列奧·施特勞斯與美國右派

出版時間:2006年7月  出版社:華東師范大學(xué)出版社  作者:[加]德魯里  頁數(shù):241  字數(shù):234000  譯者:劉華等  
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內(nèi)容概要

列奧·施特勞斯(Leo Strauss)是一位神秘的政治哲學(xué)家。在里根、老布什執(zhí)政時期,美國許多政府機構(gòu)的重要職位都被施特勞斯的弟子們占據(jù)。到了小布什當(dāng)政時期,特別是在“9·11”之后,探究強硬派政客與施特勞斯派之間的關(guān)系,成為公共傳媒討論的熱門話題。本書的作者站在自由主義的立場上,對施特勞斯的政治哲學(xué)作出了激烈的批評,并指出,如果以這種理論來引導(dǎo)現(xiàn)實政治,那將會導(dǎo)致嚴重的后果,可能危及自由民主政體的根本基礎(chǔ)。作者的許多觀點對于知識界的自由派和自由左派具有相當(dāng)強的感召力,本書也就成為論戰(zhàn)中經(jīng)常被征引的重要參考。

書籍目錄

《列奧·施特勞斯與美國右派》的背景與作者(代中譯本序)第一章 華盛頓的施特勞斯派 魏瑪?shù)挠撵` 自由主義如何破壞了宗教,帶來了虛無主義 自由主義、虛無主義與納粹 施特勞斯派的政治設(shè)想 精英主義還是民粹主義 與基督教右派的聯(lián)盟 美國的自由主義與保守主義第二章 施特勞斯的猶太遺產(chǎn) 猶太問題的界定 反現(xiàn)代的猶太特性 同化之不可能 被舉薦的猶太民族主義 拋棄的萊辛的智慧 對邁蒙尼德的再闡釋 施特勞斯的批判第三章 施特勞斯的德國淵源:海德格爾和施米特 尼采、海德格爾和納粹 為什么施特勞斯對海德格爾的批判是可疑的 施特勞斯的假冒權(quán)威:柏拉圖和尼采 謊言與政治 卡爾‘施米特對自由民主制的譴責(zé) 施米特對政治的頌揚 施特勞斯對施米特的激進化第四章 施特勞斯主義哲學(xué)在美國的應(yīng)用 哈里‘雅法:美國的古代血統(tǒng) 平等與《獨立宣言》 美國的保守主義背叛 原初意圖 對雅法的批評 艾倫.布魯姆:美國不可救藥的現(xiàn)代性 美國的自由主義 教育 平權(quán)法案 愛、性與女權(quán)主義 威爾默.肯德爾:民粹主義療法第五章 新保守主義:施特勞斯的遺產(chǎn) 新保守主義“新”在何處 對資產(chǎn)階級精神的頌揚 二元思考:正統(tǒng)主義及其敵人 美國的分崩離析 民族主義還是愛國主義 知識分子的叛逆 民眾主義的策略 新保守主義保守在何處 兩個世界中最糟的一個 家庭的價值:對婦女不宣而戰(zhàn) 新保守主義在政治上的成功附錄 部分譯名對照

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  •   列奧.施特勞斯,當(dāng)代美國保守主義政治哲學(xué)的締造者,生前神秘而沉寂,死后卻聲譽日隆。其學(xué)說不僅在學(xué)術(shù)界吸引了人們的興趣,而且更重要的是在實踐中直接指導(dǎo)了美國政治上的保守主義,尤其是小布什的內(nèi)外政策。施特勞斯本人的著述晦澀難懂,而加拿大學(xué)者的這本介紹和評論施特勞斯政治哲學(xué)的著作,通俗易懂,并且側(cè)重分析了施特勞斯學(xué)派對美國保守主義政治思潮的影響。喜歡政治哲學(xué)和理論,以及研究美國文化的人,都應(yīng)該一讀。當(dāng)然,即使是純粹消遣,讀讀也無妨。
  •     《施特勞斯與美國右派》這部論戰(zhàn)小冊子,甚至比布魯姆《美國心靈的封閉》更加通俗地闡釋了施特勞斯的古典政治哲學(xué)及其所屬于的美國保守主義陣營,雖然篇名以施特勞斯為名,但實際上卻主要是對于以施特勞斯為首的美國保守主義陣營進行的總批判,從而展現(xiàn)出美國自由主義派與保守主義之間的矛盾與沖突。
      全書分為五章,第一章揭露了施特勞斯為首的保守主義陣營如何控制了美國政治,以及如何對于美國政治施加影響,并指出美國這種保守主義是如何使國家轉(zhuǎn)向極權(quán)和獨裁。這種揭露很令我吃驚,畢竟當(dāng)年劉軍寧在《保守主義》一書中,將保守主義塑造成為自由至上主義,或者說保守主義本質(zhì)上就是自由主義,為何德魯里會認為保守主義造成了美國政治的極權(quán)?在甘陽那本小冊子中,已經(jīng)對于美國保守主義的轉(zhuǎn)型進行了大體的分析,而德魯里的揭露也進一步印證了這一點。不過,我還是會產(chǎn)生一種疑問,自由主義與保守主義之間的差異究竟在哪里呢?
      在第二章,德魯里以淺顯易懂的方式,對施特勞斯的哲學(xué)進行了詮釋,雖然后來被曼斯菲爾德認為過于膚淺了,但我們也不能否認是一種自由主義視角下的解讀。在這一章中,德魯里緊緊抓住了施特勞斯是猶太人這一事實,通過對于施特勞斯關(guān)于猶太人與現(xiàn)代性、世俗化的沖突與矛盾,揭示出施特勞斯古典政治哲學(xué)是以猶太人命運為起點,民族、傳統(tǒng)和神秘主義為特征的宗教保守主義,因而反對世界性、現(xiàn)代性和理性為特征的現(xiàn)代主義。并通過,解讀施特勞斯的萊辛與邁蒙尼德的研究,認為施特勞斯以猶太人的視角扭曲了萊辛著作的本意,而以自己之心揣度邁蒙尼德,從而成功地以自己的視角替代了邁蒙尼德的原意。
      在第三章中,德魯里進一步挖掘了施特勞斯的思想淵源,指出除了猶太教傳統(tǒng)外,施特勞斯還受到了同時代的存在主義大師海德格爾與納粹法學(xué)家施米特的影響。并針對海德格爾對現(xiàn)代性的批判,并認為海德格爾的存在主義與納粹有著深刻的聯(lián)系。而施特勞斯正是接受了海德格爾對于現(xiàn)代性的批判,從而在內(nèi)心中也接受了所謂的納粹主義洗禮。而另一位納粹法學(xué)家施米特更是德魯里攻擊的對象。作為曾經(jīng)在納粹政權(quán)服務(wù)過的法學(xué)家施米特,以其尖刻地對自由主義抨擊而著名。德魯里認為,他這一批判深刻影響到了施特勞斯,使得施特勞斯的古典政治哲學(xué)充滿了決斷論的味道在其中。經(jīng)德魯里這么一揭發(fā),真覺得施特勞斯散發(fā)著一股納粹的味道,但是我們必須與前一章相聯(lián)系,發(fā)現(xiàn)施特勞斯畢竟是猶太人,他怎么也不會是同情納粹的,而且據(jù)其《剖白》中自云,認為納粹是虛無主義的政治災(zāi)難,為何德魯里要將納粹與施特勞斯聯(lián)系在一起呢?難道施特勞斯作為猶太人對于納粹德國的仇恨,還抵不上自由主義對于極權(quán)主義的憎惡嗎?
      在隨后的兩章中,德魯里著重批判了施特勞斯的門內(nèi)學(xué)生及其同路人。在第四章中,德魯里分別批判了雅法、布魯姆和肯德爾,在最后一章中重點批判了美國保守主義代表克里斯托。分別就雅法的美國史研究、布魯姆的《走向封閉的美國精神》等問題展開逐一批判。不過說回來,德魯里以自由主義為立場,對保守主義進行炮火猛烈的攻擊,其實不免也陷入一種尷尬的境地,如果自由主義允許自由表達的話,為什么保守主義不能有自己的聲音呢?而如果說,保守主義對于美國政治影響深遠的話,那自由主義對于美國經(jīng)濟的影響可以說是無孔不入了。這一切又都從何談起呢?
      通過閱讀這個這部書,其實還是很有收獲,至少我們可以分清楚自由主義與保守主義之間究竟有哪些不同,而不是被劉軍寧忽悠著認為保守主義就是自由主義,另外德魯里一直在說施特勞斯反對自由主義,而不反對民主制,這個論斷我在閱讀施特勞斯的著作中其實很難看到影子,反而是是施特勞斯申明自己支持古典自由主義,而反對現(xiàn)代自由主義(見施氏《古今自由主義》)。最后,還要說一點,由于德魯里是一位女性作者,因此其又在書中特別強調(diào)了女性主義的立場,這不禁讓我啞然失笑,其實施特勞斯關(guān)于女性的論述并不多,而對此問題有所涉及的布魯姆也不過是譴責(zé)了學(xué)校中日漸敗壞的風(fēng)氣,卻不料被德魯里敏感的政治正確抓到了,并大肆進行攻擊——其實,曼斯菲爾德倒是有一本《男子氣概》,專門談?wù)撨@一主題,卻不知道為何德魯里卻只字未提。
      閱讀此書,是為了更好地學(xué)習(xí)古典政治哲學(xué)——從自由主義者的眼里,施特勞斯的古典哲學(xué)究竟是怎樣的形象,也有助于我們從反面把握古典政治哲學(xué)的一些命題。
  •     Noble lies and perpetual war: Leo Strauss, the neo-cons, and Iraq
      Are the ideas of the conservative political philosopher Leo Strauss a shaping influence on the Bush administration’s world outlook? Danny Postel interviews Shadia Drury – a leading scholarly critic of Strauss – and asks her about the connection between Plato’s dialogues, secrets and lies, and the United States-led war in Iraq.
      
