交往行為理論

用戶評(píng)論 (總計(jì)10條)

•   　　viii the history of postwar philosophy
  　　p1 （不是基于理性，而是希望從社會(huì)科學(xué)角度來進(jìn)行研究）確實(shí)是旁征博引。
  　　p143(對(duì)于Weber的回顧)
  　　p144 Horkheimer,Adorno,Marcuse用Weber的視角來解釋Marx.
  　　p168 結(jié)合對(duì)韋伯的研究來進(jìn)行讀解。
•   　　 這套書讀了10來天了，很辛苦的說。最終還在某種的迷茫中部分逃離，雖然期間也不乏喜悅。
  　　
  　　 曹衛(wèi)東譯本尚好。有個(gè)英譯本對(duì)照就足夠了。但曹的序言卻有點(diǎn)誤導(dǎo)，說是“是一部過渡性的著作”，實(shí)際上應(yīng)該是“基礎(chǔ)性的著作”，communicative action是哈貝馬斯理論的基石，無論從批判角度，還是從建構(gòu)性角度。
  　　
  　　 Habermas之廣博讓人五體投地，同時(shí)卻以讓人極端畏懼的方式寫作：德意志式的、淵博的才華橫溢的卻又冷冰冰的、毫無同情心也毫無節(jié)制的寫作方法。當(dāng)他涉入任何一個(gè)分論題的時(shí)候【W(wǎng)eber, Searle,Parsons, wittgenstein, Mead, Durkheim，Lukacs, Horkheimer,Adorno, Austin ,Mycintyre, Rawls， Piaget,】都以一流的專業(yè)性和一流的篇幅來予以處理，總體的效果卻是讓那些弱智的追隨者被遺棄在漫長而艱辛的馬拉松思想之旅中悲嘆甚至折磨致死。再考慮到語言翻譯的問題，這一困難簡直是災(zāi)難性的了。
  　　
  　　 第一部分“導(dǎo)論”中, Habermas說，理性【rationality】構(gòu)成了哲學(xué)的基本問題：隨著科學(xué)和反思意識(shí)的發(fā)展，哲學(xué)變成或收縮成為元哲學(xué)，其中保持穩(wěn)定的就是“認(rèn)知、語言理解和行為中的合理性的形式前提”，也即是合理性理論【theory of rationality,p2】；隨即哈貝馬斯沿著社會(huì)學(xué)的路徑去介入合理性問題?！驹诖?，sociology不是今天已經(jīng)高度分化和體制化的社會(huì)學(xué)，而是一種特定的社會(huì)理論，試圖解釋“現(xiàn)代生活世界合理化的增長過程”（p.6）】
  　　 第一節(jié)“rationality: a preliminary specification”中，哈貝馬斯比較了認(rèn)知-工具理性和交往理性，并將前者契入后者之中，從而形成了某種較為寬泛的“合理性”：范圍涵蓋斷言行為、規(guī)范行為、表達(dá)行為和評(píng)價(jià)行為。這四者一起構(gòu)成交往實(shí)踐，特點(diǎn)是共識(shí)，且建立在主體間對(duì)可批判地檢驗(yàn)的有效性要求的認(rèn)可上（rests on the inter-subjective recognition of criticizable validity claim）。
  　　 第二節(jié)比較了神話世界觀和現(xiàn)代世界觀的特點(diǎn)。在分析神話世界觀的時(shí)候，采納了Levi-Strauss及其弟子Godelier的理論。“先人們毫無戒備地把自己奉獻(xiàn)給無法主宰的周圍偶然世界，神話思維在敘事中解釋世界，在想象中把握世界”（p.47-48）。當(dāng)世界逐漸去魅（disenchantment）時(shí)候，自然和社會(huì)就在反思中分化了。這一變遷伴隨著基本概念系統(tǒng)的變化，而哈貝馬斯則試圖在其中為交往理性提供一個(gè)關(guān)鍵的位置：聯(lián)結(jié)de-centered worldview與有效性要求。
  　　 第三節(jié)則沿著上述思路，分析四種行為概念：目的[和策略]行為對(duì)應(yīng)著客觀世界；規(guī)范調(diào)節(jié)的行為對(duì)應(yīng)著社會(huì)世界；戲劇行為（dramaturgical action）對(duì)應(yīng)著主觀世界；而交往行為則對(duì)應(yīng)著某種原初的生活世界（lifeworld）。后一種行為把三個(gè)世界概念合成一個(gè)體系，可以用于達(dá)成溝通的解釋框架。
  　　
  　　
  　　第二部分討論Max Weber的合理化理論?；蛟S這里提供了Weber研究的最好的也最精致的導(dǎo)游圖。Weber擺脫了孔多塞的啟蒙的理性主義和19世紀(jì)的歷史進(jìn)化論，在一種科學(xué)的語境中來理解現(xiàn)代社會(huì)的合理化過程。這里分為四個(gè)小論題：西方理性主義；宗教-形而上學(xué)的去魅與現(xiàn)代意識(shí)的形成；社會(huì)合理化與新教倫理；法的合理化。應(yīng)該強(qiáng)調(diào)了Weber對(duì)工具理性過度發(fā)展即所謂官僚化‘鐵籠’的擔(dān)憂。
  　　
  　　第三部分借助Austin和searle的語言分析的討論而開展哈氏的形式語用學(xué)（formal pragmatics）的建構(gòu)，為交往理性奠定某種語言學(xué)、方法論和知識(shí)論基礎(chǔ)。得到強(qiáng)調(diào)的是“以言行事的行為【illokutionary action】”，是交往的基礎(chǔ)。
  　　
  　　第四部分討論了馬克思主義者Lukacs、Horkheimer, Adorno等對(duì)weber官僚化命題的接納。進(jìn)一步發(fā)展為物化（reification）這一悲觀的命題。意義和自由都喪失了：就前者而言，工具理性喪失了道德基礎(chǔ)；就后者而言，阿多諾的“受到控制的世界【verwaltete welt】”和韋伯的“鐵籠”是一樣，個(gè)性萎縮, Horkheimer說，只有聽命于環(huán)境了，面對(duì)工具合理性的技術(shù)世界，人已經(jīng)微不足道，徹底邊緣化了。在分析中，哈氏也注入了淡淡的信心的光芒“扎根在言語有效性當(dāng)中的合理性潛能才是核心所在。這種合理性潛能永遠(yuǎn)不會(huì)完全枯竭”。【P321】
  　　 為了提供新的可能性，在這一部分的最后一部分，哈貝馬斯指出，為了擺脫絕望，必須擺脫意識(shí)哲學(xué)范式【paradigm of consciousness philosophy】，借助語言學(xué)走向主體間性【inter-subjectivity】，“有了主體間性，個(gè)體之間才能自由交往，個(gè)體才能通過與自我進(jìn)行自由交流才能找到自己的認(rèn)同，才可以在沒有強(qiáng)制的情況下實(shí)現(xiàn)社會(huì)化”。【375】
  　　 由此，Habermas開啟了新的，直接承續(xù)啟蒙思想的哲學(xué)征程：拯救現(xiàn)代性或理性。上卷到此結(jié)束。
  　　江緒林 2011年5月23日
•   　　實(shí)在寫不動(dòng)了，把自己作業(yè)給貼上來吧：P
  　　
  　　Habermas argues that the history of Western society is the history of societal rationalization (institutional differentiation). If Weber saw inherent dangers in this process, Habermas paints a more complex (and contingent) picture. While he recognizes the danger of one-sided development (colonization of the lifeworld) he also makes the case for how the balance between the lifeworld and systems can be stabilized. How does he make this case?
  　　
  　　
  　　
  　　
  　　
