存在主義是一種人道主義

用戶評論 (總計(jì)95條)

•   貌似悲觀的存在主義傳達(dá)的真正意念在于給予我們從廢墟中重新站起來的力量，正如薩特的存在主義在二戰(zhàn)后的日本如此受歡迎，正如加繆西西弗斯的神話不斷將巨石推向山頂。一種沉重，深邃但又富含人道主義的哲學(xué)思想之下，薩特為我們闡釋了存在主義的真正內(nèi)涵。存在主義是一種人道主義。
•   一直都挺喜歡薩特的存在主義哲學(xué)，但是對于存在主義的核心思想一直都沒有清晰的輪廓，他的這篇文章本來是反駁其他評判存在主義的文章，但是對于我們進(jìn)入存在主義哲學(xué)的人來說，是很好的入門文章
•   薩特的著作對知識分子的人生起到一定的指導(dǎo)作用。
•   個(gè)人很崇拜薩特，要認(rèn)識薩特就請從這本書開始！
•   永遠(yuǎn)支持薩特！
•   已經(jīng)看過N遍，這本書還是值得收藏滴！
•   書印的很好，翻譯的也好，價(jià)錢又便宜，很不錯(cuò)
•   額外華國鋒大部分
•   譯得還可以
•   終于買到這本書了！！高興之極！?。∫灰刮春涎?，先睹為快了。讀書人的心情，本來如此。
•   譯文經(jīng)典系列當(dāng)然是好書，選題印刷都沒得說?？上?，正文第6頁第2行，“…上帝的觀念被禁止了，但是盡管如此，本質(zhì)先于存在的思想仍然沒有出現(xiàn)；這種思想到處都碰得見…”。這句話肯定有錯(cuò)誤！“出現(xiàn)”一詞是個(gè)錯(cuò)誤。在此句上文中，作者說明上帝是按本質(zhì)創(chuàng)造存在，也即“本質(zhì)先于存在”，何來“本質(zhì)先于存在的思想仍然沒有出現(xiàn)”？而存在主義者強(qiáng)調(diào)的是“存在先于本質(zhì)”。上帝的觀念既然被禁止了，那么“本質(zhì)先于存在”的觀念也應(yīng)該得到相應(yīng)的改變。因此，這句話要表達(dá)的意思應(yīng)該是，上帝的觀念雖然被禁止了，但是還沒有觸及本質(zhì)先于存在的觀念，也即本質(zhì)先于存在的思想仍然沒有改變。此處錯(cuò)誤可能是校對出現(xiàn)的錯(cuò)誤。希望下次印刷時(shí)能夠改正。
•   書很薄 但印刷很精美 封面也很美，喜歡！?。?！文章很精彩！對存在主義有了更多了解~
•   譯者的序把薩特的一生寫了一遍
•   薩特的思想 很多東西給人激勵
•   是正版。不過書略薄，不大適合做精裝...但是內(nèi)容和紙質(zhì)都不錯(cuò)，而且挺喜歡的，這就算沒白買了唄
•   送姐姐的，她很喜歡~
•   就是喜歡薩特，看他的書會有很多共鳴，也給自己提供了很多新的思考方向。
•   再版的書變成硬面的，適合收藏
•   還沒有看書，但是產(chǎn)品包裝不錯(cuò)，看起來很舒服
•   這本小冊子，編得很有意思
•   這本書是精裝本，看過去很像是精美的硬皮筆記本，內(nèi)容還沒看，應(yīng)該不錯(cuò)，比較薄，薩特大師的作品。
•   書的裝幀，印刷都非常好。。薩特的作品第一次讀
•   很古典包裝的小冊子，印刷很好。還沒看，給個(gè)好評。
•   　　薩特出版《存在與虛無》之后，雖然以嚴(yán)謹(jǐn)?shù)倪壿嬜屓诵蕾p，但太過晦澀，以至于“法國的普通讀者讀起來也十分苦惱”。而正因晦澀的哲學(xué)，讓人難以讀懂，往往就伴隨著斷章取義的曲解。
  　　
  　　薩特一度十分苦惱，“存在主義被指責(zé)為鼓勵人們對人生采取無所作為的絕望態(tài)度”。而另一方面的譴責(zé)來自于薩特的存在哲學(xué)并不承認(rèn)有所謂的“普遍的人性”存在。
  　　
  　　好吧，接下來可以大致交代一下薩特的主要思想了。首先“存在先于本質(zhì)”，這也就否定了神創(chuàng)造人的觀點(diǎn)?！叭司褪侨?。這不僅說他是自己認(rèn)為的那樣，而且也是他愿意成為的那樣。人除了自己認(rèn)為的那樣以外，什么都不是。”這樣看來，人會成為什么樣的人，完全都是自己選擇的結(jié)果。人有選擇的自由，而自由難免干涉他人。人總是在不斷做出選擇中生存，而人在做出選擇的時(shí)候，就要承擔(dān)做這個(gè)選擇相應(yīng)的責(zé)任。并想想如果人人都像你這樣做，會對社會造成什么影響。人在選擇的同時(shí)要承擔(dān)責(zé)任，這是存在的痛苦，而人可以自由的選擇，這是存在的樂觀。
  　　
  　　存在主義旨在說明，人的本質(zhì)是不斷改變的，人具備不斷完善自己的能力。而同時(shí)，一個(gè)人的所有處境都是自己的選擇，你之所以成為一個(gè)懦夫或者一個(gè)英雄，并非命中注定，而是你主動選擇的結(jié)果。每個(gè)人都能成為更好的人，除非他選擇墮落或者自己選擇不做選擇。行動，才是存在的唯一動力。“人只是他企圖成為的那樣，那只是在實(shí)現(xiàn)自己意圖上方才存在，所以他除掉自己的行動總和外，什么都不是。除掉他的生命外，什么都不是?！?br /> 　　
  　　在你沒有成為你最終要成為的那個(gè)人之前，你什么都可以改變。
•   　　這本很薄的小冊子收錄了兩篇文章，一篇是《存在主義是一種人道主義》的演講稿，另一篇是《對<局外人>的評論》。我猜想第二篇被收錄進(jìn)來多半是為了湊字，因?yàn)榈谝黄钠獭５幸馕兜氖?，這兩篇文章恰恰形成了有趣的張力，讓我們看到存在主義的不同面貌。薩特在第二篇文章中強(qiáng)調(diào)“存在”與語境相脫離，生活自身是無序的、斷裂的、由自足的一小段一小段拼接起來的，這構(gòu)成生活自身的荒誕。但這兩篇文章的并置，它們的不同側(cè)重乃至矛盾，恰恰提示我們存在主義內(nèi)在于它所處的語境當(dāng)中，是一種社會歷史性非常強(qiáng)的哲學(xué)思想。