      By Danny Postel
      
      10/18/03: (openDemocracy) What was initially an anti-war argument is now a matter of public record. It is widely recognised that the Bush administration was not honest about the reasons it gave for invading Iraq.
      Paul Wolfowitz, the influential United States deputy secretary of defense, has acknowledged that the evidence used to justify the war was “murky” and now says that weapons of mass destruction weren’t the crucial issue anyway (see the book by Sheldon Rampton and John Stauber, Weapons of Mass Deception: the uses of propaganda in Bush’s war on Iraq (2003.)
      
      By contrast, Shadia Drury, professor of political theory at the University of Regina in Saskatchewan, argues that the use of deception and manipulation in current US policy flow directly from the doctrines of the political philosopher Leo Strauss (1899-1973). His disciples include Paul Wolfowitz and other neo-conservatives who have driven much of the political agenda of the Bush administration.
      
      If Shadia Drury is right, then American policy-makers exercise deception with greater coherence than their British allies in Tony Blair’s 10 Downing Street. In the UK, a public inquiry is currently underway into the death of the biological weapons expert David Kelly. A central theme is also whether the government deceived the public, as a BBC reporter suggested.
      
      The inquiry has documented at least some of the ways the prime minister’s entourage ‘sexed up’ the presentation of intelligence on the Iraqi threat. But few doubt that in terms of their philosophy, if they have one, members of Blair’s staff believe they must be trusted as honest. Any apparent deceptions they may be involved in are for them matters of presentation or ‘spin’: attempts to project an honest gloss when surrounded by a dishonest media.
      
      The deep influence of Leo Strauss’s ideas on the current architects of US foreign policy has been referred to, if sporadically, in the press (hence an insider witticism about the influence of “Leo-cons”). Christopher Hitchens, an ardent advocate of the war, wrote unashamedly in November 2002 (in an article felicitously titled Machiavelli in Mesopotamia) that:
      
      “[p]art of the charm of the regime-change argument (from the point of view of its supporters) is that it depends on premises and objectives that cannot, at least by the administration, be publicly avowed. Since Paul Wolfowitz is from the intellectual school of Leo Strauss – and appears in fictional guise as such in Saul Bellow’s novel Ravelstein – one may even suppose that he enjoys this arcane and occluded aspect of the debate.”
      Perhaps no scholar has done as much to illuminate the Strauss phenomenon as Shadia Drury. For fifteen years she has been shining a heat lamp on the Straussians with such books as The Political Ideas of Leo Strauss (1988) and Leo Strauss and the American Right (1997). She is also the author of Alexandre Kojève: the Roots of Postmodern Politics (1994) and Terror and Civilization (forthcoming).
      She argues that the central claims of Straussian thought wield a crucial influence on men of power in the contemporary United States. She elaborates her argument in this interview.
      
      A natural order of inequality
      
      Danny Postel: You’ve argued that there is an important connection between the teachings of Leo Strauss and the Bush administration’s selling of the Iraq war. What is that connection?
      
      Shadia Drury: Leo Strauss was a great believer in the efficacy and usefulness of lies in politics. Public support for the Iraq war rested on lies about Iraq posing an imminent threat to the United States – the business about weapons of mass destruction and a fictitious alliance between al-Qaida and the Iraqi regime. Now that the lies have been exposed, Paul Wolfowitz and others in the war party are denying that these were the real reasons for the war.
      
