美國的漢學(xué)研究起步很早。哥倫比亞大學(xué)東亞圖書館的第一套藏書來自於老佛爺慈禧的饋贈,這從側(cè)面表現(xiàn)出美國對於中國的研究熱情萌芽極早。至此書出版的一九九七年時,美國的漢學(xué)研究早經(jīng)開枝散葉,無論是研究深度還是研究廣度都已經(jīng)執(zhí)世界漢學(xué)研究的牛耳了。在先秦與趙宋以後這兩個美國漢學(xué)界素所見重的歷史時期,研究成果尤其豐厚。
面對明清民國碩果累累生機勃勃的漢學(xué)研究成果,cohen同學(xué)不但沒有錦上添花地唱讚歌,反而抽絲剝繭言之鑿鑿地指出這些研究成果的謬誤與不足,僅此一點,其勇氣已足以讓慣於表揚與自我表揚的中國同行們無地自容。而cohen同學(xué)這種“蠹生於木還食其木”的求索精神也是美國漢學(xué)長盛不衰的要因之一罷。
更爲難能可貴的,是cohen同學(xué)不但有破而且有立,提出了新的研究思路與研究方法。十六年後的今天,二〇一三年,我們已經(jīng)看得到美國漢學(xué)研究在他指出的研究向度上的進展與創(chuàng)獲,讓人對於這本書更生崇敬。
順便一提,école des annales對於histoire totale的追求在這本書裡得到了意外的囬應(yīng),我想,這一歷史的訴求終會再次得到人們的肯定與發(fā)揚。
全書文字極流暢,一氣呵成,閱讀體驗非常好。
具體內(nèi)容我一如既往選擇三緘其口。想知道的還是去看書罷。
Paul A. Cohen’s Discovering History in China mainly reflects American historiography of “recent Chinese history” (in general, the nineteenth and twentieth century) since the postwar, points out its primary problems, and indicates a new trend, namely the China-oriented approach, in American historical writing in the end. In this book, Cohen handles three different, yet interlaced, approaches, to wit impact-response one, tradition-modernity one, and imperialism one, which had dominated American historical writing before the publication of this very book. As for the reason, or motive, why Cohen intends to write such as book, one involves several intellectual problems forming during his career. Between the publication of his first book (China and Christianity, 1963) and the second one (Between Tradition and Modernity, 1974), the outside environment experienced significant change (mainly the Vietnam War) which influenced the author greatly. For the first time, the author began to reflect his former thinking of China, gradually he doubted traditional approaches, and a new idea germinated. On the other hand, the relative scarcity of self-critical historiographical writing on the filed of recent Chinese history made the author feel discontented. Despite the fact that in late 1960s, a more critical perspective had grown, from the author’s eyes, it was too imperfect to be satisfied. These concern and uneasiness impelled the author to initiate this book.
In the first chapter, the target Cohen intends to assail is “impact-response” approach. This very conceptual framework bases on two basic assumptions, the first one is that “the confrontation with the West was the most significant influence on events in China”, the other one assumes that the role played by the West is active, while china took “a much more passive or reactive” one in this period. The main problem with this approach is that it’s too general, its intellectual realm is not clearly defined and delimited. Furthermore, the concept of West is not a definite notion, even the Westerns themselves couldn’t understand it very well. Two reasons may contribute to this phenomenon, the first one is that the West itself experienced tremendous change during the modern times, the other is that the West is a relative concept, and it’s not a unite and unidimensional idea. Therefore, the “total west”, or west as a monolith, never exist, let alone its impact on China. In reality, the West China encountered was only “a part of a whole”, and even this part changed over time. Moreover, the West confronted by China was not pure, the West mentioned by Chinese was, more often than not, the one created in Chinese minds, just as Cohen has described, it’s some kind of “hybridization”. The other trouble is that historians tend to discuss Chinese-response too abstractly. To illustrate his argument, Cohen reinterprets three sorts of Chinese historical events in recent times, rebellion, reform, and reaction. Under his narrative and analysis, these activities, rather than been regarded as responses to western impact by previous historians, mainly responded to Chinese own problems which had accumulated since eighteenth century or earlier.