  　　盡管《存在主義是一種人道主義》對存在主義的一些關(guān)鍵概念——比如焦慮，被拋，存在先于本質(zhì)，絕望等等——給予了深入淺出的解釋，編者仍然在這本書的序言部分提示我們，《存在主義是一種人道主義》是薩特面對社會主義和天主教力量對他的攻擊而所作出的回應(yīng)，并且是以公眾演講的方式，因而其針對性和文體意味著這篇文章并不能代替《存在與虛無》而成為我們理解薩特思想的路徑。這一提示的價(jià)值在我們讀《對<局外人>的評論》時(shí)就變得明朗起來。《存在主義是一種人道主義》所強(qiáng)調(diào)的人和人之間的互助關(guān)系以及共同命運(yùn)恰恰是《對<局外人>的評論》所潛在抵制的。在這篇更早的文章當(dāng)中，薩特認(rèn)為由于沒有某種先在的行為規(guī)范和道德準(zhǔn)則，一切自由選擇——自主決定并預(yù)見到該決定后果——基礎(chǔ)上的處世方式及思想觀念都是被允許的，因此這必然導(dǎo)致個(gè)體和個(gè)體之間的陌生感和溝通的有限性——“有一天你將發(fā)現(xiàn)你愛的那個(gè)人成為了陌生人”。薩特認(rèn)為人的高貴就在于意識到這種生之荒誕和無意義的必然性，并且有勇氣去直面這一事實(shí)，而不是和大多數(shù)人一起參與偽造某種道德標(biāo)準(zhǔn)和社會習(xí)俗，犧牲自覺的行為偏好、感覺和沖動去順從它，僅僅因?yàn)樗敲婺坎磺宓娜罕妱?chuàng)造并維持的假象。眾人同情或憤恨在這里，薩特顯然預(yù)設(shè)了“大多數(shù)人”是虛偽的，正是這種普遍的虛偽才成就了作為“局外人”的默而索的清醒以及他反抗絕望的悲劇精神。但在《存在主義是一種人道主義》當(dāng)中，薩特卻強(qiáng)調(diào)人和人之間的共同命運(yùn)以及某種實(shí)用主義精神——必須面對被拋的命運(yùn)，并且根據(jù)現(xiàn)有的資源進(jìn)行切合實(shí)際的自由選擇。他的“人道主義”就是個(gè)體必須以他之外的某種目標(biāo)為指向，并且將自身作為他所存在的宇宙的能動主體。
  　　不管這是他的原初想法還是他的權(quán)宜之計(jì)，通過強(qiáng)調(diào)絕望處境的必然性和自由選擇來爭取共產(chǎn)主義和天主教力量的同情和支持顯然是徒勞了。由于后兩者對身份政治的強(qiáng)調(diào)，自我犧牲而非自由選擇乃是它們的行為準(zhǔn)則。即便如此，無論共產(chǎn)主義還是天主教都無法忽視薩特，因?yàn)樗菓?zhàn)后人們的心態(tài)以及生存狀態(tài)的最好闡釋，沒有人可以逃脫。這也就是為什么薩特、加繆、海明威以及50-60年代西方社會運(yùn)動者以及80年代的中國青年能夠形成某種呼應(yīng)和聯(lián)系的根本原因。
  　　《對<局外人>的評論》另一個(gè)有趣之處是它的文本細(xì)讀。薩特用了一種絕對不亞于新批評和結(jié)構(gòu)主義的極其詳盡乃至于過度闡釋的方法分析了《局外人》用詞和局勢。語言學(xué)轉(zhuǎn)向影響下的批評方法按照科學(xué)主義的思路尋找語言的某種既定規(guī)律，而強(qiáng)調(diào)生活之荒誕的薩特作為那個(gè)時(shí)代的人，難免也借助甚至傾心于科學(xué)主義；正如加繆用一種極其嚴(yán)謹(jǐn)?shù)奈谋窘M織方法來建構(gòu)起某種荒謬和散漫的情節(jié)表象。這多少讓我們想起19世紀(jì)的拉斐爾前派——他們在緬懷中世紀(jì)以及英國民間文學(xué)的同時(shí)，對19世紀(jì)的自然主義以及科學(xué)技術(shù)采取積極投入的態(tài)度。薩特對線性時(shí)間和敘事性的反對賦予存在主義某種對時(shí)代、語境以及歷史的離心力，剩下的是自由的個(gè)體坐在一片上不著天下不著地的虛無和廢墟之中。但是無論是這種虛無情緒本身還是薩特（以及加繆）流露出的科學(xué)主義傾向，都使存在主義比其他諸多哲學(xué)思想更深地扎根于它藉以萌生的時(shí)代和社會。
  　　存在主義強(qiáng)調(diào)“向死而生”，要求個(gè)體明白自己被拋到虛無之中，必須自己賦予自己確定性；存在主義的實(shí)際處境恰恰相反——它誕生并存在于及其特殊的戰(zhàn)后社會語境當(dāng)中，卻努力要將自己導(dǎo)向無關(guān)于時(shí)間和連續(xù)性的虛無境地，并在此基礎(chǔ)上提供某種有關(guān)個(gè)體存在的普適性規(guī)律。
•   　?。≒16）我要估量這種感情的深淺，只有付諸行為，以行動來說明和肯定我的感情的深淺。
  　　
  　?。≒16）情感是由人的行為形成的。
  　　
  　?。≒17）在你選擇一個(gè)人向他請教時(shí)，你作這項(xiàng)選擇就已經(jīng)承擔(dān)責(zé)任了。
  　　
  　?。≒19）因?yàn)槿耸亲杂傻模覜]有什么人性可以認(rèn)為是基本的。
  　　
  　　（P20）事情是由人們決定要怎樣就怎樣的。
  　　
  　?。≒22）因?yàn)槭谷顺蔀榕撤虻氖欠艞壔蛘咦尣降男袨?；而氣質(zhì)并不是一種行動。
  　　
  　　（P25）對所謂人的處境，他們的理解是相當(dāng)清楚的，即一切早先就規(guī)定了人在宇宙中基本處境的限制。
  　?。ㄖ新裕?br /> 　　如果人不聯(lián)系這些限制而自由地決定自己和自己的存在，這些限制就是微不足道的。
  　　
  　　（P26）任何意圖都具有普遍性；在這個(gè)意義上，任何意圖都是任何人所理解得了的。
  　　
  　?。≒35）一個(gè)存在主義者永遠(yuǎn)不會把人當(dāng)作目的，因?yàn)槿巳耘f在形成中。
•   　　薩特對于周遭環(huán)境事物是那么敏感，他的“注視”體現(xiàn)在意識的牢牢鎖定，而已不局限于雙眼。意識催生出強(qiáng)大的念力，這是薩特一貫強(qiáng)調(diào)的積極性哲學(xué)。
  　　
  　　“行動吧，在行動的過程中就形成了自身，人是自己行動的結(jié)果，此外什么都不是?！辈灰屵z憾、悲愴在第一時(shí)間左右我們的主動思考、積極行動、向往自由的權(quán)利。
•   　　 活在這個(gè)世代的我的還在形成中的世界觀里有這么一個(gè)概念：沒有絕對的對，沒有絕對的錯(cuò)，每一種說法和每一個(gè)概念都代表一種角度在特定的場合下都是解釋的通的。至少我深以為然。
  　　 薩特的那本巨作我還沒看，只是看了這一篇簡短的辯護(hù)文，就產(chǎn)生了一些想法，想要做個(gè)筆記，這筆記只是有個(gè)人色彩的拙見而已。
  　　
  　　[12頁-22頁]
  　　1.“存在主義被指責(zé)為鼓勵人們對人生采取無所作為的絕望態(tài)度”
  　　 我想起那句“命里有時(shí)終須有，命里無時(shí)莫強(qiáng)求”。一聽就是宿命論的調(diào)調(diào)。宿命論在很多人眼中是很消極的，讓人不愉快的。當(dāng)年我娘常把這句話掛在嘴邊，就被同事指責(zé)消極了，多年后，經(jīng)歷了很多事后，那同事也開始同意這句話來了。人生的關(guān)鍵就是要學(xué)會放棄啊。
  　　
  　　2.“觀望是一種奢侈品”
  　　 置身事外，笑傲江湖，這是多少人的追求呢？這是溫飽解決后的事情吧？你看，我又俗了。置身俗世就是不可能抱觀望態(tài)度啊?？傆幸患虑闀屓藨嵟模傆幸患虑闀屓送榈?，雖然是別人的事情，但總有一些事情會觸動到自己的神經(jīng)的。做到不問世事的，估計(jì)不是凡人了吧。