  　　 What Habermas, together with other contemporary theorists, face in modern society is the growing autonomy of subsystems, which have detached from the world views in which they were originally embedded. Modernity is thus featured with multiple value spheres, with each of them having their own logic. If activities can only be rationally justified within their own value system, the decision between different value systems can never be rationally grounded. Since there is no rationality of value any more, formal rationality, presented as the rational calculation of money and power in market and state, will become dominant. So the problem of modernity is actually the incompatibility of value systems and the imbalanced development of rationalization. Weber sees no historical necessity for such contradiction to be resolved, and he predicts that the advanced formal rationalization will inevitably confine us in the iron cage, while Habermas wants to rescue us from Weber’s pessimistic prophecy of our future. He suggests that the hope to overcome these problems lies in the communicative action and the rationalization of our lifeworld.
  　　
  　　 Habermas starts his argument from his interpretation of Weber’s theory on rationalization. Weber describes the rise of capitalism as the general theory of rationalization with the history of specific form of rationalization, but he seems to believe that as long as the switchman has introduced us the to the track, we don’t need validity claim any more, and can go on forever on the track without thinking what our destination is until the next charismatic movement occurs. Habermas also recognizes the risk that the state and market colonize the lifeworld, but he argues that these two spheres, whose inner logic are oriented to satisfying interests, cannot produce meaning and legitimacy. He suggests that an instrumental order based only on the purposive-rational weighing of interest by strategically acting subjects would be unstable. Validity claim is always needed to stabilize the system, since “process of rationalization can attach to societal orders of life only because the stability of legitimate orders depends on the de facto recognition of validity claims that can be attacked internally, that is shaken by critique, new insights, learning process, and the like” (Habermas, 1984:192). Habermas suggests that only through ideas can order of life acquire legitimacy, which brings back Weber’s theory on the interplay between ideas and interest. He agrees with Weber on his analysis of the interconnected relation between social structure and cultural value in The Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism. “Interest can be satisfied through norms of social intercourse in the long run only if they are connected with ideas that serve to provide reasons for them; and ideas in turn cannot establish themselves empirically if they are not connected with interests that supply them with power” (Habermas, 1984:188). Puritan’s pursuit of profit is embedded in the value system of Calvinism. Only the interpenetration of ideas and interest and their reciprocal stabilization can anchor the value orientation of accumulation for the sake of accumulation.
  　　
  　　 But in assuming the predominance of bureaucracy, Weber goes too far in confining rationalization only to the type of purposive rational action. Habermas argues that there are two limitations in Weber’s prophecy. Firstly, he tailors his view on rationalization to the stand point of ethical rationalization. It is true that the spirit of capitalism has been decoupled from the support of religious doctrine as soon as it becomes dominant in society, but even if religion doesn’t work anymore, the potential of cultural rationalization can equally be traced to other dimensions. The second limitation of Weber’s argument is that he is mostly interested in the evolutionary process of anchoring purposive rational action in a value-rational way from a concrete historical context, while ignores the potential of rationalization of lifeworld from divergent paths in the world. Habermas suggests that Weber hasn’t exhausted the systematic scope of his theoretical approach on the interplay between ideas and interests, which is linked to the institutionalization of new action orientations and the emergence of legitimate orders.