In the end, the author provides a method to correct this approach, to contemplate and analyze China in three zones. The outermost zone, which was directly influenced by west; intermediate zone, which was activated or given direction, but was not actually brought into being, by the West; innermost zone, which stands for culture and society without been disturbed by the West. These zones were fluid, yet, and there were interactions between them, which forces us to speculate on this period of Chinese history from a dynamic perspective.
In the second chapter, Cohen tackles the “tradition-modernity” approach. This paradigm, from Cohen’s perspective, receives a great deal of influence from nineteenth century’s thoughts about China. The fundamental assumption shared by the historians of this paradigm, such as Joseph R. Levenson and Mary Wright, is consistent with nineteenth-century western view of China, regarding it as a “static, unchanging society, a society in a state of perpetual repose.” It was the modern West that activated static China, and its final fate would be a Western-styled modern society. In this sense, all kinds of transformation in modern China were influenced by the West, without West, it’s impossible for China to make any fundamental change during this period. Cohen, however, is not satisfied with this sort of interpretation of Chinese history, and unearths several severe problems involving in this very approach. One trouble is that there is no middle zone between “modern” and “tradition”, every historical event must be tilted by one or the other. In reality, yet, just as Schwartz claimed that some areas of human experience are not readily identifiable as either “traditional” or “modern”. Another lethal problem is the one described by J. H. Hexter, the “assumption of the conservation of historical energy”. From the “tradition-modernity” perspective, once the “modernity” wins a battle in certain area, then, the “tradition” must retreat from this very area proportionally, vice verse. It’s entirely possible, however, that both could make progress in certain period, since the “cake” they intend to divide might swell at the same time. A third problem with this approach is that it “employs concepts that neatly symmetrical to describe and explain realities that are fundamentally asymmetrical”. In the end, to get rid of the burden and difficulty imposed by modernization theory, Cohen recommends superseding it with another one, which is less Western-centered.
Toward the end of the 1960s, with the increasingly escalating of the Vietnam War, young American historians began to rethink the abovementioned two approaches which had dominated historiography over the past two decades. This new trend, Cohen denominates as “imperialism” approach, asserted that imperial invasion was the bane of modern Chinese backwardness, poverty, and chaos. Compared with the foregoing two chapters, the third one is much more controversial and debatable. Just as A. Feuerwerker has pointed out, the length of this chapter is not proportionate to the figures or thoughts Cohen intends to handle. Compare to J. K. Fairbank and Levenson, James Peck (Feuerwerker describes him as one “who knew little about China and was concerned mainly with America’s failings in Vietnam”) and Frances Moulder (“l(fā)acking any intimate knowledge of either China or Japan” depicted by Feuerwerker) are far less significant and influential in Chinese history area.
With respect to the internal problems of this very approach, the primary one is that it pays too much attention to exogenous factor. The advocates of this approach, such as James Peck and Frances Moulder, strongly backed the argument that the West was the most important, and sometimes the solo, element which hindered the development of China in modern times. It also implies that China itself alone couldn’t make tremendous change, only under the invasion of the West, could such change took place in China. Moreover, this approach fails to separate imperial influence from other Chinese self factors, and combine them together under the name of imperial invasion. Another problem is that the appropriateness of adopting the entire China economy as the only unit of analysis. Cohen suggests subdividing the whole China into different regions, and then analyzing exogenous influence on different regions respectively. The final problem involves the concept of imperialism. Chinese colonial framework, as Cohen has summarized, is “partial, multiple, and layered” , therefore the discussion of imperial influence on modern Chinese society must be more precisely than before.