  　　
  　　3.“存在主義被責(zé)難為強(qiáng)調(diào)了人類處境的陰暗一面”
  　　 新聞里那些讓人不爽的案件特別讓人印象深刻；剛接觸占星時(shí)，我對那些硬相位特別感興趣，總覺得理解了那些最不堪的境況，接受了最壞的可能性，就沒有比這更慘的遭遇了。人類處境的陰暗面也好，人類內(nèi)在的陰暗面也好，有光明就有陰影，承認(rèn)月球有站在這里看不到的那一頭背面，就是悲觀主義么？
  　　
  　　4.“人是無法同存在于自我之外的他人取得一致的”
  　　 一個(gè)人是一座島----水木丁姐的博客標(biāo)題----當(dāng)時(shí)偶然瞥見就非常合我心意啊。后來對薩特的初次印象是他的那句“他人即地獄”。想要與他人取得一致，這個(gè)目標(biāo)太遙遠(yuǎn)了嘛，要求太高了嘛。一家人都有參差不齊的，更何況不同環(huán)境長大的他人？正因?yàn)闊o法取得一致，所以我們偶爾碰見意見差不多，興趣愛好差不多的人，就特別高興，特別的有志同道合甚至靈魂伴侶的感覺。
  　　
  　　5.“誰喜歡怎樣做就可以怎樣做，我們將無法申斥任何人的觀點(diǎn)或者行動”
  　　 這句說得好像法律道德正義等無法束縛一個(gè)人一樣。最近也在看盧梭的《社會契約論》，在談生死權(quán)時(shí)，有一點(diǎn)大概是說，我們都沒有處死別人的權(quán)利，而法律上有刑罰，是因?yàn)槲覀兠總€(gè)人在立法之前就因?yàn)榇蠹叶疾幌氤蔀閮词值臓奚?，而一致同意假如自己成為了兇手也得死。最初的目的就是為了保障自己的生命，沒有人在當(dāng)初就預(yù)想自己被處死的。而兇手是侵犯了他人，攻擊了社會權(quán)利，破壞了國家法律，所以保全國家和保全兇手不能相容。
  　　 不過，在不重大影響他人的情況下，這句話是成立的吧。那么自殺呢？自殺者的身體已經(jīng)毀滅了，死亡這件事情在他死后仍然不停折磨著跟他最親近的人，等于他一直在傷害他們。那么不相干的陌生人呢？所以這句話是針對陌生人的么？我們無法對陌生人所作所為評價(jià)什么的意思？
  　　
  　　6.“存在主義是一種使人生成為可能的學(xué)說，它為人類打開了選擇的可能性”
  　　 過去我比較相信宿命論，覺得遇到的事情都有我遇到它們的道理，如果一切都是應(yīng)該出現(xiàn)的，那么困難和悲傷也是應(yīng)該有的，我就不會那么想不通那么不開心了。后來出現(xiàn)了一些用這個(gè)理論講不通的事情。如果把這個(gè)世界解釋成，一切事物不是由必然性而是由偶然性組成的，這就把上面宿命論的一些bug給修復(fù)了。我的生存之道的一些bug也修復(fù)了。
  　　
  　　7.“裁紙刀的本質(zhì)，先于它的存在”
  　　 這句是針對已存在的物體說的吧。工匠會想要達(dá)到某一固定目的而按照固定方式制造物件，所以技術(shù)角度看是本質(zhì)在先，存在在后。那按這個(gè)思路想，對于已存在的bug，人們想要改善生活，所以發(fā)明一些什么去修復(fù)那個(gè)bug，也是來源于固定的未知目的的需要？
  　　 這么說來，知道自己缺什么，應(yīng)該在缺的方面填補(bǔ)一些什么，這么清楚的目的，不會是完全的未知，不是完全的無中生有呢（無中生有，怎么能“無”中生“有”呢，早期發(fā)明都是本來就存在于自然界的物體來的，這么說，應(yīng)該是存在先于本質(zhì)咯？），所以連發(fā)明創(chuàng)造也是有根有據(jù)的。
  　　 最初原始社會的一些偶然發(fā)現(xiàn)是偶然性積累成規(guī)律的結(jié)果，現(xiàn)在要做的好像是不停的修復(fù)那些bug?；蛘哂羞@樣的想法，正是因?yàn)槲颐撾x不出那個(gè)框框（本質(zhì)）吧。
  　　
  　　8.“如果存在真是先于本質(zhì)的話，人就要對自己是怎樣的人負(fù)責(zé)”
  　　 這句話是用誰的角度來說的呢？如果啊，這里只有我跟你。你做了一件自找的事情，我勸過你了，你不聽還是繼續(xù)深陷其中，那么我應(yīng)該不要多干涉啊。一件事情，我覺得不好的，你覺得沒什么，那么我也不該多說什么，最終的任何后果都是你承擔(dān)的。但是，無論怎樣，即使是我決定不要多干涉你的事，還是我認(rèn)為你要自己為自己負(fù)責(zé)，都其實(shí)免不了有種勸不了你，為了擺脫內(nèi)疚感困擾而找托詞的意思在里面。不過你做“錯(cuò)”事，我決定放棄勸說你，其實(shí)也就決定了要承擔(dān)這種內(nèi)疚感纏身的感覺了。所以，所有行為的后果，不管愿意不愿意，真的是自負(fù)的。
  　　
  　　9.“……所有領(lǐng)袖都懂得這種痛苦。它阻止不了他們采取行動；相反，它是他們行動的真正條件，因?yàn)檫@個(gè)行動先就假定有多種可能性，而選擇其中之一時(shí)，他們懂得其價(jià)值只是由于被挑選上了”
  　　 總覺得，即使預(yù)知了無法逃脫的壞結(jié)局仍然改變不了奔向那個(gè)結(jié)局的命運(yùn)的，這是不是消極就不知道了，沒有一點(diǎn)外力是很難脫軌的呢。
  　　 這篇小短文本身只是12頁-42頁共三十頁那么長，后面的再有什么想法也不記錄了，或者是我虎頭蛇尾了，或者是覺得這些想法沒有建設(shè)性不想再多糾纏了，又或者是家里太吵了，等下次一時(shí)打雞血再記錄吧。
  　　 12宮蠢蠢欲動的這幾年，估計(jì)能期待有很多的成長吧，真好>v<。
  　　
  　　
  　　==============存在主義的核心思想==============
  　　[34頁]
  　　自由承擔(dān)責(zé)任的絕對性質(zhì)；通過自由承擔(dān)責(zé)任，任何人在體現(xiàn)一種人類類型時(shí)，也體現(xiàn)了自己——這樣的承擔(dān)責(zé)任，無論對什么人，也不管在任何時(shí)代，始終是可理解的——以及因這種絕對承擔(dān)責(zé)任而產(chǎn)生的對文化模式的相對性影響。
  　　============================================
•   　　 在人存在之前神并不存在，因而不存在任何預(yù)設(shè)的目的，人的一切都應(yīng)該有人來決定；人給自己下定義，人決定自己應(yīng)該成為什么樣的人。
  　　
  　　 人不能把他的意愿交給他人，因?yàn)槿耸亲杂傻?，他有自己的選擇，他遵循自己的意志，我唯一能依靠的只有自己，事實(shí)上也是如此，我們不能把自己的意志和選擇加給他人，也不能相信承載自己意志的人會絕對按照自己的意志行事。