  　　
  　　 Habermas doesn’t deny the potential as what Weber describes that different spheres become in conflict with each other, but he thinks it is possible to unify them through the compatibility of their inner logics. Modern theorists have long been trying to answer the question of how can we make sure that modern society, with different value systems, not fall apart. Utilitarianism argues that society can achieve stability when every individual tries to maximize their own interest. Habermas says this is wrong, since it only assumes one world in which everyone’s goal is fixed, and this is absolutely not the reality in modern world. Normative regulated theory assumes the predominance of norms that bind us together as a society. Habermas doesn’t accept this view either, since it doesn’t explain where the norms come from, thus leaving no room for the possibility of social change. After refuting all the other theorists from Durkheim to Goffman, he offers the solution as communication. He argues that the compatibility of different value systems is secured at the formal level of the rational argumentation. Rationality is defined by Habermas as “a disposition of speaking and acting subjects that are expressed in modes of behavior for which there are good reasons or grounds” (Habermas, 1984:22). So the logic of argumentation is to support validity claims not within one’s own framework, but by good reasons that those outside the framework can also understand and criticize. Habermas assumes the existence of universal reasons in his critique on cultural relativism. He never offers a clear definition of what universal reasons are in the whole book of The Theory of Communicative Action, but I think this is absolutely justifiable because for Habermas, universal reasons are not some substantive standards for evaluation. Universal reasons are embodied in the process of communication, and people’s attempts to rationally justify their value system and leave it open to renovation. So the assumption of universal reasons is not a Euro-centric view point. On the contrary, it contains the possibility of discovering divergent paths to cultural rationalization in different places of the world.
  　　
  　　 The importance of communicative rationality reveals itself only in modern society, because in traditional society, the mythical worldview of what society is and ought to be is mostly inherited from the past and internalized to every member in society from generation to generation. The burden of interpreting this worldview is limited to a very small group of people in society. This is what Durkheim calls “mechanical solidarity”. But the problem of modernity is that more and more people begin to have the hunch that what we see in the world may not be the only representation. So in a context that there are multiple values as candidates for interpretation, we need argumentative speech as the procedure to achieve consensus, instead of accepting the worldview from the past. Habermas defines lifeworld as the “totality of interpretations presupposed by the members of society as background knowledge” (Habermas, 1984:13), without which our communication will become absolutely unstable and collapse in chaos. But the critical difference in modern society from traditional society is that the background knowledge in lifeworld is always open to critiques and reinterpretation. The whole process is always unstable and filled with conflicts and struggles, but the learning process of achieving consensus through rational communication can be socially institutionalized. So the stability of modern society comes from the unstable process of open discussion and the logic of argumentation.
  　　
  　　 By emphasizing the importance of argumentation, Habermas provides us with a normative dimension of seeing democracy, which is different from the instrumental view. The instrumental view assumes that politics is only the balance of interest and power, so democracy is only to equalize the opportunity for different groups to influence the decision making process. While acknowledging its importance, Habermas criticizes the instrumental view as confusing the empirical consensus coming from negotiation of interest with the consensus achieved from rational communication and mutual understanding. Habermas suggests that the instrumental view of democracy doesn’t explain how the translation between systems is possible, thus leaving the question of how integration of society is possible unanswered. Revised theories presuppose the norms as a function to maintain solidarity. But Habermas continues to question this stance because it cannot explain how people’s preference change in communication. He points out that the major shortcoming for both liberalism and system theory is that they regard the transference rules between individuals (or systems) as given or coming into existence spontaneously. But these rules are far from fixed and unchallengeable. On the contrary, they are achieved through deliberation.
  　　
  　　 However, different from Elster’s theory on argumentation, Habermas is not only depicting a process of will formation through public discussion. If open discussion in lifeworld has nothing to do with the politics in formal political systems, deliberation becomes nothing but noise. What Habermas suggests is a civil society that is “composed of spontaneously emergent organizations and movements, which resonates problems in private sphere, distill and transmit the reactions in amplified form to the public sphere so that they can institutionalize problem solving discourses on questions of general interest inside the framework of organized public spheres” (1996:367). Public sphere is not only a communication structure rooted in the life world through the associational network civil society, it must also “amplify the pressure of problems, that is, not only detect and identify problems but also convincingly and influentially thematize them, furnish them with possible solutions, and dramatize them in such a way that they are taken up and dealt with by parliamentary complexes” (Habermas, 1996:359). In the process, law is always needed as a surety for the cohesion of society. Since participation in civil society is always discursive, formal political systems are needed to routinize and institutionalize it. What Habermas suggests is a political system embedded in the public sphere, where the rational potential intrinsic in everyday communicative practices can dam against the colonizing encroachment of system imperatives on areas of lifeworld.