      So what were the real reasons? Reorganising the balance of power in the Middle East in favour of Israel? Expanding American hegemony in the Arab world? Possibly. But these reasons would not have been sufficient in themselves to mobilise American support for the war. And the Straussian cabal in the administration realised that.
      
      Danny Postel: The neo-conservative vision is commonly taken to be about spreading democracy and liberal values globally. And when Strauss is mentioned in the press, he is typically described as a great defender of liberal democracy against totalitarian tyranny. You’ve written, however, that Strauss had a “profound antipathy to both liberalism and democracy.”
      
      Shadia Drury: The idea that Strauss was a great defender of liberal democracy is laughable. I suppose that Strauss’s disciples consider it a noble lie. Yet many in the media have been gullible enough to believe it.
      
      How could an admirer of Plato and Nietzsche be a liberal democrat? The ancient philosophers whom Strauss most cherished believed that the unwashed masses were not fit for either truth or liberty, and that giving them these sublime treasures would be like throwing pearls before swine. In contrast to modern political thinkers, the ancients denied that there is any natural right to liberty. Human beings are born neither free nor equal. The natural human condition, they held, is not one of freedom, but of subordination – and in Strauss’s estimation they were right in thinking so.
      
      Praising the wisdom of the ancients and condemning the folly of the moderns was the whole point of Strauss’s most famous book, Natural Right and History. The cover of the book sports the American Declaration of Independence. But the book is a celebration of nature – not the natural rights of man (as the appearance of the book would lead one to believe) but the natural order of domination and subordination.
      
      The necessity of lies
      
      Danny Postel: What is the relevance of Strauss’s interpretation of Plato’s notion of the noble lie?
      
      Shadia Drury: Strauss rarely spoke in his own name. He wrote as a commentator on the classical texts of political theory. But he was an extremely opinionated and dualistic commentator. The fundamental distinction that pervades and informs all of his work is that between the ancients and the moderns. Strauss divided the history of political thought into two camps: the ancients (like Plato) are wise and wily, whereas the moderns (like Locke and other liberals) are vulgar and foolish. Now, it seems to me eminently fair and reasonable to attribute to Strauss the ideas he attributes to his beloved ancients.
      
      In Plato’s dialogues, everyone assumes that Socrates is Plato’s mouthpiece. But Strauss argues in his book The City and Man (pp. 74-5, 77, 83-4, 97, 100, 111) that Thrasymachus is Plato’s real mouthpiece (on this point, see also M.F. Burnyeat, “Sphinx without a Secret”, New York Review of Books, 30 May 1985 [paid-for only]). So, we must surmise that Strauss shares the insights of the wise Plato (alias Thrasymachus) that justice is merely the interest of the stronger; that those in power make the rules in their own interests and call it justice.
      
      Leo Strauss repeatedly defends the political realism of Thrasymachus and Machiavelli (see, for example, his Natural Right and History, p. 106). This view of the world is clearly manifest in the foreign policy of the current administration in the United States.
      
      A second fundamental belief of Strauss’s ancients has to do with their insistence on the need for secrecy and the necessity of lies. In his book Persecution and the Art of Writing, Strauss outlines why secrecy is necessary. He argues that the wise must conceal their views for two reasons – to spare the people’s feelings and to protect the elite from possible reprisals.
      
      The people will not be happy to learn that there is only one natural right – the right of the superior to rule over the inferior, the master over the slave, the husband over the wife, and the wise few over the vulgar many. In On Tyranny, Strauss refers to this natural right as the “tyrannical teaching” of his beloved ancients. It is tyrannical in the classic sense of rule above rule or in the absence of law (p. 70).
      
      Now, the ancients were determined to keep this tyrannical teaching secret because the people are not likely to tolerate the fact that they are intended for subordination; indeed, they may very well turn their resentment against the superior few. Lies are thus necessary to protect the superior few from the persecution of the vulgar many.
      
      The effect of Strauss’s teaching is to convince his acolytes that they are the natural ruling elite and the persecuted few. And it does not take much intelligence for them to surmise that they are in a situation of great danger, especially in a world devoted to the modern ideas of equal rights and freedoms. Now more than ever, the wise few must proceed cautiously and with circumspection. So, they come to the conclusion that they have a moral justification to lie in order to avoid persecution. Strauss goes so far as to say that dissembling and deception – in effect, a culture of lies – is the peculiar justice of the wise.
      
      Strauss justifies his position by an appeal to Plato’s concept of the noble lie. But in truth, Strauss has a very impoverished conception of Plato’s noble lie. Plato thought that the noble lie is a story whose details are fictitious; but at the heart of it is a profound truth.
      
      In the myth of metals, for example, some people have golden souls – meaning that they are more capable of resisting the temptations of power. And these morally trustworthy types are the ones who are most fit to rule. The details are fictitious, but the moral of the story is that not all human beings are morally equal.
      
      In contrast to this reading of Plato, Strauss thinks that the superiority of the ruling philosophers is an intellectual superiority and not a moral one (Natural Right and History, p. 151). For many commentators who (like Karl Popper) have read Plato as a totalitarian, the logical consequence is to doubt that philosophers can be trusted with political power. Those who read him this way invariably reject him. Strauss is the only interpreter who gives a sinister reading to Plato, and then celebrates him.
      
      The dialectic of fear and tyranny
      
      Danny Postel: In the Straussian scheme of things, there are the wise few and the vulgar many. But there is also a third group – the gentlemen. Would you explain how they figure?
      
      Shadia Drury: There are indeed three types of men: the wise, the gentlemen, and the vulgar. The wise are the lovers of the harsh, unadulterated truth. They are capable of looking into the abyss without fear and trembling. They recognise neither God nor moral imperatives. They are devoted above all else to their own pursuit of the “higher” pleasures, which amount to consorting with their “puppies” or young initiates.
      
      The second type, the gentlemen, are lovers of honour and glory. They are the most ingratiating towards the conventions of their society – that is, the illusions of the cave. They are true believers in God, honour, and moral imperatives. They are ready and willing to embark on acts of great courage and self-sacrifice at a moment’s notice.
      
      The third type, the vulgar many, are lovers of wealth and pleasure. They are selfish, slothful, and indolent. They can be inspired to rise above their brutish existence only by fear of impending death or catastrophe.
      
      Like Plato, Strauss believed that the supreme political ideal is the rule of the wise. But the rule of the wise is unattainable in the real world. Now, according to the conventional wisdom, Plato realised this, and settled for the rule of law. But Strauss did not endorse this solution entirely. Nor did he think that it was Plato’s real solution – Strauss pointed to the “nocturnal council” in Plato’s Laws to illustrate his point.
      
