維特根斯坦全集（全12卷）
出版時間：2003-1 出版社：河北教育出版社 作者：[奧] 路德維希·維特根斯坦 頁數(shù)：12冊 字數(shù)：3200000 譯者：涂紀亮 等
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內(nèi)容概要
最近二三十年來，在西方哲學界掀起了一股強勁的“維特根斯坦研究熱”，連續(xù)出版了數(shù)十本研究他的哲學思想的專著，論文更是不計其數(shù)。在維特根斯坦逝世52周年之際，出版他的12卷本的《全集》，具有特殊的紀念意義。
出版西方哲學家的全集，這是繼苗力田的《亞里士多德全集》之后的第二套全集。由于維特根斯坦對20世紀西方哲學思想界影響巨大，因此《全集》的出版在思想界、哲學界、出版界、翻譯界都是值得慶幸的大事，它對于促進中西學術(shù)文化交流，繁榮我國哲學社會科學，都將產(chǎn)生十分重要的影響。
維特根斯坦（1889 1951）是英籍奧地利裔學者，是20世紀西方重要的哲學家和思想家。他的著作和思想對當代西方哲學的發(fā)展產(chǎn)生了重要影響。他不僅直接促成了當代英美分析哲學的形成和發(fā)展，而且對當代歐洲大陸哲學的發(fā)展也起到了關鍵作用。
書籍目錄
第一卷 邏輯筆記（1913年） 向摩爾口述的筆記（1914年） 1914－1916年筆記 邏輯哲學論（1921年） 略論邏輯形式（1929年）第二卷 路德維?！ぞS特根斯坦與維也納小組（1929－1931年）第三卷 哲學評論（1929－1930年）第四卷 哲學語法（1931－1933年）第五卷 維特根斯坦1930－1932年劍橋講演集 維特根斯坦1932－1935年劍橋講演集第六卷 藍皮書與一種哲學考察（褐皮書）（1933－1935年）第七卷 論數(shù)學的基礎（1937－1944年）第八卷 哲學研究（1945－1949年）第九卷 心理學哲學評論（1946－1947年）第十卷 關于心理學哲學的最后著作（1948－1949年） 論確實性（1949年）第十一卷 雜評（1914－1951年） 紙條集（1945－1948年） 關于顏色的評論（1950－1951年）第十二卷 關于倫理學的講演（1929年） 評弗雷澤的《金枝》（1931－1936年） 哲學（1933年） 關于“私人經(jīng)驗”和“感覺材料”的講演筆記（1934－1936年） 感覺經(jīng)驗的語言與私人經(jīng)驗（1936年） 原因與結(jié)果：直覺意識（1937年） “哲學演講”筆記（1941－1942年） 關于哲學、心理學和宗教信仰的講演與談話（1936－1946年）
媒體關注與評論
維特根斯坦的著作難讀難譯，以涂紀亮為首的專家們用6年時間，能啃下這樣一塊硬骨頭，值得稱贊。維特根斯坦的著作雖在1927年就有中文譯本，但一直沒有完整的材料。譯者們經(jīng)過艱辛努力，為中國讀者做了一件好事。這不但是我國學術(shù)界、出版界的一件大事，也是國際學術(shù)界的一件大事。
編輯推薦
維特根斯坦的著作難讀難譯，以涂紀亮為首的專家們用6年時間，能啃下這樣一塊硬骨頭，值得稱贊。維特根斯坦的著作雖在1927年就有中文譯本，但一直沒有完整的材料。譯者們經(jīng)過艱辛努力，為中國讀者做了一件好事。這不但是我國學術(shù)界、出版界的一件大事，也是國際學術(shù)界的一件大事。
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評論、評分、閱讀與下載
用戶評論 (總計5條)
- 偉大的哲學家!