  　　
  　　 Critiques on Habermas are mostly focused on the inequality and exclusion in public sphere. It is true that in modern society, various value systems are all candidates for reinterpretation, but what we cannot ignore is that some candidates just have more opportunities to win than others. Public sphere cannot be of zero degree culture (Fraser, 1992:120). Fraser argues that by assuming one unified public sphere, we run the risk that the voice of the subordinate is swallowed (1992:119). Then how can we know that deliberation is but another way for the powerful to mask and legitimize their dominance? Habermas’s response is to revise his theory on public sphere and make it more plural. But he insists on his theoretical framework, which emphasizes the importance of communicative rationality. From Habermas’s stance, we can defend his theories in two dimensions. Firstly, even if we adopt the counter subaltern public sphere, social movement still needs to appeal to the public. Although interest is always behind, social movement is not only the expression of interest of a particular group, but the attempt to thematize problems that the whole society should concern. The empirical question of to what extend should the public sphere be unified can always be open to discussion, but the argumentative process of acquiring legitimacy is always the same. Secondly, even if we acknowledge that “l(fā)egitimacy is always based on some form of successful power and every consensus exists as a temporary result of a provisional hegemony as a stabilization of power” (Mouffe, 1999), we should also notice that Habermas never denies the existing inequality and power struggle. Communicative action in lifeworld not only provides the common ground for bourgeoisie, but also for the excluded others, like labor movement and feminist movement. Contact with these movements in turn “transformed these discourses and the structures of the public sphere itself from within” (Habermas, 2001:429). We can say the goal of any power is the economic and political hegemony, and deliberation is among all the ways to achieve hegemony, but the argumentative process as a formal standard to reach consensus at least opens up the opportunity for different groups to compete for the hegemonic dominance, and reinterpreter or even abandon the previous one in the process of open discussion.
  　　
  　　 By making the balance between system and lifeworld, Habermas tells us that politics is not limited to the negotiation and compromise of interest and power; it is also to establish legitimacy of norms where various perceptions of what good life is could be contained. This is not only to set up a desirable goal of what politics ought to be. Because all the good sociologists stand somewhere between facts and norms, Habermas’s theory also offers useful concept packages to explain the empirical facts of how the structural transformation of public sphere is possible, and what makes democracy work better.
