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　　在當(dāng)代西方分析哲學(xué)史上，彼得·斯特勞森是一個(gè)具有劃時(shí)代意義的英國(guó)哲學(xué)家：他以語(yǔ)言分析方法對(duì)形而上學(xué)問(wèn)題的研究，使分析哲學(xué)的反形而上學(xué)態(tài)度開(kāi)始發(fā)生轉(zhuǎn)變，由此，他與美國(guó)哲學(xué)家蒯因共同被看做改變了分析哲學(xué)的發(fā)展方向。同時(shí)，在當(dāng)今牛津哲學(xué)中，斯特勞森還是一個(gè)獨(dú)特的，甚至有些傳統(tǒng)的哲學(xué)家：他對(duì)日常語(yǔ)言的邏輯分析不僅是從自然的、常識(shí)的立場(chǎng)出發(fā)，而且往往使用傳統(tǒng)哲學(xué)中的許多概念術(shù)語(yǔ)，如“共相”、“殊相”、“范疇”、“斷定”、“個(gè)體”、“屬性”、“命題”等等，這些就使他的哲學(xué)在分析中有了思辨的色彩。他的這本代表作《西方語(yǔ)言哲學(xué)經(jīng)典原著系列·個(gè)體：論描述的形而上學(xué)》就充分體現(xiàn)了他的這種哲學(xué)特點(diǎn)。

作者簡(jiǎn)介

作者：（英國(guó)）斯特勞森（Straswon P.F.）

書(shū)籍目錄

INTRODUCTION  PART I: PARTICULARS Ⅰ. BODIES 1. The Identification of Particulars [1] We identify particulars in spech. The identiflability of some kinds of particular may be dependent upon the identifi-ability of other kinds. [2] Identification of particulars which are sensibly present.The identification of particulars which are not sensibly pre-sent raises a theoretical problem. Its solution. [3] The general conditions of particular-identification. These conditions are satisfiable because our knowledge of particulars forms a unified structure o/a spatio-temporal character. 2. Reidentification [4] A condition of our possessing such a scheme of knowledge of particulars is the ability to reidentify particulars. Scepti-cism about reidentification. [5] Reidentification of places. 3. Basic Particulars [6] A general argument to show that material bodies are the basic particudars from the point of view of identification. [7] Arguments to the same effect from the nature of different categories of particulars. 2. SOUNDS [1] Is the status of material bodies as basic particulars a necessary condition of any scheme whatever which provides for knowledge of objective particulars? [2] The character o/this chapter. [3] The model of the auditory world. The problem of satisfy-ing the conditions of a non-solipsistic consciousness. 3. PERSONS [ 1 ] Why are states of consciousness ascribed to anything ? and why to the same thing as corporeal characteristics? [2] The unique position of the personal body in perceptual experience described; but this does not answer these questions. [3] Cartesian and 'No-ownership' views. The incoherence of the No-ownership view. [4] A condition of the ascription of states of consciousness to oneself is ability to ascribe them to others. The incoherence of the Cartesian view. The primitiveness of the concept of a person. [5] The logical character of a fundamental class of personal predicates. [6] The central importance of predicates ascribing actions. The idea of a 'group mind'. [7] Disembodiment. 4. MONADS PART Ⅱ: LOGICAL SUBJECTS 5. SUBJECT AND PREDICATE (1): TWO CRITERIA [1] The distinction between particulars and universals is traditionally associated in a certain way with the distinction between reference and predication or between subject and predicate. 1. The 'Grammatical' Criterion [2] Various forms of the reference-predication or subject-predicate distinction recognized by philosophers. [3] One prima facie attractive way of explaining the dis-tinction is shown to be inadequate. Viewing it as a distinction between grammatical styles of term-introduction seems to yield more satisfactory results. [4] Quine's distinction in terms of the variables of quantifi-cation does not at first sight offer an alternative interpretation. [5] F inalstatement, on the present approach, of the conditions of an expression' s being a subject- or predicate-expression. [6] The present, grammatical approach to the subject-pre-dicate distinction, though it appears to harmonize with authori-tative views, is not the only possible approach. [7] The grammatical approach encourages scepticism both about the importance of the subject-predicate distinction and about its traditional association with the particular-universal distinction. …… 6. SUBJECT AND PREDICATE (2): LOGICAL SUBJECTS AND PARTICULAR OBJECTS CONCLUSION INDEX

章節(jié)摘錄

版權(quán)頁(yè)：   But how shall we divide publicly perceptible, or publicly observable, particulars into types or categories? Clearly there are many ways of doing so, adapted to different philosophical purposes. I shall be content with the roughest of divisions. I shall speak, for example, of events and processes, states and conditions on the one hand; and of material bodies or things possessing material bodies, on the other. I shall use these terms loosely: for example, a field or a river will count as material bodies or things possessing material bodies. In general, I shall not claim that my distinctions are very clear, or that they are precise or exhaustive. They may nevertheless serve my purpose. Another distinction, worth men-tioning now, to which I shall later refer is that between, e.g.events and processes which, as named and conceived of by us,necessarily are of, or performed or undergone by, material bodies or things possessing material bodies, and events and processes not of this kind. Thus a death is necessarily the death of some creature. But that a flash or a bang occurred does not entail that anything flashed or banged. 'Let there be light' does not mean 'Let something shine'. We have already seen that it is quite possible, in certain circum-stances, to identify, e.g., events and processes without any de-pendence on identification of particulars of other types. For public events and processes may be directly locatable. Such expressions as 'That flash', uttered immediately after there has been a flash,'That terrible noise', uttered while the noise continues, enable the hearer directly to locate the particular in question. They involve no reference to any other particular at all, except at most for the discountable implicit references to hearer and speaker which have already been discussed, and afortiori no reference to particulars of other types.

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《個(gè)體:論描述的形而上學(xué)》為“西方語(yǔ)言哲學(xué)經(jīng)典原著系列”之一。

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