiferandLawrenceH.Summers　RiskReductionasaManagerialMotiveforConglomerate　Mergers,232　YakovAmihudandBaruchLev　TheHubrisHypothesisofCorporateTakeovers,233　RichardRoll　TheMarketforCorporateControl:TheScientificEvidence,235　MichaelC.JensenandRichardS.Ruback　TheMarketforCorporateControl:TheEmpiricalEvidence　Since1980,242　GreggA.Jarrell,JamesA.Brickley,andJeffryM.Netter　HostileTakeoversinthe1980s:TheReturntoCorporate　Specialization,245　SanjaiBhagat,AndreiShleifer,andRobertW.Vishny　NotesandQuestions,248B.Management’sFiduciaryDutyandTakeover　Defenses,258　TheProperRoleofaTarget’sManagementinRespondingtoaTenderOffer,258　FrankH.EasterbrookandDanielR.Fischel　SeekingCompetitiveBidsVersusPurePassivityinTenderOfferDefense,262　RonaldJ.Gilson　TheCaseforFacilitatingCompetingTenderOffers:AReplyandExtension,265　LucianA.Bebchuk　TheMarketforCorporateControl:TheEmpiricalEvidenceSince1980,267　GreggA.Jarrell,JamesA.Brickley,andJeffryM.Netter　TheWealthEffectsofSecond-GenerationStateTakeoverLegislation,272　JonathanM.KarpoffandPaulH.Malatesta　TheFutureofHostileTakeovers:LegislationandPublicOpinion,278　RobertaRomano　NotesandQuestions,285ⅦSecuritiesRegulation,293　A.DisclosureRegulation,295　MandatoryDisclosureandtheProtectionofInvestors,295　FrankH.EasterbrookandDanielR.Fischel　MarketFailureandtheEconomicCaseforaMandatoryDisclosureSystem,301　JohnC.Coffee,Jr.　TheEffectofthe1933SecuritiesActonInvestorInformationandthePerformanceofNewIssues,303　CarolJ.Simon　NotesandQuestions,305　B.InsiderTradingRegulation,310　InsiderTrading:Rule10b-5,Disclosure,andCorporatePrivacy,310　KennethE.Scott　TheRegulationofInsiderTrading,313DennisW.CarltonandDanielR.Fischel　NotesandQuestions,317

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