  　　
  　　
  　　
  　　
  　　
  　　References:
  　　
  　　Fraser, Nancy. 1992. "Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy." Pp. 109-143 in Habermas and the Public Sphere, edited by Craig Calhoun. Cambridge: MIT Press.
  　　
  　　Habermas, Jürgen. 1981. The Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and the Rationalization of Society. Boston: Beacon Press.
  　　
  　　Habermas, Jürgen. 1996. Selections from Between facts and norms : contributions to a discourse theory of law and democracy. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
  　　
  　　Habermas, Jürgen. 2001. The postnational constellation: political essays. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
  　　
  　　Mouffe, Chantal. 1999. “Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism?” in Social Research, Vol. 66, No. 3 (Fall 1999).
•   　　其實(shí)最近兩天看Habermas，仔細(xì)玩味一下這iron cage的說法，又覺得這判斷確實(shí)就是很專橫的：資本主義的興起是某個(gè)價(jià)值觀念的內(nèi)化和社會(huì)結(jié)構(gòu)在一個(gè)個(gè)特定的歷史環(huán)境下互動(dòng)的結(jié)果，追求財(cái)富本來是一個(gè)價(jià)值合理的行為，怎么到了最后就突然變成目的合理的行為了呢？資本主義的興起是需要這種價(jià)值體系作支撐的，弄到最后反而就完全不顧價(jià)值，變成了工具理性的行為。這個(gè)究竟是怎么回事，好像Weber也沒有明確的解釋過，全然是他個(gè)人直覺式的判斷，是個(gè)預(yù)言。我也很懷疑這預(yù)言是不是真的就準(zhǔn)確。像Jose列舉了那么多國家的例子。但我一直覺得理論會(huì)指導(dǎo)你去看它想讓你看到的東西。你懷里揣著Weber，當(dāng)然看世界怎么看都是Weber了。
  　　
  　　Habermas覺得Weber走得太遠(yuǎn)，說穿了他想把我們從iron cage中拯救出來。于是他說Weber對(duì)于理性化的定義在分析未來世界的時(shí)候被他給縮小了?，F(xiàn)代社會(huì)的目的合理行為仍然是需要在價(jià)值上自圓其說的，而且因?yàn)橛胁煌瑑r(jià)值體系的存在，這種通過交往而相互理解、證明的行為是重要的，且是現(xiàn)代社會(huì)之所以為現(xiàn)代社會(huì)的重要特征。在Habermas看來，傳統(tǒng)社會(huì)里不存在為某一個(gè)價(jià)值體系自圓其說的問題，因?yàn)閹缀趺恳粋€(gè)人生下來以后就自然而然地把那套傳統(tǒng)的東西給內(nèi)化了。社會(huì)中也不存在與傳統(tǒng)相競爭的價(jià)值體系?，F(xiàn)代社會(huì)與傳統(tǒng)社會(huì)不同，并不在于現(xiàn)代社會(huì)中沒有共同分享的價(jià)值體系，而在于這個(gè)體系更多程度上是“自致”（achieved），而不是“先賦”（ascribed）的。所以大家有更多的空間去反思去參與去討論，現(xiàn)代社會(huì)的價(jià)值體系是在交往的過程中形成的。這個(gè)相當(dāng)于在解釋Durkheim的有機(jī)團(tuán)結(jié)（organic solidarity）如何可能。
  　　
  　　可我覺得Habermas也并沒有把我們從iron cage里面救出來。或者說，Habermas對(duì)于交往的需要與可能性的判斷，和Weber對(duì)于“路徑依賴”（當(dāng)然Weber本人沒用這概念啦）的判斷，兩者相比較起來，專橫的程度是一樣的。就像Weber沒有辦法從理論上給我們解釋為什么我們上了軌道就把扳道工給踢出局一樣，Habermas也沒可能跟我們解釋現(xiàn)代社會(huì)為啥就一定建立在扳道工辛勤工作的基礎(chǔ)之上（有意思的是Habermas用的比方是switch station）。
  　　
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  　　Habermas的理論的特點(diǎn)（我一共就讀了五天而已，如果說得不對(duì)，麻煩指出來）在于“論戰(zhàn)性”。我覺得溝通行動(dòng)理論最精彩的地方在于它對(duì)功利主義、目的論、Durkheim Parsons Goffman的批判。（但是對(duì)Durkheim的看法我不是很同意，在社會(huì)分工論和自殺論里面，Durkheim確實(shí)有把價(jià)值規(guī)范當(dāng)成理所當(dāng)然的存在的傾向，但是宗教生活的基本形式可是論述了這種規(guī)范的來源的，當(dāng)然和Habermas又是不一樣的路數(shù)。）在看批判的時(shí)候你就大概知道他的觀點(diǎn)了，但是論述交往如何可能的時(shí)候，倒多少有點(diǎn)讓人失望。這次除了我之外所有人的memo都說他們看了Habermas之后并沒有了解溝通如何成為可能。這倒是件很諷刺的事情，因?yàn)镠abermas要解釋的正是這個(gè)問題。
  　　