The three approaches-the “impact-response” one, “tradition-modernity” one, and “imperialism” one-are three different variants in the same tone, they all establish on the “Western-centeredness”, just as Cohen has concluded, it “robs China of its autonomy and makes of it, in the end, an intellectual possession of the West.” Contrast to these Western-oriented approaches, ultimately, Cohen points out a new trend in American historical writing since the 1970s, which he designates as “China-oriented” approach. In the final chapter, he mainly discusses its four characteristics. The first one is that it “begins with Chinese problems set in a Chinese context”, which means these problems must be experienced by Chinese themselves and the criteria for judging the consequence of these very problems must be Chinese, rather than Western. Another identifying feature is that this approach attempts to comprehend China by dividing it into “smaller, more manageable spatial units”. Since China is so vast and complicated, different regions have respective languages, customs, traditions, and other material conditions, the generalization which is popular among the foregoing approaches should be replaced with differentiation, a more precise picture of Chinese history should be depicted by American historians. Furthermore, this sort of differentiation is applicable to separating Chinese hierarchy into various levels as well. Not only should we differentiate between the gentry and the peasant, but among the peasant, it should be divided into much more detailed strata. The final facet of the China-oriented approach is the combination of history with other disciplines, especially social sciences. By introducing the techniques and strategies of other disciplines, one could expand the field of history study and interpret history more precisely and closely.