  　　
  　　 除掉行動外，沒有真實(shí)，人只是他企圖成為的那樣，除掉他自己的行動總和外，他什么都不是，一個(gè)人成為什么人是根據(jù)他做的事情決定的，人的生活就是行動，由他做的事我們可以判斷他是什么人和他擁有什么生活。
  　　
  　　 存在主義不使人成為物，不使人成為實(shí)現(xiàn)目的的手段，而是人本身就是目的，這個(gè)目的沒有止境，因?yàn)槿艘恢痹诎l(fā)展，唯物主義說物質(zhì)決定意識，意識是對物質(zhì)的反映，對同樣的物質(zhì)而言人類具有相同的反應(yīng)，這就預(yù)設(shè)了人的行動，這可能么？再次重申一點(diǎn)，人是自由的，人不是手段。
  　　
  　　 我們從我思中發(fā)現(xiàn)了自己，也發(fā)現(xiàn)了別人，沒有對照的我思并不能得出什么結(jié)論，這是參照物，發(fā)現(xiàn)自己的同時(shí)也發(fā)現(xiàn)了別人，別人是自己存在的條件。
  　　
  　　 人類可以理解他人一方面是因?yàn)槿祟惿钤谕瑯拥南拗葡?，比如勞動和死亡，這些限制使人類相互理解成為可能。存在主義的核心思想是自由承擔(dān)責(zé)任的絕對性，人在承擔(dān)責(zé)任是不僅反映了他自己，也反映了這一類人的類型，這種絕對承擔(dān)責(zé)任對文化模式產(chǎn)生相對性的影響，責(zé)任是絕對的，但是根據(jù)限制的不同責(zé)任的具體內(nèi)容有所不同，由此得到了不同的文化模式，但是由于共同限制的存在，使人類的相互理解成為了可能。
  　　
  　　 人類通過行動承擔(dān)責(zé)任，而行動之前需要選擇，選擇是普遍性的，在某種意義上，選擇是可能的，而不選擇不是不可能的，即使不選擇，也不過是我選擇的不選擇，這仍然是一種選擇，只是在這種選擇里我選擇不選擇，比如沉默不說話，或者靜止不行動。生活是由人決定的，生活在沒有人生活之前是沒有，內(nèi)容的，他的價(jià)值恰恰就是你選擇的那種意義，而這些選擇所導(dǎo)致的行為構(gòu)成了生活本身，也就是說生活并不是預(yù)設(shè)的，在人存在之前沒有生活。
  　　
  　　 存在的人道主義，是除了人之外，并無其他的立法者存在。另外，存在主義認(rèn)為人必須在自身之外尋求一個(gè)解放自己或者體現(xiàn)某種理想的目標(biāo)，人才能體現(xiàn)自己真正是人，也就是說人要給自己定目標(biāo)，在行動中規(guī)定自己是什么人，并在行動中規(guī)定自己的本質(zhì)，而這個(gè)目標(biāo)是超越自己的。
•   　　薩特說存在主義是一種人道主義，基礎(chǔ)觀點(diǎn)是存在先于本質(zhì)，具體到人，那便是人成為什么樣的人是由其自身選擇造成的。懦夫也好，強(qiáng)者也罷，這些并不是一開始就存在的，也就是說并非與生俱來的。換句話說，人具有極強(qiáng)的主觀能動性，并且應(yīng)該為自己的行為負(fù)責(zé)。人在選擇的同時(shí)應(yīng)該思索“如果人人都像我這樣做，世界會變得怎么樣”？即人在抉擇的同時(shí)，為全社會樹立了模板，該為全社會負(fù)責(zé)。在他的體系中，評判的標(biāo)尺是自由——高層次的自由，猶如在司湯達(dá)《巴馬修道院》里，拉?桑賽飛琳娜由于相信一個(gè)男子的真正價(jià)值就在于有熱情，當(dāng)眾宣稱崇高的感情是值得為之做出犧牲的。而且，正如司湯達(dá)所表現(xiàn)的，如果生活對她做出這種要求，她也會從感情的高度犧牲自己。這種自由，絕非為泄欲胡作非為的借口。
  　　與此相對的是叔本華對于人自身的定義。叔本華認(rèn)為人的本質(zhì)從一開始便已注定，它是不可更改的。后天的教育及其他外界因素的影響改變的只是人的思維方式。也就是說他本身的目標(biāo)并未改變，只是所采取的手段方式被束縛，或是說被教導(dǎo)。就好比一個(gè)個(gè)利己主義者，在外界環(huán)境的影響下，他的思維方式可能發(fā)生改變，通過不同的抉擇，塑造不同的形象，如懦弱——保全自身，息事寧人，卑劣——損人利己，不擇手段，高尚——爭取平等，只有如此自己的權(quán)利才能取得最大化并長期維持?？偠灾?，我覺得存在先于形象，而非本質(zhì)。因?yàn)橹挥姓媲榱髀兜啮情g才是他本質(zhì)的體現(xiàn)，而這往往連他自己都未曾發(fā)覺。
  　　薩特說只要有足夠的資料，我們總有辦法去了解一個(gè)人?？蓡栴}的關(guān)鍵在于，我們?nèi)绾稳フ莆兆銐蚨嗟馁Y料？有時(shí)候，我們獲得到的都是帶有偏見的，有時(shí)候抉擇本身就是違心之作。記得古人舉過一個(gè)例子（具體是誰我忘了）：從山的一邊越過鴻溝抵達(dá)另一邊，勇者可能不需要借助外界刺激，想跳也就跳了；次勇者，激以十金；次次勇者，百金。金錢不足，后面追著老虎，他也就跳了過去。這個(gè)例子可能極端了一點(diǎn)，但可以說明抉擇都是一樣的，原因卻很不同，我們所看到的并不是率性而發(fā)的“本質(zhì)”。另外，薩特要求我們從心而為之，可多少人能有這樣的氣魄，大多數(shù)人可能更多的是妥協(xié)，就連強(qiáng)力意志的尼采，最終受不了孤寂而瘋狂。例如最近一位在中國大受追捧的韓星，曾經(jīng)是很man的，如今做出這樣的改變，你說哪個(gè)是他真實(shí)想法？又或者都不是？而在中國，壓抑就更為全方位了。我覺得人的本質(zhì)是不能被認(rèn)識的，我們所了解到的，只是粉飾過的形象罷了。
  　　縱使這樣，我仍認(rèn)同人要為自己的行為負(fù)責(zé)。就好比利己主義者，你追求利益最大化并沒有錯(cuò)，但手段方法便受到法律的制約了。你既然做出了選擇，就應(yīng)該明白這之后的影響及所要承擔(dān)的責(zé)任。情非得已的情況不是沒有，但特殊不能代替一般，且成年人有且必須有自制力，有自律意識，也因此所采取的行為并非本質(zhì)的體現(xiàn)。
  　　薩特的觀點(diǎn)我并非全部認(rèn)同，但人的形象確實(shí)是由于自我的不斷抉擇所塑造的，自身的不如意自己要負(fù)很大的責(zé)任。我不是鷹犬，只是我們不能只是抱怨，要生存，要發(fā)展，要解決問題。
  　　
•   　　這本書由兩部分組成，兩部分譯者不同，第一部分是“針對幾種對存在主義的責(zé)難進(jìn)行辯護(hù)”，短短三十幾頁，對存在主義有了大概的了解；第二部分是薩特和萊維的對話，主要涉及薩特思想的演化，這一部分讓我覺得艱澀難懂，讀起來很吃力，讀完不知所云。