  　　可不管怎么說，Habermas倒是目前頗為流行的“審議式民主”（deliberative democracy）的理論基礎(chǔ)。我覺得你列出種種細(xì)節(jié)性的技術(shù)問題質(zhì)問Habermas交往如何可能，是很無聊的事情。Habermas又不灌水不做BBS版主，他當(dāng)然不會(huì)知道要讓一大群人變得虛心變得愛學(xué)習(xí)，善于接受各種信息和意見，站在別人的角度思考……這些事情有多困難。他估計(jì)沒有那種互動(dòng)越多道理說得越爛最后意見完全被推向兩個(gè)相反極端的慘痛經(jīng)歷，因而還對(duì)交往理解溝通抱有美好的幻想，抑或公共空間也無非就是個(gè)隱喻。所以美國的社會(huì)學(xué)家要跑到世界各個(gè)地方去做比較研究，告訴大家deliberation在各種社會(huì)背景下究竟需要些什么條件才能成為可能。這樣的問題你得去問Patrick和Gianpaolo，問Habermas那算問錯(cuò)人啦?，F(xiàn)代社會(huì)科學(xué)研究就是有這么個(gè)稀奇古怪的分工，你可以不喜歡它，但是它就放在那里。
  　　
  　　但我其實(shí)還是很懷疑Habermas的理論的，不僅僅是懷疑這個(gè)有沒有可能在現(xiàn)實(shí)世界實(shí)現(xiàn)，更懷疑這個(gè)目標(biāo)是不是可欲的。理性、參與、反思等等等等，好些時(shí)候?qū)ξ襾碚f倒是個(gè)消極的東西。我發(fā)現(xiàn)自己一般不會(huì)說，因?yàn)槲覀兪怯欣硇缘娜怂晕覀円此家獏⑴c；我倒是常常說，現(xiàn)在這種狀況已經(jīng)很難維持下去了，因?yàn)楣沧R(shí)已經(jīng)不存在了，你再不讓大家進(jìn)來進(jìn)行討論，那么重建共識(shí)的希望都沒有了，所以我們得鼓勵(lì)大家的反思。我承認(rèn)在這個(gè)問題上我有那么一點(diǎn)功能主義——如果共識(shí)是存在的，是大家都接受的，是可以一代代傳下去的，那么為什么要讓大家都來反思屬于我們這個(gè)社會(huì)共同的價(jià)值觀呢？（Habermasian會(huì)回答說我這個(gè)“如果”是不存在的。但是為什么“如果”不存在，他們給出的答案又將是一個(gè)套套邏輯。）
  　　
  　　Habermas是反對(duì)文化相對(duì)主義的。其實(shí)他沒有充分的理由來反對(duì)文化相對(duì)主義。他就是說一個(gè)人不能順著一個(gè)文化的內(nèi)在邏輯為這個(gè)文化辯護(hù)，你想要為自己的文化價(jià)值證明就必須接受客觀的、普遍存在的評(píng)判標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。而文化相對(duì)主義本來就是反對(duì)用所謂普遍存在的評(píng)判標(biāo)準(zhǔn)來衡量不同文化的。所以他這個(gè)就是等于在說，因?yàn)槲幕鄬?duì)主義是不行的，所以文化相對(duì)主義是不行的。我對(duì)于文化相對(duì)主義也是懷疑的，因?yàn)槲矣X得有必要用一些大家都可以接受的方式把自己的道理講給別人聽。但是我對(duì)處在強(qiáng)勢地位的人反對(duì)文化相對(duì)主義這一行為也是天生反感的。我不是懷疑他們理解其他文化的真誠，我是懷疑他們真正理解那種文化內(nèi)在邏輯的能力。如果他們不具備這種能力，卻一天到晚假設(shè)這種能力是客觀存在的，那么更多情況只不過是自己yy了再強(qiáng)加于人罷了。
  　　
  　　=======================分割線=======================
  　　
  　　Habermas對(duì)我的意義在于提醒我們更加關(guān)注“價(jià)值”的一邊而不是僅僅把政治理解為權(quán)力的斗爭和利益的平衡。雖然基于理性和相互理解的辯論（argumentation）未必就能完全和基于利益平衡的協(xié)商（negotiation）完全分開來，事實(shí)上Habermas也不是要把這兩個(gè)東西分開來，他分開來說完全是用了Weber“理想類型”（ideal type）的方法，他更不是想告訴我們argumentation比negotiation要來得高級(jí)。他就是想告訴我們，政治其實(shí)還是有argumentation的，這一塊一直是存在的。這是我從最消極的角度理解的Habermas，而我覺得它有意義。
  　　
  　　=======================分割線========================
  　　
  　　上個(gè)禮拜讀的Frazer和Mouffe的書都是對(duì)Habermas的批判。（插一句，這兩位的書都非常好讀，但我最喜歡的還是Cohen跟她老公寫的那本Civil Society and Political Theories，我在網(wǎng)上弄了一本，今天寄到了，八百頁，重死人了，缺點(diǎn)就是不能躺床上看。）他們基本的觀點(diǎn)是在權(quán)力不平等的情況下，指望通過理性交往達(dá)成共識(shí)不但是不可能的，而且會(huì)起到加劇不平等的負(fù)面效果。本來是強(qiáng)權(quán)政治，誰欺負(fù)誰大家都看得清清楚楚；現(xiàn)在改成了投票，強(qiáng)勢者的地位就被合法化了；甚至再把你拉過來好好談?wù)?，不但從制度上來說強(qiáng)勢者的地位合法化了，而且從弱勢群體的心理層面來說，他們也會(huì)“覺得”既得利益者的強(qiáng)勢地位是“合理”的，并且從別人的眼睛里面來看這個(gè)世界。說到這里Gramsci的味道已經(jīng)很濃了。果不其然，說著說著Mouffe同志就給了我們一個(gè)葛蘭西式的論斷——所有社會(huì)都不過是某一種文化的霸權(quán)主義統(tǒng)治罷了。
  　　
  　　所以Mouffe強(qiáng)調(diào)struggle——不能只有理性的交往，不能不看利益的妥協(xié)和權(quán)力的制衡，不能假定決策過程中沒有排斥，而如果真的有排斥的存在，我們要想辦法反抗。我覺得這話說的也有道理。所以我一直覺得在美國學(xué)習(xí)，稍微保持一點(diǎn)“犟頭犟腦”的姿態(tài)也是應(yīng)該的。你不能說我全然憑理性來判斷——他們好的東西我就學(xué)，他們不好的東西我不學(xué)。首先你不具備這樣完善的理性（你要具備了也不在這兒讀博士了），其次不等你用理性判斷好是非，你早已經(jīng)被學(xué)術(shù)生產(chǎn)的流水線打造成一顆螺絲釘了。所以反抗是必須的，不然你就被它吞沒了。（但其實(shí)還是度的問題，心態(tài)不好專門跟人家唱反調(diào)的話，看似很有批判精神，其實(shí)變成了沒有靶子的背叛。）