- 暫時只針對第十二卷，譯者放任到極限，達雅不及，而信亦未能至，不一一指出了；簡單的例舉一個“poor evidence”（p390，第十二卷），翻成“可憐的證據(jù)”。其它類似的地方很多，我是對比英文本看的，不知是否原版，但譯者在此的表現(xiàn)確實出乎意料，這本書不知道是拿給誰看的，但愿不要誤人。
后補：涂先生業(yè)已溘然長逝，其工作頗有矚目之處，亦算學界之損失矣；譯者江怡雖是直譯，而不通之處甚多，大概在此用力不多而至於此。 - The conception of a philosopher’s philosophy could be obtained, loosely this way, by drawing a boundary for that philosopher – a boundary that defines what philosophical problems are and what are not – The boundary inwardly encapsulates the philosopher’s philosophical theories, the conception of philosophy then is what can be essentially abstracted from these philosophical theories. For Wittgenstein, that boundary is the analysis of language. Yet if I proceed hastily this way, we might completely misunderstand Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy, because we implicitly hold a traditional conception of philosophy which is precisely what Wittgenstein would reject.
What constitutes traditional conception of philosophy then, if you agree, is a way of answering or explaining philosophical problems by positing philosophical theories, in short it begins with philosophical problems. On the other hand, Wittgenstein did not think that there are genuine philosophical problems in the first place, and philosophy should start by realizing that philosophical problems are pseudo-problems, hence philosophy should disappear. As evidently in the preface of Tractatus, Wittgenstein summarizes neatly his conception of philosophy as follows:
What can be said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence.
Therefore, what can be said at all can be said clearly, which clearly indicates that there are no genuine philosophical problems: The riddle does not exist. If a question can be framed at all, it is also possible to answer it (Tractatus §6.5), philosophical problems are merely confusions in language and we must pass over in silence. Because the solutions provided in Tractatus are by no means themselves philosophical theories, this is why Wittgenstein claims “how little is achieved” when solutions of problems are found (Tractatus preface) and the solutions are merely ladders to be thrown (Tractatus §6.54). Consequently, Wittgenstein hadn’t answered philosophical problems with philosophical theories, instead he tried to dissolve the so-called philosophical problems. I could not help arriving at the conclusion that what Wittgenstein said about language is primarily intended to show (in a Tractatian sense) his conception of philosophy. In other words, his philosophy does not begin with linguistic analysis to answer any philosophical problems, instead it begins with the conception of philosophy that there are no genuine philosophical problems – the complete silence – and then he simply wanted to describe how such pseudo-problems could possibly occur.
Richard Rorty once said that there exists a later Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations, who belongs with Dewey, distinct from earlier Wittgenstein, who belongs with Kant, of Tractatus (Consequences of Pragmatism, p28). It’s thus been a popular opinion to distinguish two Wittgenstein from Tractatus and Philosophical Investigations, simply comparing the technical language employed in Tractatus and ordinary language used in Philosophical Investigations, and indeed, Tractatus is repudiated explicitly as containing grave mistakes in the preface of Philosophical Investigations.
Despite this apparent shift from a picture theory of logic beneath the surface of language to the games conception of language, there had been no shift in Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy throughout his whole philosophical career. Wittgenstein firmly believed that there are no genuine philosophical problems from the very outset, he wrote more because he thought what previously had been said was not satisfactory in showing this conception of philosophy.
Early Wittgensteinian philosophy contends that pseudo-philosophical problems arise due to the lack of understanding of the logic of our language (Tractatus §4.003), philosophy is thus a critique of language (Tractatus §4.0031) and the activity to logically clarify thoughts (Tractatus §4.112). These words might give a false prima facie impression that the boundary of philosophy is now drawn clearly by Wittgenstein, those who misunderstood Wittgenstein , like logical positivists, mistakenly took this as if Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy was all about linguistic analysis. In a letter to an editor who wanted to publish Tractatus, Wittgenstein had written explicitly that the book’s point was ethical, and explained that his conception of philosophy was to dissolve philosophical problems (On Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, p42).