  　　第一部分讀完還是很有收獲的：
  　　存在主義是一種容易理解、容易踐行的實(shí)用主義哲學(xué)。
  　　它強(qiáng)調(diào)存在先于本質(zhì)，“首先有人，人碰上自己，在世界上涌現(xiàn)出來——然后才給自己下定義”。
  　　存在主義強(qiáng)調(diào)人的主觀性，意義通過選擇和行動體現(xiàn)出來，“人只是在企圖成為什么的時(shí)候才取得存在”。
  　　行動的重要性不言而喻，理論和信仰如果有什么現(xiàn)實(shí)意義，也不過是起一種大綱性質(zhì)的指導(dǎo)作用，“這就是說，去發(fā)明吧。沒有任何普遍的道德準(zhǔn)則能指點(diǎn)你應(yīng)當(dāng)怎樣做：世界上沒有任何天降的標(biāo)志……但是盡管有，不管是什么情形，總還得我自己去理解這些標(biāo)志”。
  　　對于喜歡抱怨和推脫責(zé)任的人來說，存在主義就像是當(dāng)頭一棒，“一個(gè)人投入生活中，給自己畫了像，除了這個(gè)畫像外，什么都沒有”。
  　　但是存在主義是樂觀的，“是懦夫把自己變成懦夫，是英雄把自己變成英雄；而且這種可能性是永遠(yuǎn)存在的”。
•   　　 此文是薩特對存在主義所受的責(zé)難的做出的辯護(hù)，言辭犀利。
  　　
  　　 關(guān)于物的“本質(zhì)先于存在”的闡述。
  　　
  　　 從基督教存在主義的觀點(diǎn)闡述關(guān)于人的“本質(zhì)先于存在”，但這顯而易見是將“人”這一概念的普遍性推向了極端。于是引出無神論存在主義者眼中“人是存在先于本質(zhì)的特殊存在”，進(jìn)而提出存在主義的第一原則——人除了自己認(rèn)為的那樣以外，什么都不是。也就是說，人在通過自己的愿意定義創(chuàng)造自己前，什么也不是，不存在人這一概念，當(dāng)然也不存在人性的善或惡。
  　　
  　　 “把自己存在的責(zé)任完全由自己擔(dān)負(fù)起來”
  　　 在這里，薩特著重談了這種負(fù)責(zé)并非是只對自己負(fù)責(zé)，也是對所有人負(fù)責(zé)——因?yàn)槲覀冊跒樽约鹤鲞x擇是，只能選擇更好的（這里的更好必須是對所有人都更好，否則就談不上更好）。也因?yàn)槠扔谏娴膲毫?，我們在鑄造自己的形象時(shí)，必須使之符合整個(gè)時(shí)代的價(jià)值觀——這樣一來，就將個(gè)體的人與整體的人連接了起來，隨之所要承擔(dān)的責(zé)任便也寬泛了起來。而更大的責(zé)任，意味著痛苦，一種“亞伯拉罕式的痛苦”，一種“領(lǐng)袖式的痛苦”。
  　　
  　　 “聽任”
  　　 存在主義者不贊成通過發(fā)明新的道德準(zhǔn)則來使上帝不聲不響地死掉。存在主義者會將“上帝是不存在的”這一命題一直推演到底。但這一推演卻是尷尬而痛苦的。因?yàn)闆]有上帝的存在，也就意味著人的內(nèi)心找不到依靠，在模鑄自己的形象時(shí)，會找不到參照標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，這樣一來就使我們所有人都處在一個(gè)沒有價(jià)值照耀的黑暗世界里，孤苦伶仃，無法自解。這樣的我們是自由的，徹底的自由，但卻是被迫的自由，因?yàn)檫@不是我們所能選擇的，這是我們被創(chuàng)造出來后便被賦予的自由，我們就是自由。
  　　 我們在沒有任何指引，支持或幫助的情況下，卻不得不隨時(shí)對所有人負(fù)責(zé)，為所有人做出更好的選擇。決定我們存在的是我們自己，這種聽任帶來莫大的痛苦。
  　　
  　　 “絕望”“嚴(yán)峻的樂觀主義”
  　　 這是一種殘酷的思想，但卻真實(shí)。存在主義強(qiáng)調(diào)“存在”，所以任何事物在付諸行動將其實(shí)踐之前，都是不存在的，包括夢，期待，愛。甚至于作為“人”，除掉一系列行為之后，便不復(fù)存在了。
  　　 存在主義者不相信熱情，但深信是由人決定了自身的存在，決定了自己會成為怎樣的一個(gè)存在，所以這其實(shí)是把決定權(quán)交到我們自己手中。一切又說回到“負(fù)責(zé)”。
  　　
  　　 如果你對面對一個(gè)感覺選擇左右為難，千萬別去找存在主義者討教。他們會告訴你“首先，價(jià)值太抽象了，無法把握，不能用來決定我們所考慮的特殊的，具體的問題。其次，情感在真正付諸行動之前，是無法衡量其深淺的，所以我們也不能使用情感作為行動的參照。再次，你找上我，你多少就已經(jīng)知道我會給你什么忠告了，你就已經(jīng)為你的選擇負(fù)責(zé)了。所以，你選擇吧，你是自由的。”
  　　
  　　 存在主義最接近理性的天堂。不承認(rèn)宗教，不承認(rèn)基本的人性，在這種孤寂的情況下什么也不能依靠，沒有參考標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，卻不得不一直改變自己，創(chuàng)造未來。這是種巨大的責(zé)任。但是存在主義又比悲觀主義更積極。
  　　
  　　 哲學(xué)的魅力就在于思辨，如果你停止思考與質(zhì)疑，那哲學(xué)就變得和宗教無異。所以這樣一篇類似于辯論的文章是很引人入勝的，因?yàn)樗鼜闹辽賰蓚€(gè)不同角度來闡述了一個(gè)比較完整的理論體系。而關(guān)于“自由”“選擇”“責(zé)任”的一再論述，恰到好處解答了我的些許疑惑。
  　　
  　　
•   　　買這本書，因?yàn)橐谎劭吹搅藭?，正是我前段時(shí)間思考到的程度。
  　　目前看到第五頁。
  　　雖說是力薦，但和力薦哈利波特的意思顯然是不一樣的。
  　　
  　　薩特開篇就說寫這篇短文是針對幾種對存在主義的責(zé)難對它進(jìn)行辯護(hù)。
  　　
  　　我大言不慚的說，這幾種責(zé)難正是各色人等針對我的幾種責(zé)難。只是我的辯護(hù)，只是說給自己聽。
  　　
  　　至于存在先于本質(zhì)，目前我的理解是，一切都是本質(zhì)先于存在，但向前追溯，第一個(gè)本質(zhì)的誕生之前，一定先有存在——源頭是存在。
  　　繼續(xù)推論的話，也就是先存在“人”，再有人的定義、概念——人的存在，先于人的本質(zhì)，先于各種定義概念思想，先于其他各種物質(zhì)的存在和本質(zhì)。
  　　
  　　1人的存在——2人的本質(zhì)——3其他萬物的本質(zhì)/存在。
  　　哪怕一棵草，也只有先有了人的存在，繼而有了人對自己的定義，才會有對稱之為一棵草的草的定義。
  　　
  　　3基于1、2之后存在，2決定3.