  　　
  　　但是Mouffe的理論不解決權(quán)力的合法性的問題。除非你是斗爭哲學(xué)的狂熱崇拜者，否則總要努力尋找一些大家都能認(rèn)同的底線的。就像作為在美國學(xué)習(xí)的中國人，你不能為了反抗就成天把中國特色論掛嘴邊上。即使不是為了獲得學(xué)位，你也要用美國人能聽得明白的道理來解釋中國為什么特殊，為什么不適用某個(gè)西方理論的原因。而這種訴諸研究規(guī)范的行為，其實(shí)正是Habermas意義上的交往理性。所以Mouffe講的并不能推翻Habermas的理論，因?yàn)镠abermas并沒有說政治只有大家坐下來好好談，只是真正達(dá)成共識(shí)仍舊需要需要交往理性，不管你們前番吵得如何不可開交了。
  　　
  　　而Frazer作為女性主義者，強(qiáng)調(diào)公民社會(huì)的多元化。大概意思是說，社會(huì)上的弱勢群體，不能直接參加Habermas意義上的那個(gè)單一的公共空間，而要有自己的subaltern counter public sphere。這有點(diǎn)像一個(gè)安全的地帶，保護(hù)那些弱勢群體（比如女性），發(fā)出他們自己的聲音，而不被主流所吞沒。但是Frazer自己也意識(shí)到，弱勢群體的聲音是不可能永遠(yuǎn)保留在自己那個(gè)安全的地帶的，真正想讓這個(gè)聲音變得有意義，最終還是要訴諸公眾。所以這下就變成了一個(gè)經(jīng)驗(yàn)問題：公共空間在多大程度上是多元的？“安全地帶”在多大程度上要介入到真正的公共空間？所以Frazer的批判其實(shí)也沒有推翻Habermas的理論，她只是做了修正，讓公共空間變得更加多元罷了。而Habermas被修正過的理論也從來就沒有說公共空間是單一的。
  　　
  　　所以，其實(shí)，這兩個(gè)人，寫的算什么批判呢。批著批著最后又繞回去了，ms還又一次證明了Habermas的理論很好用。
  　　
  　　然而這個(gè)批判對(duì)我們來說還是有意義的。雖然它們最終的成果都讓我們感到比較失望，但起碼它提供了一次很好的思維體操訓(xùn)練。其實(shí)Habermas和Gramsci并不相矛盾。Gramsci的霸權(quán)主義理論非常微妙，可能這樣講更加容易理解一些：馬克思的意識(shí)形態(tài)似乎是全然內(nèi)化于被統(tǒng)治階級(jí)的，那些人眼里的世界是“假”的，是統(tǒng)治者的利益。（所以我們不能通過虛幻的思想來看待歷史，而是要看物質(zhì)基礎(chǔ)。）而另一種觀點(diǎn)則認(rèn)為，受壓迫的那群人其實(shí)并沒有真正相信統(tǒng)治者施加于他們的意識(shí)形態(tài)灌輸，但是因?yàn)樗麄儧]有反抗的能力，所以會(huì)接受自己的地位。而Gramsci的霸權(quán)主義在這兩個(gè)觀點(diǎn)當(dāng)中的某一個(gè)位置。統(tǒng)治階級(jí)是會(huì)灌輸意識(shí)形態(tài)，但不是單方向上的壓迫，且往往是有物質(zhì)利益作為認(rèn)同的基礎(chǔ)的。受壓迫的那群人也不會(huì)全然接受自己的地位，也有反抗和爭論，但是國家會(huì)體制化它們。所以Gramsci的理論既不單單是權(quán)力的斗爭，也不單單是文化上的意識(shí)形態(tài)灌輸。
  　　
  　　而Habermas呢，其實(shí)也在這兩者中間的某一個(gè)地方。班上有人說，Habermas這理論好是好，就是太美妙太不真實(shí)了——他是把Habermas理解成鼓勵(lì)大家碰上矛盾就坐下來談的理論，那么Habermas就變成居委會(huì)阿姨了——而即使居委會(huì)阿姨也肯定不會(huì)只有“坐下來談”這樣一種手段（當(dāng)然這四個(gè)字她們會(huì)最常掛在嘴邊）。Habermas是不避諱這過程中出現(xiàn)的所有斗爭和妥協(xié)的。世界上沒有一種政治只存在理性交往不存在斗爭和妥協(xié)。但是這事情你得反過來想。其實(shí)counterfactual是非常有幫助的——如果沒有溝通理性，我們還能怎么辦？
  　　
  　　他們強(qiáng)調(diào)的是不同的東西，但恰恰是一個(gè)硬幣的兩面。排斥與寬容，理性溝通與利弊權(quán)衡，大多數(shù)時(shí)候都纏繞在一起，分開來說并強(qiáng)調(diào)某一方面，完全是方法論意義上的。也許這問題我們都不該較真，認(rèn)真過了頭，這事情就不好玩了。理性的交往最后會(huì)達(dá)成共識(shí)，而這個(gè)共識(shí)有可能不過是某一種文化的霸權(quán)罷了。而霸權(quán)作為一個(gè)社會(huì)的存在，又必須通過某一種程序讓它獲得合法性。而這個(gè)合法性，在現(xiàn)代社會(huì)這種每個(gè)人都隱隱約約感覺到山洞外有另一番景象的背景下，又往往是不穩(wěn)定的。所以會(huì)有人反抗，會(huì)有人提出異議。但是最終我們還是期望通過理性溝通來達(dá)成共識(shí)和一種暫時(shí)穩(wěn)定的狀態(tài)。從這點(diǎn)上來講，Habermas是對(duì)的，關(guān)于共識(shí)的實(shí)質(zhì)性評(píng)判標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，在現(xiàn)代社會(huì)是不存在的，但是我們需要給大家一個(gè)機(jī)會(huì)，由原則而推出共識(shí)，而并不僅僅是通過利益的妥協(xié)而達(dá)成共識(shí)。所以雖然實(shí)質(zhì)性的評(píng)判標(biāo)準(zhǔn)不存在了，形式標(biāo)準(zhǔn)仍然存在。
  　　
  　　唯一仍然讓我感到困惑的是，按照Habermas的說法，現(xiàn)代社會(huì)的人幾乎不需要“權(quán)威”。Habermas并不認(rèn)為現(xiàn)代社會(huì)就是什么都能批判什么都能反對(duì)完全用不著傳統(tǒng)的社會(huì)，他也認(rèn)為lifeworld當(dāng)中需要保持一些傳統(tǒng)的東西使得我們的交往可以在某種程度上穩(wěn)定。但傳統(tǒng)需要不斷被反思和批判。什么能夠批判，什么不能夠批判，還是由公開的討論來決定的。而我認(rèn)為這觀點(diǎn)不是很靠譜。公開的討論只能決定我們怎么看一件事情，不能決定我們能不能公開討論一件事情。這在邏輯上是有問題的——你都已經(jīng)公開討論了，還說什么不能公開討論的。