      The real Platonic solution as understood by Strauss is the covert rule of the wise (see Strauss’s – The Argument and the Action of Plato’s Laws). This covert rule is facilitated by the overwhelming stupidity of the gentlemen. The more gullible and unperceptive they are, the easier it is for the wise to control and manipulate them. Supposedly, Xenophon makes that clear to us.
      
      For Strauss, the rule of the wise is not about classic conservative values like order, stability, justice, or respect for authority. The rule of the wise is intended as an antidote to modernity. Modernity is the age in which the vulgar many have triumphed. It is the age in which they have come closest to having exactly what their hearts desire – wealth, pleasure, and endless entertainment. But in getting just what they desire, they have unwittingly been reduced to beasts.
      
      Nowhere is this state of affairs more advanced than in America. And the global reach of American culture threatens to trivialise life and turn it into entertainment. This was as terrifying a spectre for Strauss as it was for Alexandre Kojève and Carl Schmitt.
      
      This is made clear in Strauss’s exchange with Kojève (reprinted in Strauss’s On Tyranny), and in his commentary on Schmitt’s The Concept of the Political (reprinted in Heinrich Meier, Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss: The Hidden Dialogue). Kojève lamented the animalisation of man and Schmitt worried about the trivialisation of life. All three of them were convinced that liberal economics would turn life into entertainment and destroy politics; all three understood politics as a conflict between mutually hostile groups willing to fight each other to the death. In short, they all thought that man’s humanity depended on his willingness to rush naked into battle and headlong to his death. Only perpetual war can overturn the modern project, with its emphasis on self-preservation and “creature comforts.” Life can be politicised once more, and man’s humanity can be restored.
      
      This terrifying vision fits perfectly well with the desire for honour and glory that the neo-conservative gentlemen covet. It also fits very well with the religious sensibilities of gentlemen. The combination of religion and nationalism is the elixir that Strauss advocates as the way to turn natural, relaxed, hedonistic men into devout nationalists willing to fight and die for their God and country.
      
      I never imagined when I wrote my first book on Strauss that the unscrupulous elite that he elevates would ever come so close to political power, nor that the ominous tyranny of the wise would ever come so close to being realised in the political life of a great nation like the United States. But fear is the greatest ally of tyranny.
      
      Danny Postel: You’ve described Strauss as a nihilist.
      
      Shadia Drury: Strauss is a nihilist in the sense that he believes that there is no rational foundation for morality. He is an atheist, and he believes that in the absence of God, morality has no grounding. It’s all about benefiting others and oneself; there is no objective reason for doing so, only rewards and punishments in this life.
      
      But Strauss is not a nihilist if we mean by the term a denial that there is any truth, a belief that everything is interpretation. He does not deny that there is an independent reality. On the contrary, he thinks that independent reality consists in nature and its “order of rank” – the high and the low, the superior and the inferior. Like Nietzsche, he believes that the history of western civilisation has led to the triumph of the inferior, the rabble – something they both lamented profoundly.
      
      Danny Postel: This connection is curious, since Strauss is bedevilled by Nietzsche; and one of Strauss’s most famous students, Allan Bloom, fulminates profusely in his book The Closing of the American Mind against the influence of Nietzsche and Martin Heidegger.
      
      Shadia Drury: Strauss’s criticism of the existentialists, especially Heidegger, is that they tried to elicit an ethic out of the abyss. This was the ethic of resoluteness – choose whatever you like and be loyal to it to the death; its content does not matter. But Strauss’s reaction to moral nihilism was different. Nihilistic philosophers, he believes, should reinvent the Jud?o-Christian God, but live like pagan gods themselves – taking pleasure in the games they play with each other as well as the games they play on ordinary mortals.
      
      The question of nihilism is complicated, but there is no doubt that Strauss’s reading of Plato entails that the philosophers should return to the cave and manipulate the images (in the form of media, magazines, newspapers). They know full well that the line they espouse is mendacious, but they are convinced that theirs are noble lies.
      
      The intoxication of perpetual war
      
      Danny Postel: You characterise the outlook of the Bush administration as a kind of realism, in the spirit of Thrasymachus and Machiavelli. But isn’t the real divide within the administration (and on the American right more generally) more complex: between foreign policy realists, who are pragmatists, and neo-conservatives, who see themselves as idealists – even moralists – on a mission to topple tyrants, and therefore in a struggle against realism?
      
      Shadia Drury: I think that the neo-conservatives are for the most part genuine in wanting to spread the American commercial model of liberal democracy around the globe. They are convinced that it is the best thing, not just for America, but for the world. Naturally, there is a tension between these “idealists” and the more hard-headed realists within the administration.
      
      I contend that the tensions and conflicts within the current administration reflect the differences between the surface teaching, which is appropriate for gentlemen, and the ‘nocturnal’ or covert teaching, which the philosophers alone are privy to. It is very unlikely for an ideology inspired by a secret teaching to be entirely coherent.
      
      The issue of nationalism is an example of this. The philosophers, wanting to secure the nation against its external enemies as well as its internal decadence, sloth, pleasure, and consumption, encourage a strong patriotic fervour among the honour-loving gentlemen who wield the reins of power. That strong nationalistic spirit consists in the belief that their nation and its values are the best in the world, and that all other cultures and their values are inferior in comparison.
      
      Irving Kristol, the father of neo-conservatism and a Strauss disciple, denounced nationalism in a 1973 essay; but in another essay written in 1983, he declared that the foreign policy of neo-conservatism must reflect its nationalist proclivities. A decade on, in a 1993 essay, he claimed that “religion, nationalism, and economic growth are the pillars of neoconservatism.” (See “The Coming ‘Conservative Century’”, in Neoconservatism: the autobiography of an idea, p. 365.)
      
      In Reflections of a Neoconservative (p. xiii), Kristol wrote that:
      
      “patriotism springs from love of the nation’s past; nationalism arises out of hope for the nation’s future, distinctive greatness…. Neoconservatives believe… that the goals of American foreign policy must go well beyond a narrow, too literal definition of ‘national security’. It is the national interest of a world power, as this is defined by a sense of national destiny … not a myopic national security”.
      The same sentiment was echoed by the doyen of contemporary Straussianism, Harry Jaffa, when he said that America is the “Zion that will light up all the world.”
      It is easy to see how this sort of thinking can get out of hand, and why hard-headed realists tend to find it na?ve if not dangerous.
      
      But Strauss’s worries about America’s global aspirations are entirely different. Like Heidegger, Schmitt, and Kojève, Strauss would be more concerned that America would succeed in this enterprise than that it would fail. In that case, the “l(fā)ast man” would extinguish all hope for humanity (Nietzsche); the “night of the world” would be at hand (Heidegger); the animalisation of man would be complete (Kojève); and the trivialisation of life would be accomplished (Schmitt). That is what the success of America’s global aspirations meant to them.
      
      Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man is a popularisation of this viewpoint. It sees the coming catastrophe of American global power as inevitable, and seeks to make the best of a bad situation. It is far from a celebration of American dominance.
      
      On this perverse view of the world, if America fails to achieve her “national destiny”, and is mired in perpetual war, then all is well. Man’s humanity, defined in terms of struggle to the death, is rescued from extinction. But men like Heidegger, Schmitt, Kojève, and Strauss expect the worst. They expect that the universal spread of the spirit of commerce would soften manners and emasculate man. To my mind, this fascistic glorification of death and violence springs from a profound inability to celebrate life, joy, and the sheer thrill of existence.
      
      To be clear, Strauss was not as hostile to democracy as he was to liberalism. This is because he recognises that the vulgar masses have numbers on their side, and the sheer power of numbers cannot be completely ignored. Whatever can be done to bring the masses along is legitimate. If you can use democracy to turn the masses against their own liberty, this is a great triumph. It is the sort of tactic that neo-conservatives use consistently, and in some cases very successfully.
      
      Among the Straussians
      
      Danny Postel: Finally, I’d like to ask about your interesting reception among the Straussians. Many of them dismiss your interpretation of Strauss and denounce your work in the most adamant terms (“bizarre splenetic”). Yet one scholar, Laurence Lampert, has reprehended his fellow Straussians for this, writing in his Leo Strauss and Nietzsche that your book The Political Ideas of Leo Strauss “contains many fine skeptical readings of Strauss’s texts and acute insights into Strauss’s real intentions.” Harry Jaffa has even made the provocative suggestion that you might be a “closet Straussian” yourself!
      
      Shadia Drury: I have been publicly denounced and privately adored. Following the publication of my book The Political Ideas of Leo Strauss in 1988, letters and gifts poured in from Straussian graduate students and professors all over North America – books, dissertations, tapes of Strauss’s Hillel House lectures in Chicago, transcripts of every course he ever taught at the university, and even a personally crafted Owl of Minerva with a letter declaring me a goddess of wisdom! They were amazed that an outsider could have penetrated the secret teaching. They sent me unpublished material marked with clear instructions not to distribute to “suspicious persons”.
      
      I received letters from graduate students in Toronto, Chicago, Duke, Boston College, Claremont, Fordham, and other Straussian centres of “l(fā)earning.” One of the students compared his experience in reading my work with “a person lost in the wilderness who suddenly happens on a map.” Some were led to abandon their schools in favour of fresher air; but others were delighted to discover what it was they were supposed to believe in order to belong to the charmed circle of future philosophers and initiates.
      
      After my first book on Strauss came out, some of the Straussians in Canada dubbed me the “bitch from Calgary.” Of all the titles I hold, that is the one I cherish most. The hostility toward me was understandable. Nothing is more threatening to Strauss and his acolytes than the truth in general and the truth about Strauss in particular. His admirers are determined to conceal the truth about his ideas.
      
      My intention in writing the book was to express Strauss’s ideas clearly and without obfuscation so that his views could become the subject of philosophical debate and criticism, and not the stuff of feverish conviction. I wanted to smoke the Straussians out of their caves and into the philosophical light of day. But instead of engaging me in philosophical debate, they denied that Strauss stood for any of the ideas I attributed to him.
      
      Laurence Lampert is the only Straussian to declare valiantly that it is time to stop playing games and to admit that Strauss was indeed a Nietzschean thinker – that it is time to stop the denial and start defending Strauss’s ideas.
      
      I suspect that Lampert’s honesty is threatening to those among the Straussians who are interested in philosophy but who seek power. There is no doubt that open and candid debate about Strauss is likely to undermine their prospects in Washington.
      
      
      --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      
      
      
      Who is Leo Strauss?
      Leo Strauss was born in 1899 in the region of Hessen, Germany, the son of a Jewish small businessman. He went to secondary school in Marburg and served as an interpreter in the German army in the first world war. He was awarded a doctorate at Hamburg University in 1921 for a thesis on philosophy that was supervised by Ernst Cassirer.
      
      Strauss’s post-doctoral work involved study of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, and in 1930 he published his first book, on Spinoza’s critique of religion; his second, on the 12th century Jewish philosopher Maimonides, was published in 1935. After a research period in London, he published The Political Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes in 1936.
      
      In 1937, he moved to Columbia University, and from 1938 to 1948 taught political science and philosophy at the New School for Social Research, New York. During this period he wrote On Tyranny (1948) and Persecution and the Art of Writing (1952).
      
      In 1949, he became professor of political philosophy at the University of Chicago, and remained there for twenty years. His works of this period include Natural Right and History (1953), Thoughts on Machiavelli (1958), What is Political Philosophy? (1959), The City and Man (1964), Socrates and Aristophanes (1966), and Liberalism Ancient and Modern (1968).
      
      Between 1968 and 1973, Strauss taught in colleges in California and Maryland, and completed work on Xenophon’s Socratic discourses and Argument and Action of Plato’s Laws (1975). After his death in October 1973, the essay collection Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy (1983) was published.
      
      Recommended articles on Leo Strauss, neo-conservatism, and Iraq
      
      M.F. Burnyeat, “Sphinx without a Secret”, New York Review of Books, 30 May 1985 [paid-for only]
      
      Stephen Holmes, “Truths for Philosophers Alone?”, Times Literary Supplement, 1-7 December 1989; reprinted in Stephen Holmes, The Anatomy of Antiliberalism (1996)
      
      Robert B. Pippin, “The Modern World of Leo Strauss,” Political Theory Vol. 20 No. 3 (August 1992) [affiliate only]
      
      Gregory Bruce Smith, “Leo Strauss and the Straussians: An Anti-democratic Cult?”, PS: Political Science & Politics Vol. 30 No. 2 (June 1997) [affiliate only]
      
      Michiko Kakutani, “How Books Have Shaped U.S. Policy,” The New York Times, 5 April 2003 [paid-for only]
      
      Alain Frachon and Daniel Vernet, “The Strategist and the Philosopher”, Le Monde, 15 April 2003
      
      James Atlas, “A Classicist’s Legacy: New Empire Builders,” The New York Times, 4 May 2003 [paid-for only]
      
      Jeet Heer, “The Philosopher,” The Boston Globe, 11 May 2003 [paid-for only]
      
      Jim Lobe, “The Strong Must Rule the Weak: A Philosopher for an Empire,” Foreign Policy in Focus, 12 May 2003
      
      Seymour Hersh, “Selective Intelligence,” The New Yorker, 12 May 2003
      
      William Pfaff, “The long reach of Leo Strauss”, International Herald Tribune, 15 May 2003
      