Cohen’s Discovering History in China, just as Lloyd E. Eastman has asserted, “Every historian of China should read this book” , in this reflective work, he lays bare “the hidden assumptions that have informed and skewed much American research on nineteenth and twentieth century”. As a Chinese, I wonder that when could our historians write a book like this to reflect our historiography on modern Chinese history during the past century, to demonstrate the assumptions taken by previous historians (one may be the model of peasant war). I believe this would be a painstaking work, yet, it would be tremendous meaningful, since the first step to get rid of bad habits is to know its existence.
數(shù)年前讀過Paul A. Cohen的 discovering history in China:American historical writing on the recent Chinese Past的中譯本。林同奇翻譯的中文書名為《在中國發(fā)現(xiàn)歷史:中國中心觀在美國的興起》,中文名的副標題并沒有直譯,直譯的話應(yīng)該是“美國對中國最近歷史的敘述”,注意這兒的the recent Chinese Past不能翻譯為中國近現(xiàn)代史,柯文反對“傳統(tǒng)——現(xiàn)代”的歷史二分法,故用the recent Chinese past 代替 the modern Chinese history一詞,作者在書的開篇即有說明,林的翻譯“中國中心觀在美國的興起”雖然點出了作者的主要觀點,但是這并不是全書的主要內(nèi)容,如果書的內(nèi)容就是“中國中心觀在美國的興起”,那么這本書除了能激起中國人的自豪感而外并無多大價值,在美國學(xué)術(shù)界內(nèi)部也得不到多大承認,以至于成為柯文的代表作了。說實話,當(dāng)時看中譯本看得云里霧里,覺得柯文沒什么,他只是為了他跟老師唱反調(diào),批評同行,以提高自己的聲譽罷了,印象中最深的就是他不斷地批評,卻沒有任何他自己真正有分量的東西,而且中譯本有不少地方根本不通,看不懂說的是什么,所以我對此書的評價一直很低,還搞不懂中國人為什么推崇此書,也許是因為柯文提倡以中國為中心寫歷史迎合了我們而已,大家平心而論,有多少人正是因為這樣才推崇這本書呢?(當(dāng)然,是否真的讀懂或者只是讀過,那就值得拷問了)最近有同學(xué)需要此書的讀書報告,我借此機會就把英文版找來好好讀了一遍,發(fā)現(xiàn)和我原來讀中譯本的感覺完全不一樣,我發(fā)現(xiàn)英文版中的柯文是娓娓道來,而不是像個刺猬似的隨意刺人,柯文是一個了不起的哲學(xué)家,徹底改變了我對此書的印象。
中譯本把副標題翻譯為“中國中心觀在美國的興起”我想應(yīng)該是出于商業(yè)的考慮,但是如果讀一讀英文版的,我們發(fā)現(xiàn)中國中心觀在每一章中有提及,但是對中國中心觀的闡述集中于最后一章,此書能啟發(fā)人的地方不在于作者的中國中心觀,而是作者對于美國中國史研究的反思的睿智和對歷史學(xué)學(xué)科的哲學(xué)思考。
作者在此書中反復(fù)提及歷史研究與過去的關(guān)系。作者認為每一個歷史學(xué)家都是他的時代和環(huán)境以及個人觀念的囚犯,所以對歷史的考察,無一例外都是帶有偏見的研究,所以得到只能是一種洞見,而不能窺其全豹,我們認為某些東西很重要,所以我們對歷史提出了這樣的問題和假設(shè),而恰恰是這些我們關(guān)注的問題和假設(shè)使決定了我們在歷史學(xué)中種種結(jié)論,但實際上我們忽略了許多歷史中存在的東西,我們就把歷史簡單地化約為沖擊-反應(yīng),傳統(tǒng)與現(xiàn)代,所以后面的歷史學(xué)家一旦改變了原有觀念和假設(shè),必將在歷史中發(fā)現(xiàn)另外的東西,推翻前輩歷史學(xué)家的結(jié)論。