In later Wittgenstein’s work Philosophical Investigations, although, it seems that what Wittgenstein says about language has changed, away from stressing the ontological importance of the mirroring of the world (the fact-stating discourse) to a more pragmatic sense that defines meaning in use (The Great Philosophers, p326). This does not at any rate alter his conception of philosophy. In Philosophical Investigations §89 Wittgenstein refers to the famous Augustine’s saying in Confessions, and reminds us the intuition of the problem “What, then, is time?”
We know when no one asks us, but no longer know when we are supposed to give an account of it.
This is meant to illustrate that genuine philosophical problems do not exist, the confusions arise when language is like an engine idling (PI §132) such as Augustine’s case. In §109, Wittgenstein claims that Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language, and this bewitchment is due to the false belief of existence of philosophical problems and explanations needed for them. Later Wittgenstein, like himself in the earlier period, aimed to show his conception of philosophy that philosophical problems are pseudo problems, in this way, he means problems are solved, not a single problem (PI §133).
So far, I have described Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy, deliberately downplaying the role of his linguistic analysis in different phases, in order to emphasize that Wittgenstein does not intend to advocate a philosophy of language, rather Wittgenstein has his conception, his attitude, and his belief of philosophy that philosophical problems are pseudo problems before he says anything that we would, in this case mistakenly, classify them as philosophy of language. For Wittgenstein there cannot be a new philosophy created to dissolve philosophical problems. There should be no philosophy at all, only therapeutic methods. As I believe, this is crucial to understand Wittgenstein’s seemingly disjointed remarks while at the same time avoiding any self-inconsistent interpretations of Wittgenstein. And this is why I think a discussion on his conception of philosophy should precede his doctrines on language.
At this point we might ask ourselves this question, are there no genuine philosophical problems at all? If we attempt to answer this question, we will ultimately fall back to a critical analysis of Wittgensteinian discussion on language. But it seems to be wrong, as Wittgenstein does not want to explain why there are no genuine philosophical problems, he wants to show how no genuine philosophical problems are to be possible. Then, could we begin our philosophy from a different route, originating from a conception of philosophy that treats philosophical questions as genuine as they can be? Say, can we commence philosophy with a question such as “what is time”, and believe that we can get an account or theory of it?
It is possible indeed. In a Pyrrhonian sense of equipollence, the choice of conception of philosophy becomes a point of departure or divergence in the presupposed view of reality. Is reality as descriptive as what it is, or can we be more argumentative as there is something deeper or higher than the appearance of reality? Still, theorizing and seriously attempting to solve philosophical problems is possible, as a matter of fact, it is what a lot of philosophers firmly believe. Although, Wittgenstein would say he provided an alternative to this conception, an alternative that would bring peace to philosophy and end the confusions and torment (PI §132) haunted with any form of theorizing. Is this fully convincing to give up all the philosophical problems? Well, we can argue either way.
However, even if we can accept that Wittgenstein has provided a possibility of solutions. There is something, which is constantly remerging in philosophy as whole, disturbing in Wittgenstein’s philosophy and interpretation of his work. This awkwardness in Wittgenstein’s philosophy, and in all negative philosophy, whose symptom I will term, in this particular context, as the paradox of Silence: to achieve complete silence, one might have to shout and break the silence, consequently silence becomes impossible. Quietism, in Wittgenstein’s philosophy, aims to make philosophical problems disappear, not only this did not happen, it left an inerasable trace in the history of philosophy, only more philosophical problem has emerged hitherto.
The paradox of Silence, as I believe, is akin to the problem of negation, persistently manifested in negative expression. By the very way of expression of any sort whether descriptive or argumentative, negative or positive, the expression will be inevitable turned into argumentative and positive through interpretations and re-interpretations. Even Wittgenstein himself did not want to write argumentatively or theorize in any way, followers and commentators would re-interpret and re-formulate, and even came up with personal excuses to explain why Wittgenstein failed to write argumentatively. Isn’t argumentative and positive form of expression presupposed in any conception of philosophy whatsoever? Even in such a short essay that I am attempting to show Wittgenstein is not in any way argumentative and positive, but isn’t this already becoming argumentative and positive and degenerating to its opposite end? The negation of philosophy merely turned itself into a different form of positive philosophy, to restore silence, we have to shout for it, and more shouts come along. Nietzsche, Heidegger and Derrida, like Wittgenstein, wanted to negate philosophy, but in the end they all fell into the trap of negative expression.