      Peter Berkowitz, “What Hath Strauss Wrought?”, Weekly Standard, 2 June 2003
      
      “Philosophers and kings,” The Economist, 19 June 2003
      
      Steven Lenzner & William Kristol, “What was Leo Strauss up to?”, The Public Interest, Fall 2003
      
      Laura Rozen “Con Tract: the theory behind neocon self-deception”, Washington Monthly, October 2003
      
      Copyright ? Danny Postel, 2007 2003. Published by http://www.opendemocracy.net
      
      
  •     ——一個偏執(zhí)的自由主義者的妄想
      德魯里女士“令人驚訝的”羅列出一長串曾經(jīng)或仍舊活躍于美國政治舞臺上的所謂施特勞斯主義者的名單,這些人身居要職、名聲顯赫;她也沒有忘記為共和黨起草綱領(lǐng)性文件《與美國的契約》(The Contract with America)的議會發(fā)言人紐特?金里奇(Newt Gingrich)寓所里長期聚集的基督教聯(lián)盟的說客;當(dāng)然,她還提到《紐約時報》的一個說法:“施特勞斯是1994年共和黨《與美國的契約》之政綱的教父。”德魯里女士豐富的聯(lián)想能力讓她從這些千絲萬縷的關(guān)聯(lián)中感到一陣巨大恐懼,她發(fā)現(xiàn)廣大美國人民很可能生活在被一個叫作施特勞斯的猶太裔德國流亡學(xué)者一手編織、培育起來的邪惡軸心組織的陰謀統(tǒng)治下,即便這個陰謀還沒實現(xiàn),但如果不將它戳穿,災(zāi)難終會到來,整個自由民主政體將岌岌可危。
      德魯里女士這番杞人之憂與被她斥為新保守主義與之有共同喜好的反猶分子帕特?羅伯特的異想天開堪稱伯仲,后者將世界歷史敘述為猶太人、共濟會員和國際金融家的一場陰謀。當(dāng)然羅伯特的奇思妙想遠非首創(chuàng),自中世紀以來就有種種類似攻擊猶太人的謠言,20世紀初在俄國流傳、后來成為希特勒迫害猶太人的口實、至今仍被哈馬斯憲章采納的《猶太賢士議定書》是其最著名的版本。德魯里女士倒也謙虛地承認新聞記者們早就揭露出施特勞斯主義者自老布什政府以來對美國政策產(chǎn)生了令人不安的影響,不過,她大概想成為學(xué)院里的“深喉”,“施特勞斯門事件”的揭密英雄。正如美國記者們將水門事件視為典范,從而將此后的諸多政府陰謀和丑聞冠之以“門”的稱號,德魯里女士也從中發(fā)現(xiàn)了政治陰謀的好萊塢式樣板劇情,她用這種劇情描畫施特勞斯所產(chǎn)生的思想影響。
      可惜的是,政治思想并非如政治事件那樣可以發(fā)現(xiàn)確鑿的因果實證,德魯里女士于是使用了危險而可疑的“邏輯思路”——施特勞斯的政治哲學(xué)與美國新保守主義的意識形態(tài)有著必然的邏輯關(guān)聯(lián),他們分享共同的核心論題,施特勞斯的思想潛藏著“政治操縱”的主題。順著這條邏輯思路,她順藤摸瓜揪住了施特勞斯的思想源頭:他對猶太遺產(chǎn)的繼承,他的德國淵源海德格爾和施米特。后兩位與納粹擺不脫的干系尤其讓德魯里女士興奮不已,顯然,證明了施特勞斯與他們的思想親緣,也就坐實了他與極權(quán)統(tǒng)治的曖昧糾葛。所以,在討論海德格爾思想與納粹的關(guān)系問題時,德魯里女士一方面借助施特勞斯對海德格爾的批判:海德格爾的哲學(xué)直接將他導(dǎo)向納粹,一方面又力圖證明施特勞斯并不像他自己認為的那樣與自己的老師劃清了界線。(p79以下)她搬起施特勞斯的石頭砸了施特勞斯的腳,非常聰明,在貶低了施特勞斯的智商后她確實顯得很聰明。
      事實上,這種精神連坐法的伎倆并不鮮見,德魯里女士的自由主義前輩卡爾?波普爾在《開放社會及其敵人》一書中就將自柏拉圖至馬克思的諸多哲人劃歸為歷史主義者,把他們看作極權(quán)主義的思想根源,統(tǒng)統(tǒng)打入開放社會的敵人陣營。從德魯里女士的一句叫囂——“毫無疑問,德國浪漫主義促成了德意志民族病態(tài)的民族主義,并點燃了對猶太人殺氣騰騰的仇恨”(p46)——中,仍然可以聽到波普爾的回音。波普爾堅定的敵友劃分為他在冷戰(zhàn)時期贏得了英國女王授予的爵士頭銜,誰來為德魯里女士戴上英雄的桂冠呢?她為了給前輩報一箭之仇嗎?波普爾上個世紀50年代謀求芝加哥大學(xué)教職時,曾被施特勞斯和另一位政治哲學(xué)家沃格林(Eric Voegelin)聯(lián)手封殺,在兩位思想家看來,波普爾純粹是不學(xué)無術(shù)之徒。并不需要深入分析,想像一下,一位柏拉圖學(xué)者皓首窮經(jīng)鉆研柏翁思想,波普爾卻在一本著作中將諸多思想大家逐一批判,著實讓人生疑。德魯里繼承了波普爾的惡習(xí),相比施特勞斯一生埋首解讀經(jīng)典,筆耕不輟,她研究施特勞斯的著作從1988年到1997年不過薄薄兩本,便號稱批判施特勞斯。中譯前言倒也明言,德魯里在“學(xué)術(shù)上”不一定有多大貢獻,可還是給她戴了頂“敏感的洞察”的高帽子。這位近20年前寫了本研究一個當(dāng)時鮮為人知的學(xué)院知識分子的著作(《列奧?施特勞斯的政治思想》)的女士,十多年后借著媒體炒作以這一本口水論戰(zhàn)集儼然成了“公共知識界”施特勞斯專家的人有著怎樣的敏感洞察呢?
      這種邏輯推進如何面對尼采的這一反駁:尼采在《道德的譜系》開篇說到,所有思想都在至深根源上纏繞交織,一棵樹木必然生出同一種果實,“我們的果實合你們的口味嗎?但這與那棵樹有何想干?這與我們,我們哲人有何想干?”德魯里女士會喊到:“砍掉那棵樹!讓‘自戀的’哲人閉嘴!”
      并非只有德魯里女士會使用思想株連罪式的審判。德魯里批判的敵人卡爾?施米特1939年寫下一篇文章《中立與中立化——評施泰丁的〈帝國與歐洲文化之病〉》,標(biāo)題中提到的著作將布克哈特、尼采、格奧爾格、托馬斯?曼、弗洛伊德和卡爾?巴特等人一應(yīng)劃入“其終極目的為非政治化、中立化、無決斷狀態(tài)、虛無主義,而最后則是布爾什維主義的文化陣線里”,1939年的施米特仍舊明白混雜樹敵的可疑,他提到一句俗語“不要審判,免得你們自己受審判”。德魯里女士顯然沒聽過這句經(jīng)驗之談,于是她也不得不接受“審判”——用思想株連罪對待一個人是輕而易舉的勾當(dāng),欲加之罪,何患無辭呢?從參加一戰(zhàn)的德國士兵背包里發(fā)現(xiàn)最多的是格奧爾格詩集,荷爾徳林詩集被像彈藥一樣送上二戰(zhàn)戰(zhàn)場,于是二者與好戰(zhàn)成性的德意志民族主義不僅有邏輯關(guān)聯(lián)還有歷史關(guān)聯(lián),那么從參加越戰(zhàn)的美國大兵褲兜里搜出《花花公子》能說明什么呢?美利堅民族色情狂式的帝國主義嗎?