以此為思路,作者認真反省了美國研究中國史的三種主要方法:沖擊——反應(yīng)理論(compact-response approach),現(xiàn)代化理論(modernization approach),帝國主義理論(imperialism approach)。沖擊反應(yīng)理論是費正清的主要觀點,認為中國近代史就是一部西方?jīng)_擊(武力征服),中國為了尋求出路不得作出回應(yīng),學(xué)習(xí)西方,因此近代中國發(fā)生了巨大變化,由此中國傳統(tǒng)與現(xiàn)代截然兩分,得出了傳統(tǒng)與現(xiàn)代(現(xiàn)代化理論)的研究思路。帝國主義理論與前兩種方法也是如影隨形,這是西方的帝國主義使得中國不得不回應(yīng)西方。值得注意的是作者不是完全否定這三種研究方法,而是一一指出這三種方法的局限。作者認為任何一種理論都像物理學(xué)中的牛頓定律一樣,有一個適用范圍,牛頓定律是物理學(xué)中研究宏觀物體的主要力學(xué)定律,能解決很多力學(xué)問題,但是卻不適用于微觀的分子、原子,任何理論都有一定的適用范圍。作者認為對于沖擊反應(yīng)理論,最適用于研究近代的中外貿(mào)易和沿海港口城市,研究內(nèi)陸則不適用。中國很多問題看似由于西方的沖擊而引起的,但是中國古代也曾有過類似現(xiàn)象,只有從中國的傳統(tǒng)中才能理解最近中國歷史(the recent Chinese past)。比如戊戌維新變法,如果不從中國古代的改革傳統(tǒng)中去理解,就很難明白康有為為什么要托古改制,又比如農(nóng)民起義,表面上是受西方的影響,但是如果不從地理環(huán)境去研究中國區(qū)域史就很難理解為什么農(nóng)民起義集中于一些特定區(qū)域。這些問題都需要跨出簡單的沖擊-反應(yīng)模式才能尋找到答案。至于傳統(tǒng)與現(xiàn)代理論,作者在書中說到,歷史不是必然截然分為傳統(tǒng)與現(xiàn)代,這種二分法本來就存在很大問題,把歷史化分為傳統(tǒng)與現(xiàn)代,就把過去與現(xiàn)在完全分開來了,所以我們對過去很多與現(xiàn)在相同東西就無法理解。帝國主義文化理論研究的是完全淪為半殖民地的國家,比如印度,但是中國則不然,中國是一個半殖民地國家,而且其影響主要集中在一些沿海地區(qū),西方國家對中國的占領(lǐng)是小部分的、短暫的,西方國家主要目的在于貿(mào)易,真正有心蠶食中國領(lǐng)土的是俄國和日本,因此西方國家的帝國主義在物質(zhì)層面是短暫的,但是另一方面,在精神層面卻是持久和深刻的,這一點可謂一針見血,看看我們中國現(xiàn)在的整個學(xué)術(shù)局面就知道了,說現(xiàn)在中國的現(xiàn)代學(xué)術(shù)源頭在西方毫不為過,中國人一波又一波留學(xué)海外足可說明此問題。作者在最后部分,提及了在美國在20世紀六、七十年時代,由于越戰(zhàn)打得艱難,美國人失去了原有的那種自傲心態(tài),于是在學(xué)術(shù)上也開始給予別國更多地位,中國史研究領(lǐng)域開始有不少學(xué)者批評前輩史學(xué)家的觀點,興起了史學(xué)新領(lǐng)域,比如中國區(qū)域史研究、市場體系研究、城市史研究,以及中國明清史研究(從古代史中探尋最近中國歷史,這些進展表明美國中國史研究更趨深化和具體化,作者認為中國特點是多樣性,層次性,所以不能籠統(tǒng)地研究中國,作者自己的相關(guān)研究中就把中國分為沿海和內(nèi)陸,而G。William Skinner又從地理角度將中國分為九大區(qū)域:東北、北部,西北,長江上游,長江中游,長江下游,東南沿海,嶺南,云貴地區(qū)。作者還提醒說,其實中國區(qū)域的劃分不是固定不變的,應(yīng)該根據(jù)所研究的問題進行劃分,而且要注意不要習(xí)以為常地以行政劃分(省州縣)為標準,而應(yīng)該以地理文化的因素來決定哪些地方可以化在一起,哪些不行,因為行政劃分是人為的劃分,不是地理和文化的區(qū)分。作者還總結(jié)性地說到,我們研究歷史往往是根據(jù)歷史家自己時代的價值觀念和自己的偏見來看過去,如果要相對客觀的話,我們必需從歷史本身出發(fā)才能真正理解,所以研究中國史就必須從中國自身的脈絡(luò)中才能理解中國史,這正是作者提出中國中心觀(China—centered history)的理論依據(jù)。