Wittgenstein himself was definitely conscious of this issue. The shift, if we observe carefully, from the way Tractatus and Philosophical Investigations were written, as I hypothesize, was mainly due to a resisting reaction to the logical positivists’ argumentative and positive interpretation of Tractatus, Wittgenstein, then had became less argumentative and less positive, hoping to dissolve any philosophical problems while at the same time dissolve what he said that could be possibly turned into a positive and argumentative theory. He thought a descriptive method might escape this problem (PI §124), but the problem still remains. Even descriptive propositions will fail the task. When we say descriptively that ‘there is no essence of X, only family resemblance’, then we might, against Wittgenstein’s will, interpret that ‘no essence’ is precisely X’s essence, which could be termed as ‘family resemblance’, although if we look rather than think like Wittgenstein suggested, it seems this attribution happens as a consequence of expression, not what Wittgenstein wanted to show, thus the very expression makes truly negative philosophy impossible. Philosophy expressible is not philosophy per se, the expression of philosophy makes it possible to be interpreted and reinterpreted, and philosophy is thus interpretations possible. So it is impossible for Wittgenstein to shout Silence, and it explains Wittgenstein’s frustration that “Sometimes, in doing philosophy, one just wants to utter an inarticulate sound” (PI §261).
The possibility envisaged by Wittgenstein conception of philosophy, the complete silence, remains impossible. Then shall we regard this possibility as illusionary? There will always be more interpretations and more philosophies just like what Wittgenstein said that there is no last house in the road and one can always build an additional house (PI §132). But, isn’t the limit in expression exposed by Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy triggers something that shall worry us? The paradox of Silence, just like the paradox of the liar who claims “I am telling a lie”, belongs to the group of problems that exhibit the same pattern - negative self-applicable expression is impossible. However, upon a closer look, the possibility created by Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy is excluded merely by this limit of expression. Cannot this bias of expression be a narrow-minded presupposition held generally? That is to say, can we revise our presupposition in expression and make negative expression equally possible as positive expression?
In such a short essay, I do not pretend to come up with anything explicit or concrete, I can only make rough draft of what it means to revise our presupposition of expression, in order that we are able to truly speak Silence. The idea is that we can replace our traditional positive-negative dichotomic expression to holistically metaphorical expression. Here, metaphorical means interpretations-open, not as traditional interpretations-close understanding of expression. The problem with interpretations-close understanding is that it discriminates negative expression, once the self-applicable expression hits the negative end, it is either closed as a contradiction (it is not a genuine contradiction, but a contradiction in expression superficially) or reinterpreted as positive expression, in a way that has the bias towards positive expression. On the other hand, the metaphorical understanding of expression invites all interpretations, most importantly, the interpretations derived themselves should be metaphorical, i.e. expression is self-applicable metaphorically like Wittgenstein ladders, whereas the implicit assumption in traditional understanding of expression is only self-applicable positively. It is in the hope of this new way of looking at expression, that Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy, the complete Silence, will become possible.
- 12卷都看完了？
- “The negation of philosophy merely turned itself into a different form of positive philosophy, to restore silence, we have to shout for it, and more shouts come along. Nietzsche, Heidegger and Derrida, like Wittgenstein, wanted to negate philosophy, but in the end they all fell into the trap of negative expression. ”
。。。
“On the other hand, the metaphorical understanding of expression invites all interpretations, most importantly, the interpretations derived themselves should be metaphorical, i.e. expression is self-applicable metaphorically like Wittgenstein ladders, whereas the implicit assumption in traditional understanding of expression is only self-applicable positively. It is in the hope of this new way of looking at expression, that Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy, the complete Silence, will become possible. ”
。。。