  　　我很想直接說，2決定3意味著人的思想決定其他萬物——當(dāng)然了1決定2意味著先有人生理結(jié)構(gòu)的存在再有思想的誕生——但是還不能這么說，因?yàn)槿说谋举|(zhì)究竟是何呢？
  　　
  　　還不明確，我會繼續(xù)的。
•   　　【存在主義】
  　　存在主義是一種使人生成為可能的學(xué)說。這里的“成為可能”可以理解為一個(gè)薩特的術(shù)語“超越”。人類的行動是超越的，那就是說，它總是在現(xiàn)在中孕育，從現(xiàn)在朝向一個(gè)未來的目標(biāo)，我們又在現(xiàn)在中設(shè)法實(shí)現(xiàn)它。即是抱有希望。它為人類打開了選擇的可能性。
  　　【存在先于本質(zhì)】
  　　薩特說道，存在兩種存在主義，一種是基督教的存在主義，另一種這是他和海德格爾等人的無神論的存在主義。無神論者在否定神的存在或者說是懸置神后提出一個(gè)關(guān)于人的命題，即是存在先于本質(zhì)。
  　　本質(zhì)先于存在，可以理解為目的先于存在。薩特以“上帝是造人的工匠”來說明這個(gè)命題。工具在工匠制作出之前，人們已經(jīng)規(guī)定了他的用途。為了什么目的，生產(chǎn)什么工具。同理，上帝造人，讓人的本質(zhì)先于了人的存在。薩特這里同時(shí)否定了消除上帝之后的上帝的代替物，例如，實(shí)踐理性、絕對精神等等。上帝死了是從尼采處發(fā)端的。但是尼采盡管否認(rèn)了上帝對人的規(guī)定，卻依舊提出了一個(gè)世界圖式（形而上學(xué)殘余）來規(guī)定人。這個(gè)圖式即是永恒輪回。
  　　存在主義的第一原則，人除了自己認(rèn)為的那樣外，什么都不是。人先存在，而后才選擇目的。人是絕對的自由。
  　　【任意與任意的束縛】
  　　人從存在中得到了任意的自由。存在本身即是自由。把上帝對人的規(guī)定統(tǒng)統(tǒng)去除，人就是能夠自己做出選擇的。這里的自由與康德的自由觀很相似。但是康德的自由是理性的道德自律。意志即便是自由，它的根據(jù)還是在理性那里。理性成為人的意志的規(guī)定根據(jù)，薩特認(rèn)為這種普遍的理性是對人的規(guī)定和限制是本質(zhì)，它先于人的存在。
  　　薩特也說明他的出發(fā)點(diǎn)是笛卡爾的“我思”?！拔宜肌笔亲晕乙庾R意識到自我的存在。這種意識到的自我是明證的，是不言而喻的。它當(dāng)之無愧的成為主觀哲學(xué)的最堅(jiān)實(shí)的出發(fā)點(diǎn)。它的確證性在笛卡爾那里、胡塞爾那里、薩特這里都是不可撼動的。由“我思”作為基點(diǎn)，存在是緊接著著而生的。這個(gè)時(shí)候存在是自由的，因?yàn)闀簳r(shí)而言除了存在自身以外什么都是不確定的。存在先于了其他待發(fā)現(xiàn)的東西。
  　　然而如果存在是如此自由，而且沒有上帝對人進(jìn)行束縛。那么，“如果上帝不存在，什么事情都將是容許的。”這個(gè)時(shí)候薩特自然而然的引入了責(zé)任概念。在西方的文化中，有一個(gè)觀念是不證自明的，倘若一個(gè)有理性的人他的意志是自由的，那么他要為他的行為負(fù)全部的責(zé)。薩特認(rèn)為這種責(zé)任是無法逃避的。他有一個(gè)概念叫做自欺。他認(rèn)為自欺往往成為逃避責(zé)任的借口。他舉了一個(gè)神父的例子。你要做一個(gè)決定，難以下決心，于是你找到一個(gè)神父，從他那里得到了一個(gè)指引。那么以后即便這個(gè)指引帶來了麻煩和困難。你也不能這時(shí)把責(zé)任推給神父，因?yàn)槟闶沁x擇相信神父，你還要為這行為負(fù)責(zé)。
  　　這篇論文的目的是為兩種對存在主義的責(zé)難進(jìn)行辯駁。其中之一就是基督教認(rèn)為，取消了上帝，人們可以無惡不為。用責(zé)任概念來限制自由是對這種責(zé)難的有效反駁。
  　　【孤獨(dú)境地】
  　　由于薩特的存在根源于笛卡爾的“我思”，而“我思”這個(gè)概念本就自然地會帶來一個(gè)麻煩。那就是主體間性的問題。你正在思考，你的存在是自明的。然而別人是否像你這般清楚明白的存在你是不知道的。也就是共產(chǎn)黨（應(yīng)該是法國共產(chǎn)黨吧）對存在主義的責(zé)難。你的存在是如此的自由，似乎什么困難都阻攔不了你，你可以選擇任何你想選擇的東西。那么這不是一種極其強(qiáng)烈的主觀性么。薩特的反駁是通過把自由的決定轉(zhuǎn)化為行動來實(shí)現(xiàn)的。你雖然選擇什么是自由的，但是由于你得為你的自由選擇負(fù)責(zé)，你要付諸實(shí)踐和行動。而存在也正是在行動中生成的，人在實(shí)踐中不斷完善自我。
  　　【通俗化】
  　　這里需要先摘錄兩個(gè)概念，一個(gè)是，“聽任”，即決定我們存在的是我么自己。而隨同這種聽任俱來的是痛苦?！敖^望”它是指，我們只能把自己所有的依靠限制在記得意志的范圍之內(nèi)，或者在我們的行為行得通的許多可能性之內(nèi)。
  　　把薩特的思想通俗的表達(dá)是，聽任就是我可以自由進(jìn)行選擇，規(guī)劃我們的人生，但是這時(shí)你就有些猶豫和不安，到底這么做好不好，行不行，這來自于對不確定的畏懼。而由于你除了你自己是自明的存在外，別人的狀態(tài)你是難以明白的。因?yàn)閯e人也有選擇的自由，你不知道他人會不會半途倒戈。所以你只能依靠你自己，這就是絕望的感受。
  　　【存疑】
  　　選擇是自由的，在這里也就只有選擇或者不選擇，而不存在一個(gè)主觀概率的問題。這件事到底有多大的把握，薩特看來不用考慮，去行動就行了。行動之后有什么后果反正都是你要背負(fù)的。只要你做好覺悟，選擇什么都沒有問題。
  　　在這片論文中薩特沒有提供過具體的倫理規(guī)范，他只提出了他的自由與責(zé)任的模式。也就是說，沒有對人的規(guī)定性的話，很難區(qū)分一般的善惡了。好比基督教由于有上帝的支撐，它有明確的教義與信條?？档履抢?，理性起碼也提供了道德律，符合道德律的即是善，雖然道德律是行為規(guī)范的規(guī)定。
  　　
•   　　
  　　 對存在主義的認(rèn)識：
  　　
  　　 * 基督教的存在主義，雅思維斯和Gabriel Marcel
  　　 * 無神論者的存在主義，海德格爾與薩特
  　　
  　　 存在主義第一原則：人除了他自己認(rèn)為的那樣以外，什么都不是。
  　　 * 薩特認(rèn)為：如果上帝不存在，那么至少總有一個(gè)東西先于其本質(zhì)就已經(jīng)存在了，先要有這么一個(gè)東西的存在，然后才能用什么概念來說明它。而這個(gè)東西就是人。
  　　 * 也就是說，首先有人，人碰上了自己，在世界上涌現(xiàn)出來——然后才給自己下定義。所以人性是不存在的，因?yàn)闆]有上帝賦予這個(gè)人的概念。人就是人，這不僅說是他是他認(rèn)為的那樣，而且也是他愿意成為的那樣——是他，從不存在到存在之后愿意成為的那樣。
  　　
  　　
  　　
  　　 存在主義第一后果：人人明白自己的本來面目，并且把自己存在的責(zé)任完全由自己承擔(dān)下來。
  　　 * 由存在主義第一原則，我們知道，人首先是存在——人在談得上別的一切之前，首先是一個(gè)把自己推向未來的東西，并且感覺到自己在這樣做。人確實(shí)是一個(gè)擁有主觀生命的規(guī)劃，而不是一種苔蘚或者一種真菌，或者一顆花椰菜。把自己投降未來之前，什么都不存在。連理性的天堂里都沒有他，人只是企圖成為什么時(shí)才存在。
  　　 * 如何理解薩特的哲學(xué)？
  　　 * 安德烈高茲在《致D》中寫到一段他與妻子的對話：
  　　 * 對于婚姻我有一種原則性的、觀念性的偏見。.......我也一直在說：“什么能夠證明，在戒事十年后，我們歷經(jīng)變化，而這種生活的契約仍能滿足我們的欲望呢？”
  　　 * 你的回答讓我無法抵抗：如果你和一個(gè)人結(jié)合在一起，打算度過一生，你們就將兩個(gè)人的生命放在一起，不要做有損你們結(jié)合的事情。建構(gòu)你們夫妻關(guān)系就是你們共同的計(jì)劃，你們永遠(yuǎn)都需要根據(jù)環(huán)境的變化而不斷地加強(qiáng)、改變、重新調(diào)整方向。你們怎么做，就會成為怎樣的人。
  　　
  　　
  　　
  　　
  　　 存在主義第一后果產(chǎn)生的影響：
  　　
  　　 * 人自由了，沒有理性，沒有道德，也沒有上帝，人是自由的。
  　　 * 人躍不出人的主觀性。
  　　
  　　
  　　