綜觀全書,柯文是在自己的思維脈絡(luò)中展開的一次對美國中國最近歷史研究的哲學(xué)思考,而不是胡斯亂咬美國中國近代史研究的同行和前輩,但是我讀中譯本時卻有如此這般印象,看來中譯本真是誤人不淺,所以還是勸大家讀國外學(xué)術(shù)著作,最好讀外文原著,不要讀中譯本。對于費正清的觀點,我們怎么看呢?我想還是不能徹底否定的,只有站在前輩的肩上我們才能走得更遠,這正如費正清自己所言:
How Can mankind move upward except by standing on the shoulders and faces of the older generation?(摘自該書開篇所引費正清語錄)
數(shù)年前讀過Paul A. Cohen的 discovering history in China:American historical writing on the recent Chinese Past的中譯本。林同奇翻譯的中文書名為《在中國發(fā)現(xiàn)歷史:中國中心觀在美國的興起》,中文名的副標題并沒有直譯,直譯的話應(yīng)該是“美國對中國最近歷史的敘述”,注意這兒的the recent Chinese Past不能翻譯為中國近現(xiàn)代史,柯文反對“傳統(tǒng)——現(xiàn)代”的歷史二分法,故用the recent Chinese past 代替 the modern Chinese history一詞,作者在書的開篇即有說明,林的翻譯“中國中心觀在美國的興起”雖然點出了作者的主要觀點,但是這并不是全書的主要內(nèi)容,如果書的內(nèi)容就是“中國中心觀在美國的興起”,那么這本書除了能激起中國人的自豪感而外并無多大價值,在美國學(xué)術(shù)界內(nèi)部也得不到多大承認,以至于成為柯文的代表作了。說實話,當(dāng)時看中譯本看得云里霧里,覺得柯文沒什么,他只是為了他跟老師唱反調(diào),批評同行,以提高自己的聲譽罷了,印象中最深的就是他不斷地批評,卻沒有任何他自己真正有分量的東西,而且中譯本有不少地方根本不通,看不懂說的是什么,所以我對此書的評價一直很低,還搞不懂中國人為什么推崇此書,也許是因為柯文提倡以中國為中心寫歷史迎合了我們而已,大家平心而論,有多少人正是因為這樣才推崇這本書呢?(當(dāng)然,是否真的讀懂或者只是讀過,那就值得拷問了)最近有同學(xué)需要此書的讀書報告,我借此機會就把英文版找來好好讀了一遍,發(fā)現(xiàn)和我原來讀中譯本的感覺完全不一樣,我發(fā)現(xiàn)英文版中的柯文是娓娓道來,而不是像個刺猬似的隨意刺人,柯文是一個了不起的哲學(xué)家,徹底改變了我對此書的印象。
中譯本把副標題翻譯為“中國中心觀在美國的興起”我想應(yīng)該是出于商業(yè)的考慮,但是如果讀一讀英文版的,我們發(fā)現(xiàn)中國中心觀在每一章中有提及,但是對中國中心觀的闡述集中于最后一章,此書能啟發(fā)人的地方不在于作者的中國中心觀,而是作者對于美國中國史研究的反思的睿智和對歷史學(xué)學(xué)科的哲學(xué)思考。
作者在此書中反復(fù)提及歷史研究與過去的關(guān)系。作者認為每一個歷史學(xué)家都是他的時代和環(huán)境以及個人觀念的囚犯,所以對歷史的考察,無一例外都是帶有偏見的研究,所以得到只能是一種洞見,而不能窺其全豹,我們認為某些東西很重要,所以我們對歷史提出了這樣的問題和假設(shè),而恰恰是這些我們關(guān)注的問題和假設(shè)使決定了我們在歷史學(xué)中種種結(jié)論,但實際上我們忽略了許多歷史中存在的東西,我們就把歷史簡單地化約為沖擊-反應(yīng),傳統(tǒng)與現(xiàn)代,所以后面的歷史學(xué)家一旦改變了原有觀念和假設(shè),必將在歷史中發(fā)現(xiàn)另外的東西,推翻前輩歷史學(xué)家的結(jié)論。以此為思路,作者認真反省了美國研究中國史的三種主要方法:沖擊——反應(yīng)理論(compact-response approach),現(xiàn)代化理論(modernization approach),帝國主義理論(imperialism approach)。沖擊反應(yīng)理論是費正清的主要觀點,認為中國近代史就是一部西方?jīng)_擊(武力征服),中國為了尋求出路不得作出回應(yīng),學(xué)習(xí)西方,因此近代中國發(fā)生了巨大變化,由此中國傳統(tǒng)與現(xiàn)代截然兩分,得出了傳統(tǒng)與現(xiàn)代(現(xiàn)代化理論)的研究思路。