      況且以子之矛攻子之盾,并非全然無理。德魯里女士一心擁護的自由主義憑什么能逃脫這種邏輯審查?她要讓我們唱一曲自由主義的贊歌嗎?“自由啊并且主義!過往一切思想都骯臟無比,唯有你純潔無暇,有如處女!”
      因此她指責(zé)布魯姆混淆了自由主義現(xiàn)實與自由主義理想,否認“美國自由社會是自由主義理想的現(xiàn)實體現(xiàn),或是這些理念的邏輯的、不可避免的結(jié)果”,她仍舊保持對資本瘋狂逐利、個人生活的冷漠放縱和虛無主義的批評。(p134)奇怪,這些不正是她所尊敬的密爾所說的為了自由必須付出的代價嗎?甚至這些不就是自由主義的自由本身嗎?難道,德魯里女士有著更高尚、更光榮的自由主義理想,更崇高的夢幻?若是那樣,“為崇高的夢幻忍受痛苦,當(dāng)然比受益于骯臟的現(xiàn)實并搖擺其間更高貴”,施特勞斯這句讓她嘲笑的話對她這樣的自由主義者倒更合適。
      什么樣的自由主義者呢?偽自由主義者!這位偽自由主義者處處表示出道德義憤?;闹?!自由主義者有什么資格就道德問題發(fā)表見解?對于自由主義者只有嚴格的、實證的合法性,只有法律維護的個人權(quán)利,除此而外談?wù)撌裁磦€人道德?自由主義者沒有理由指責(zé)任何一組約束條件下個人的自利行為,只要當(dāng)時的法律允許,即使背叛、告密、出賣也無罪。德魯里女士卻為了印證自己的道德崇高感表示出對寫下《鮮花圣母》、《玫瑰奇跡》的“皮條客、同性戀者、小偷和向納粹領(lǐng)賞的告密者”圣?熱內(nèi)的不齒,以此證明存在主義的極端個人主義倫理學(xué)“違背傳統(tǒng)和人類共享的行為準則”,甚至不惜拉出美國詩人愛默生一塊陪斬,因為后者鼓勵人們忠實于內(nèi)心魔鬼的聲音。(p80)德魯里不是誠實的自由主義者,誠實的自由主義者必定是相對主義者,相對的相對主義者或絕對的相對主義者,前者保留自己的價值觀,但也不對其他價值觀發(fā)表意見,后者沒有任何自己的價值觀,什么都可以,只要不犯法,虛無主義者是他的另一個名稱。自由主義者只能堅守一個中立領(lǐng)域——技術(shù)化計算的經(jīng)濟利益領(lǐng)域。
      亞里士多德說,憤怒是唯一需要陳辭和說理的激情。研究施米特的邁爾問過,施米特的道德義憤來自何處,他深究了施米特堅定的啟示信仰。德魯里女士的道德義憤卻是無源之水、無本之木。
      德魯里女士時不時嘲笑對手是玩火自焚的魔法小學(xué)徒,其實她自己更像。她聲稱美國立國思想沒有任何亞里士多德的東西,因為他設(shè)定了某種特定的善,而獨立宣言奠定下的個人權(quán)利優(yōu)先于任何給定善,(p129)那么自由主義肯定不是為了追求某種善好的生活,是為自由而自由。她也確實說自由和美德具有同等價值,人們卻必須在二者之間排出次序,自由主義者選擇了自由,便坦然面對美德的喪失。(p130)可令人困惑的是,她又承認不同政治共同體可能代表相互沖突、不可公度的善(p107),一會兒又說還有傳統(tǒng)和人類共享的行為準則。她引證德沃金對商業(yè)主義的批評,批評商業(yè)放縱危及個人自由,個人將自己的信念和傳統(tǒng)傳給其子孫的自由。(p134)這個批評本就站不住腳,難道德魯里女士的子女混亂放蕩時她該打他們屁股嗎?
      在美德和自由之間進行選擇一說在更致命的一點讓德魯里女士自打耳光。既然承認她的右派對手有選擇美德的自由,作為一位自由主義者為什么不維護這種自由呢?她沒有古典自由主義者們“雖然不同意你的意見,卻誓死捍衛(wèi)你說話的權(quán)利”的風(fēng)度,立刻指稱選擇美德就會扼殺自由(p156),引申的結(jié)論自然是必須撲滅右派將美國推上美德之路的自由。
      德魯里女士還處處表白自己的真誠——對真誠信仰的真誠贊美(p53),對施特勞斯掩蓋丑陋真理的“高貴謊言”表示惡心。可真誠的基督徒一旦加入右派民團,真誠的清教徒一旦放棄自由主義,她就無法忍受了。她會立刻猜測,一定有人在背后操縱。她同樣拒絕海德格爾對個人本真性的追求,大概在她看來,要真誠,但不要足夠真誠??磥硎撬皇鞘┨貏谒埂吧钍芤环N自欺的嚴重狀況的折磨”,忍受著“嚴重性格變態(tài)的靈魂謊言的痛苦”。(p65)
      學(xué)術(shù)上的淺薄無知更讓人無法忍受。僅僅因為施特勞斯對哲學(xué)之愛欲(Eros)的重視,她便譏誚施特勞斯的思想誨淫誨盜、充滿色情。(p67)當(dāng)她讀過萊辛的幾部劇作后便自認為理解了萊辛要說的一切,她說萊辛沒有隱秘的思想,萊辛相信理性可以解決宗教的爭端,(p48-53)可我們至少從狄爾泰研究德國文學(xué)的名著《體驗與詩》中就能看到支持施特勞斯的說法(《體驗與詩》,三聯(lián)2003年版,p19,p76以下)。她對尼采的了解大概僅僅限于超人和金發(fā)野獸這兩個名號。她洋洋自得地聲稱自己曾指出施特勞斯的自然法概念是馬基雅維利式的“結(jié)果論”,也許她的邏輯也不大好,自由主義的功利主義和實用主義色彩何曾擺脫過這種結(jié)果論?
      對施特勞斯學(xué)派的批判性研究自然值得展開,可惜德魯里這本書粗制濫造、一無是處。也許有人認為她揭露了施特勞斯派的政治野心,而施特勞斯是個古典學(xué)者,他的學(xué)生們也該老老實實呆在學(xué)院里做學(xué)問。難道自由主義學(xué)者進行公共討論就是維護正義與自由,施特勞斯的弟子們介入政治就是別有用心?德魯里總結(jié)的新保守主義之“新”也毫無新意:她認為新保守主義喪失了老保守主義的溫和與謙遜,變得激進而危險。且不說激進保守主義早就不是什么新鮮事物,哈貝馬斯1980年的觀點:始于施特勞斯的“舊保守主義”,“首先是不讓自己受文化現(xiàn)代性的絲毫污染”(《現(xiàn)代性:一個尚未完成的規(guī)劃》),已經(jīng)明確其激進特征。但思想上的激進未必代表實踐的激進,德魯里過度強調(diào)右派的激進特征方才顯得激進,一種急于將對手置諸死地的激進。德魯里女士揚言自由辯論能實現(xiàn)真理,但她總顯得真理在握。比起布魯姆坦誠“帕斯卡說我們知道的太少因而當(dāng)不了獨斷論者,但又因為知道得太多不能成為懷疑主義者,這個說法完美描述了我們現(xiàn)在真實經(jīng)歷的人類狀況”(《巨人與侏儒》,華夏2003年版,p300),德魯里顯得毫無風(fēng)度。美國公共政治辯論如果都是如此水準,實在讓人泄氣。
      [美]德魯里著:《列奧?施特勞斯與美國右派》,劉華等譯,新星出版社,2006年7月,20元。
      