  　　 存在主義第一后果產(chǎn)生的疑問：
  　　
  　　 * 沒有了規(guī)矩方圓，人自由了，但是怎么保證人是正確的，或者是否有正確這個(gè)說法，那么人應(yīng)該怎么做？
  　　
  　　 * 薩特的回答是；因?yàn)樽杂?，我們也能夠更好的理解痛苦、聽任、絕望。
  　　
  　　
  　　
  　　
  　　 我們?nèi)绾卫斫馔纯啵?br /> 　　
  　　 * 存在主義者坦然地說：人是痛苦的。
  　　
  　　 * 他的意思就是，當(dāng)一個(gè)人對一件事情，并且承擔(dān)責(zé)任時(shí)，他完全意識到不但是為自己的將來做了抉擇，而且通過這一行動同時(shí)成為了為全人類作出抉擇的立法者。
  　　 * 也就是說人對自己負(fù)責(zé)的同時(shí)，也是為他人負(fù)責(zé)，在創(chuàng)造一種我希望人人都如此的人的形象。在模鑄自己的同時(shí)，也模鑄了人。
  　　
  　　 * 但反對者會這樣認(rèn)為：并非人人都是這樣做的。
  　　 *
  　　 * 薩特的回答是，那個(gè)說“并非人人都這樣做”從而為自己開脫的說謊者，在某種意義上，肯定了他否定的事情的價(jià)值。（就比如，你看到有人把削的蘋果皮，倒在了公共洗漱間的水槽里，但是當(dāng)你要責(zé)備這個(gè)人的時(shí)候，他說：別人也是這樣做的。那么他正是否定了這一普世價(jià)值。）
  　　 * 而這個(gè)人的痛苦，是欲蓋彌彰，明知道是錯(cuò)的，卻還要為自己捏造理由。
  　　 * 這種痛苦就是克爾凱郭爾所說的：亞伯拉罕的痛苦。
  　　 * 亞伯拉罕式痛苦，就是一個(gè)天使命令亞伯拉罕犧牲他的兒子?？墒侨绻且粋€(gè)現(xiàn)身的真正的天使說：你，亞伯拉罕，犧牲掉你的兒子。那這當(dāng)然是非遵循不可。可是任何人，遇到了這個(gè)情形都會問兩個(gè)問題：他是真的天使嗎？我真的是亞伯拉罕嗎？
  　　 * 就好象，有一天你看到一個(gè)老奶奶，要過馬路，你想“好孩子，就要幫助老奶奶過馬路”，可是你又想，這是誰規(guī)定的？這個(gè)道德是正確的嗎？我是好孩子嗎？我要成為好孩子嗎？
  　　
  　　 * 所以薩特說，人是痛苦的。
  　　
  　　
  　　
  　　 我們?nèi)绾卫斫饴犎危?br /> 　　
  　　 * 之前我們討論了存在主義的第一后果產(chǎn)生的影響，他說，人自由了。
  　　 * 存在主義者認(rèn)為，人自由了，這是一個(gè)極其尷尬的狀況。因?yàn)闆]有了上帝，沒有了道德，也沒有了康德所說的“宇宙法則”，那人雖自由了，但是人也孤獨(dú)、彷徨、無助了，而我們這時(shí)候可以說，人是被迫自由的。所以我們常常說中國人可能是不幸福的，因?yàn)橹袊赡苁菦]有信仰的，是被迫自由的。
  　　 * 這時(shí)候，薩特舉了一個(gè)例子：
  　　
  　　 * 一個(gè)年輕的兒子和他母親相依為命，但是這時(shí)戰(zhàn)爭爆發(fā)了，他很明白，他是他母親的唯一精神支柱，但是他也知道祖國需要他，他可能需要跨過一條艱難的路，去遠(yuǎn)方服役。忠孝難兩全？他應(yīng)該如何選擇？
  　　 * 康德的動機(jī)主義理論里有一條：人是目的，而不是手段。
  　　 * 也就是說，當(dāng)你決定跟一個(gè)女生交往的時(shí)候，你可能需要考量一下自己的動機(jī)。你是否是把她當(dāng)作你的目的，因?yàn)槟銗鬯阋退谝黄?。還是說，因?yàn)槟慵拍?，你空虛，你需要她來彌補(bǔ)你肉體以及精神的空缺。
  　　 * 如果是前者，康德會告訴你，這樣是理性的。
  　　 * 可是薩特抨擊了這一點(diǎn)，他覺得康德是矛盾的。
  　　 * 他說，你在把一個(gè)人當(dāng)作你的目的的同時(shí)，也把他作為成就你對愛情的認(rèn)知，以及把她作為讓你體驗(yàn)愛情的酸甜苦辣的工具。
  　　 * 那么，如果這樣的話，我們對價(jià)值就沒了把握。
  　　
  　　 * 這時(shí)候，我們就需要聽任：
  　　 *
  　　 * 聽任的意思與經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)里的“引導(dǎo)原則”十分相似。也就是，我們從小到大，在我們身邊總有一個(gè)權(quán)威的人，他們是我們的行為榜樣。有句俗語叫：有其父必有其子。在叛逆期之前，父親的權(quán)利是很穩(wěn)定的，父親的作為往往決定了孩子的價(jià)值取向,孩子效仿他的做法，作出一個(gè)個(gè)選擇。而叛逆期開始以后，這段關(guān)系逐漸走向崩潰，并且將在另一個(gè)地方找到平衡點(diǎn)。而這個(gè)過程，正式孩子建立自己的價(jià)值觀伊始，你發(fā)現(xiàn)原來父親未必是對的，就好象這個(gè)世界上有很多人在做一些讓你矛盾、困惑的事一樣，但同時(shí)，你也發(fā)現(xiàn)這個(gè)世界上不乏具有一定公信力、像道德標(biāo)桿一樣的強(qiáng)者。他們可能是牧師、法官、甚至只是一個(gè)普通同學(xué)，他們?nèi)〈烁赣H的位置，使你信服。而薩特說，那就去問問這些人吧。
  　　
  　　
  　　
  　　
  　　 我們?nèi)绾卫斫饨^望？
  　　 * 在探討“聽任”的時(shí)候，我們知道：牧師和法官的答案未必相同，最終我們還是要自己作出決定。我們能讓別人做決定么？答案當(dāng)然是否定的，因?yàn)樗_特說：你是自由的，所以你選擇吧。并且，只有當(dāng)你行動了，你才存在。你或許會問：選擇讓別人幫我選擇是否是一種選擇呢？用一句臺詞來反駁就是：“如果每個(gè)人都向他人要安全感，誰還有多余的安全感給人？“
  　　 * 這樣一來，我們只能把自己所有的依靠限制在自己的意識范圍之內(nèi)，我們的選擇也將局限于此，超越這界限的部分，是我們無法把握的，所以笛卡爾說：”征服你自己，而不要征服世界“。他的意思就是：我們應(yīng)當(dāng)不懷希望地行動。
  　　 * 不懷希望地行動和馬克思主義者是相沖突的，馬克思主義者認(rèn)為：你的行動顯然是以你的死亡為限，但是你可以倚仗其他人，讓他們繼承著你的事業(yè)繼續(xù)前進(jìn)。薩特反對這種態(tài)度，他認(rèn)為既然人是自由的，或許我們可以依賴那些與我們曾一起共同奮斗過的人，但是在那之后呢，我們怎么能知道俄羅斯革命的結(jié)果，是否依照馬克思的意思呢？所以我們力所能及的范圍，就是我們生命的核心，除此之外什么都沒有把握。
  　　 * 這就是薩特所說的絕望，存在主義的絕望，那他是否是一個(gè)悲觀主義者？
  　　 * 薩特說他并非是一個(gè)悲觀主義者，而是一個(gè)嚴(yán)峻的樂觀主義者。他不想有人假借存在主義者之名抱怨說：你看，我們就是這樣，我們本不懷希望，我們也無能為力。所以在薩特的小說里，他強(qiáng)調(diào)，一個(gè)人懦弱，并非是由于遺傳、環(huán)境、精神、或者生理決定的，他也不暗示英雄是與生俱來的。他認(rèn)為，真正地存在主義者應(yīng)該說：是懦夫把自己變成了懦夫。因?yàn)檐浫跏侨说墓逃袑傩?，這里說的人的軟弱，不同于軟弱的人，人的軟弱指的是——你作為人，你就是軟弱的，軟弱是你揮之不去的符號，就是體內(nèi)流淌的血液一樣。但很多人只是當(dāng)他覺得自己軟弱的時(shí)候，才承認(rèn)自己的軟弱，這是詭詐，是自欺欺人。
  　　 * 薩特在《一個(gè)企業(yè)家的童年》寫道：”這很有意思，人人都在演戲，爸爸媽媽裝扮成爸爸媽媽，媽媽裝作很苦惱，因?yàn)樗男氊惓缘奶倭?，爸爸裝作在看報(bào)紙。而呂西安自己也在演戲，但是到后來自己也不清楚到底演什么了，演孤兒？還是演呂西安？他望著盛滿水的長頸瓶，忽然間，覺得長頸瓶也是裝作一只長頸瓶。結(jié)果他幾乎沒有吃菜，他覺得自己很討厭繼續(xù)裝呂西安了，然而他又不得不裝下去。他摔了一跤，隆起了一個(gè)大包時(shí)，有時(shí)會停止哭泣問自己：”我真的疼嗎？“于是，他感到更加傷心，哭得更歡樂。
  　　 * 這段寫的十分精彩，小主人公呂西安在思考他的存在，他好像是被一個(gè)令人信服、強(qiáng)制壓抑又不可抗拒的自我完全給占據(jù)了，他感覺自己是在操縱自己的傀儡，而傀儡又是他自己。因?yàn)樗亲杂傻模啦⒎鞘巧系墼诓倏刂?，而若是他自己，他就不得不陷入了這樣絕望的窘境。
  　　
  　　
  　　
  　　
  　　 人，如何找到自己的出路？
  　　 * 笛卡爾說：我思，故我在。