帝國主義理論與前兩種方法也是如影隨形,這是西方的帝國主義使得中國不得不回應(yīng)西方。值得注意的是作者不是完全否定這三種研究方法,而是一一指出這三種方法的局限。作者認為任何一種理論都像物理學(xué)中的牛頓定律一樣,有一個適用范圍,牛頓定律是物理學(xué)中研究宏觀物體的主要力學(xué)定律,能解決很多力學(xué)問題,但是卻不適用于微觀的分子、原子,任何理論都有一定的適用范圍。作者認為對于沖擊反應(yīng)理論,最適用于研究近代的中外貿(mào)易和沿海港口城市,研究內(nèi)陸則不適用。中國很多問題看似由于西方的沖擊而引起的,但是中國古代也曾有過類似現(xiàn)象,只有從中國的傳統(tǒng)中才能理解最近中國歷史(the recent Chinese past)。比如戊戌維新變法,如果不從中國古代的改革傳統(tǒng)中去理解,就很難明白康有為為什么要托古改制,又比如農(nóng)民起義,表面上是受西方的影響,但是如果不從地理環(huán)境去研究中國區(qū)域史就很難理解為什么農(nóng)民起義集中于一些特定區(qū)域。這些問題都需要跨出簡單的沖擊-反應(yīng)模式才能尋找到答案。至于傳統(tǒng)與現(xiàn)代理論,作者在書中說到,歷史不是必然截然分為傳統(tǒng)與現(xiàn)代,這種二分法本來就存在很大問題,把歷史化分為傳統(tǒng)與現(xiàn)代,就把過去與現(xiàn)在完全分開來了,所以我們對過去很多與現(xiàn)在相同東西就無法理解。帝國主義文化理論研究的是完全淪為半殖民地的國家,比如印度,但是中國則不然,中國是一個半殖民地國家,而且其影響主要集中在一些沿海地區(qū),西方國家對中國的占領(lǐng)是小部分的、短暫的,西方國家主要目的在于貿(mào)易,真正有心蠶食中國領(lǐng)土的是俄國和日本,因此西方國家的帝國主義在物質(zhì)層面是短暫的,但是另一方面,在精神層面卻是持久和深刻的,這一點可謂一針見血,看看我們中國現(xiàn)在的整個學(xué)術(shù)局面就知道了,說現(xiàn)在中國的現(xiàn)代學(xué)術(shù)源頭在西方毫不為過,中國人一波又一波留學(xué)海外足可說明此問題。作者在最后部分,提及了在美國在20世紀六、七十年時代,由于越戰(zhàn)打得艱難,美國人失去了原有的那種自傲心態(tài),于是在學(xué)術(shù)上也開始給予別國更多地位,中國史研究領(lǐng)域開始有不少學(xué)者批評前輩史學(xué)家的觀點,興起了史學(xué)新領(lǐng)域,比如中國區(qū)域史研究、市場體系研究、城市史研究,以及中國明清史研究(從古代史中探尋最近中國歷史,這些進展表明美國中國史研究更趨深化和具體化,作者認為中國特點是多樣性,層次性,所以不能籠統(tǒng)地研究中國,作者自己的相關(guān)研究中就把中國分為沿海和內(nèi)陸,而G。William Skinner又從地理角度將中國分為九大區(qū)域:東北、北部,西北,長江上游,長江中游,長江下游,東南沿海,嶺南,云貴地區(qū)。作者還提醒說,其實中國區(qū)域的劃分不是固定不變的,應(yīng)該根據(jù)所研究的問題進行劃分,而且要注意不要習(xí)以為常地以行政劃分(省州縣)為標準,而應(yīng)該以地理文化的因素來決定哪些地方可以化在一起,哪些不行,因為行政劃分是人為的劃分,不是地理和文化的區(qū)分。作者還總結(jié)性地說到,我們研究歷史往往是根據(jù)歷史家自己時代的價值觀念和自己的偏見來看過去,如果要相對客觀的話,我們必需從歷史本身出發(fā)才能真正理解,所以研究中國史就必須從中國自身的脈絡(luò)中才能理解中國史,這正是作者提出中國中心觀(China—centered history)的理論依據(jù)。
綜觀全書,柯文是在自己的思維脈絡(luò)中展開的一次對美國中國最近歷史研究的哲學(xué)思考,而不是胡斯亂咬美國中國近代史研究的同行和前輩,但是我讀中譯本時卻有如此這般印象,看來中譯本真是誤人不淺,所以還是勸大家讀國外學(xué)術(shù)著作,最好讀外文原著,不要讀中譯本。對于費正清的觀點,我們怎么看呢?我想還是不能徹底否定的,只有站在前輩的肩上我們才能走得更遠,這正如費正清自己所言:
How Can mankind move upward except by standing on the shoulders and faces of the older generation?(摘自該書開篇所引非正清語錄)