  •     列奧·施特勞斯將繼續(xù)熱下去,起碼在小布什下臺之前注定如此。《列奧·施特勞斯與美國右派》算得上趕得上末班車的施氏思想快速入門書。遺憾的是,作者莎蒂亞·B·德魯里(加拿大)既將施特勞斯過分簡單化了,且沒有抓住他的關(guān)鍵之處。當(dāng)年科耶夫說此公之說為“神學(xué)”,伯林稱其有“魔眼”,都是極敏銳之士的極敏銳之評,非一般人可做到的。
      〈南方都市報〉今天有一篇談此書的評論。其中說到施特勞斯的學(xué)生阿蘭·布魯姆(Allan Bloom)。文中似乎把他和哈羅德·布魯姆(Harold Bloom)混淆了。此書的翻譯也頗成問題,一本書中,布魯姆的名字一會兒是阿蘭,一會兒是艾倫,有的翻譯更是與原意相反,叫人莫衷一是。
  •   極權(quán)主義作為人類歷史上已知的最大災(zāi)難,早已被納入最不政治正確的垃圾堆一列。然而可笑的是,為了在政治上獲得自己的話語權(quán),如今的各大黨派紛紛將與自己意見不合的人扣上極權(quán)的帽子,卻忽略了唯有經(jīng)濟社會思想等的全盤控制才能被定義為極權(quán)主義。這種政治正確的泛濫,反而消解了這個話題的嚴肅性。
  •   總要給人家一個自我辯護的機會,說自己高尚就高尚了,就noble了?我看不出魯麗怎么歪曲施特勞斯了。
  •   說得Strauss好可怕,正好我是要被藏起來不給知道的那個平民百姓……
  •   這也是一篇毫無風(fēng)度的評論。中國施特勞斯門徒(世界上最龐大的一群)很沒風(fēng)度的一篇杰作。
  •   呵呵,自由主義者有什么資格就道德問題發(fā)表見解?對于自由主義者只有嚴格的、實證的合法性,只有法律維護的個人權(quán)利,除此而外談?wù)撌裁磦€人道德?自由主義者沒有理由指責(zé)任何一組約束條件下個人的自利行為,只要當(dāng)時的法律允許,即使背叛、告密、出賣也無罪。
    ===============================================
    這個我不贊成。
  •   自由主義者不是不能發(fā)表道德問題的見解,而是作為一個自由主義者不能以在公共領(lǐng)域反對自由主義的政治學(xué)說的基礎(chǔ),否則還做什么自由主義者。他可以以公民或私人的身份,但是不是自由主義的身份在公共領(lǐng)域發(fā)表違背自由主義主張的言論,就如同共產(chǎn)主義者不能在公共言論中支持自由主義一樣,私下言論卻不一樣。這才是自由主義者的理想。
    不要隨便說什么施特勞斯門徒,這個詞難道和自由主義者一樣,成為一個黨派了。
  •   施特勞斯...施米特...海德格爾...尼采...這些人啊...都是好的文學(xué)家...不要把他們扯進政治...政治是骯臟的
  •    事實上,這種精神連坐法的伎倆并不鮮見,德魯里女士的自由主義前輩卡爾?波普爾在《開放社會及其敵人》一書中就將自柏拉圖至馬克思的諸多哲人劃歸為歷史主義者,把他們看作極權(quán)主義的思想根源,統(tǒng)統(tǒng)打入開放社會的敵人陣營。
    ————————————
    我想作為一種譜系學(xué)的寫作方法,寫思想史的人都在尋找歷史上的思想脈絡(luò),這是無法避免的。思想史不是general history,確實無法找到你要的那種直接證據(jù),因為并不是每個思想家都寫日記或者自述師承,也不是每個由此習(xí)慣的思想家的日記都完好地保存了下來。有這樣的自述是最好了,如果沒有,思想史的做法就不得不有點你說的“精神連坐法”的意味了。布魯姆不是在《美國精神的封閉》里也使用了相同的譜系學(xué)方法么?
  •   如同鞭炮一樣的憤青語言,對施特勞斯如圣人般不假思索的崇拜,思維膚淺的批評
  •   太陽曬善人也曬惡人。。。
  •   確實翻譯得極差,提不起閱讀的興致。內(nèi)容本身也很糟。
  •   說不上"極差"吧,劉擎老師統(tǒng)校過,但畢竟不是一個人翻譯的.作者立場非常鮮明,本來就不是給中國人"啟蒙"用的.
    自己把毒藥當(dāng)補藥喝,怪誰呢?
 

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