  　　
  　　而一個(gè)自由開放的社會(huì)是不是就意味著什么都能公開討論了呢？現(xiàn)在全世界自由開放社會(huì)的典范又是哪里呢？美國嗎？來了這里你就會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn)，這里的人雖然喜歡公開討論，卻在極多的問題上有驚人的共識(shí)（可能他們自己都沒有意識(shí)到這點(diǎn)）。而在我們的國家呢，BBS動(dòng)輒有宕機(jī)危險(xiǎn)，網(wǎng)站動(dòng)輒要被低俗的情況下，民眾竟沒有被宣傳機(jī)器灌輸成想法一樣的人。
  　　
  　　如果真論權(quán)威，難道我們的生活中真的就有比美國人更多的權(quán)威嗎？
  　　
  　　這就越發(fā)讓我覺得霸權(quán)主義和交往理性，絕對(duì)不是一對(duì)矛盾的東西。
  　　
•   德意志式的、淵博的才華橫溢的卻又冷冰冰的、毫無同情心也毫無節(jié)制的寫作方法
  精辟啊
•   原來是華東師大的老師，失敬，語言具有穿透力的說，正在閱讀這本書，曹sir是俺們學(xué)校的老師噢
•   兔子：客氣了。對(duì)Habermas實(shí)在理解得少。
•   閱讀此書猶如擁抱一具干尸，沒有生命力。
•   "而一個(gè)自由開放的社會(huì)是不是就意味著什么都能公開討論了呢？現(xiàn)在全世界自由開放社會(huì)的典范又是哪里呢？美國嗎？來了這里你就會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn)，這里的人雖然喜歡公開討論，卻在極多的問題上有驚人的共識(shí)（可能他們自己都沒有意識(shí)到這點(diǎn)）。而在我們的國家呢，BBS動(dòng)輒有宕機(jī)危險(xiǎn)，網(wǎng)站動(dòng)輒要被低俗的情況下，民眾竟沒有被宣傳機(jī)器灌輸成想法一樣的人。"
  越封鎖，越反叛。壓抑會(huì)成為反叛的動(dòng)力，因?yàn)閴阂?，所以需要過激的言論進(jìn)行釋放。
•   “Habermas又不灌水不做BBS版主，他當(dāng)然不會(huì)知道要讓一大群人變得虛心變得愛學(xué)習(xí)，善于接受各種信息和意見，站在別人的角度思考……這些事情有多困難。他估計(jì)沒有那種互動(dòng)越多道理說得越爛最后意見完全被推向兩個(gè)相反極端的慘痛經(jīng)歷，因而還對(duì)交往理解溝通抱有美好的幻想，抑或公共空間也無非就是個(gè)隱喻?！?br /> LZ說的好~所以他如果到天涯當(dāng)個(gè)版主，經(jīng)受一番摧殘歷練，估計(jì)眼看著就能涅槃著無敵了。。
  “所以，其實(shí)，這兩個(gè)人，寫的算什么批判呢。批著批著最后又繞回去了，ms還又一次證明了Habermas的理論很好用。然而這個(gè)批判對(duì)我們來說還是有意義的。雖然它們最終的成果都讓我們感到比較失望，但起碼它提供了一次很好的思維體操訓(xùn)練。”
  看這種批判的好處一是思維訓(xùn)練，二也是長點(diǎn)見識(shí)避免當(dāng)SB：自己想到類似的就興沖沖的寫出來交掉，結(jié)果老師很同情地看著你說其實(shí)這。。老早就有人研究過了。。
  “唯一仍然讓我感到困惑的是，按照Habermas的說法，現(xiàn)代社會(huì)的人幾乎不需要“權(quán)威”。Habermas并不認(rèn)為現(xiàn)代社會(huì)就是什么都能批判什么都能反對(duì)完全用不著傳統(tǒng)的社會(huì)，他也認(rèn)為lifeworld當(dāng)中需要保持一些傳統(tǒng)的東西使得我們的交往可以在某種程度上穩(wěn)定。但傳統(tǒng)需要不斷被反思和批判。什么能夠批判，什么不能夠批判，還是由公開的討論來決定的。而我認(rèn)為這觀點(diǎn)不是很靠譜。公開的討論只能決定我們怎么看一件事情，不能決定我們能不能公開討論一件事情。這在邏輯上是有問題的——你都已經(jīng)公開討論了，還說什么不能公開討論的。 ”
  關(guān)于公開的討論這點(diǎn)我也覺得挺不靠譜的。不過Habermas所謂傳統(tǒng)的東西需要在Lifeworld里有所保留，但需要不斷被反思批判，還是比之前看的Paulo Freire的extension versus communication要更進(jìn)一步，講得清楚很多了，直接解決了我讀pf時(shí)的關(guān)于這方面的疑惑，就是extension是否完全不可?。渴欠裨谀承┉h(huán)境或者情況下，對(duì)于某些傳統(tǒng)的extension也是有必要的？
  最后
  “Habermas是不避諱這過程中出現(xiàn)的所有斗爭和妥協(xié)的。世界上沒有一種政治只存在理性交往不存在斗爭和妥協(xié)。但是這事情你得反過來想。其實(shí)counterfactual是非常有幫助的——如果沒有溝通理性，我們還能怎么辦？
  從這點(diǎn)上來講，Habermas是對(duì)的，關(guān)于共識(shí)的實(shí)質(zhì)性評(píng)判標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，在現(xiàn)代社會(huì)是不存在的，但是我們需要給大家一個(gè)機(jī)會(huì)，由原則而推出共識(shí)，而并不僅僅是通過利益的妥協(xié)而達(dá)成共識(shí)。所以雖然實(shí)質(zhì)性的評(píng)判標(biāo)準(zhǔn)不存在了，形式標(biāo)準(zhǔn)仍然存在。 ”
  所以讀了些Habermas，這學(xué)期選修課我選了門evolutionary social psychology，看看人到底進(jìn)化得怎么樣了走得離猴子有多遠(yuǎn)，哈貝馬斯說的這些玄玄乎乎的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)和理想化狀態(tài)究竟在可預(yù)知的未來有沒有搞頭，哪天也能實(shí)現(xiàn)一下。。

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