  　　 * 讀薩特的書會發(fā)現(xiàn)，薩特受笛卡爾、康德的影響很大。但不同于笛卡爾的是，他認(rèn)為當(dāng)我們說”我思”時(shí)，我們是當(dāng)著別人的面找自己，所以我們對于別人以及對于自己都說肯定的，那么那些在我思里面找到自己的人，也發(fā)現(xiàn)了別人，并且別人是自己的存在條件。所以薩特在《他人即是地獄》里說：我們在現(xiàn)實(shí)中常常身不由己，這個(gè)阻礙就是“他人”的目光?！八恕钡哪抗馐强膳碌模翢o忌憚的干預(yù)我的選擇，使我在選擇的時(shí)候猶豫不決、甚至被迫做出我本不希望的選擇，這時(shí)他人即是地獄。這與盧梭在《社會契約論》中所提到的：“人生而自由，但卻無不在枷鎖之中“在字面上不謀而合。
  　　 * 那是否我們可以逃離“自由的煉獄”與“自由的枷鎖”？答案是：不能。
  　　 * 存在主義的核心思想是自由承擔(dān)責(zé)任，通過承擔(dān)，任何人在體現(xiàn)一種人的類型的同時(shí)，也在體現(xiàn)他自己。而我們每個(gè)人，通過呼吸、吃喝、睡覺或者隨便任何一種行動方式，都在創(chuàng)造絕對。
  　　 * 所以他在《存在主義是一種人道主義》中做了一個(gè)比喻：道德的抉擇像一件藝術(shù)品的制作。因?yàn)槲覀儾荒茴A(yù)知應(yīng)當(dāng)做什么。我們也不能判斷別人，什么是正確的，什么是錯(cuò)誤的。但我們知道，藝術(shù)脫離不了發(fā)明他的人，他們正是綁定在了一起，才有了藝術(shù)價(jià)值。而生活本身，在人未到達(dá)的地方，是沒有內(nèi)容的，而他的價(jià)值恰恰是你選擇他的意義。
  　　
  　　
  　　
  　　
  　　
  　　——————————————————————————
  　　
  　　馬哲課的講稿
  　　主要是把這本書搬運(yùn)、整理了一遍
  　　可能存在一些問題
  　　
•   　　Jean-Paul Sartre 1946
  　　Existentialism Is a Humanism
  　　________________________________________
  　　Written: Lecture given in 1946
  　　Source: Existentialism from Dostoyevsky to Sartre, ed. Walter Kaufman, Meridian Publishing Company, 1989;
  　　First Published: World Publishing Company in 1956;
  　　Translator: Philip Mairet;
  　　Copyright: reproduced under the “Fair Use” provisions;
  　　HTML Markup: by Andy Blunden 1998; proofed and corrected February 2005.
  　　________________________________________
  　　My purpose here is to offer a defence of existentialism against several reproaches that have been laid against it.
  　　First, it has been reproached as an invitation to people to dwell in quietism of despair. For if every way to a solution is barred, one would have to regard any action in this world as entirely ineffective, and one would arrive finally at a contemplative philosophy. Moreover, since contemplation is a luxury, this would be only another bourgeois philosophy. This is, especially, the reproach made by the Communists.
  　　From another quarter we are reproached for having underlined all that is ignominious in the human situation, for depicting what is mean, sordid or base to the neglect of certain things that possess charm and beauty and belong to the brighter side of human nature: for example, according to the Catholic critic, Mlle. Mercier, we forget how an infant smiles. Both from this side and from the other we are also reproached for leaving out of account the solidarity of mankind and considering man in isolation. And this, say the Communists, is because we base our doctrine upon pure subjectivity – upon the Cartesian “I think”: which is the moment in which solitary man attains to himself; a position from which it is impossible to regain solidarity with other men who exist outside of the self. The ego cannot reach them through the cogito.
  　　From the Christian side, we are reproached as people who deny the reality and seriousness of human affairs. For since we ignore the commandments of God and all values prescribed as eternal, nothing remains but what is strictly voluntary. Everyone can do what he likes, and will be incapable, from such a point of view, of condemning either the point of view or the action of anyone else.
  　　It is to these various reproaches that I shall endeavour to reply today; that is why I have entitled this brief exposition “Existentialism is a Humanism.” Many may be surprised at the mention of humanism in this connection, but we shall try to see in what sense we understand it. In any case, we can begin by saying that existentialism, in our sense of the word, is a doctrine that does render human life possible; a doctrine, also, which affirms that every truth and every action imply both an environment and a human subjectivity. The essential charge laid against us is, of course, that of over-emphasis upon the evil side of human life. I have lately been told of a lady who, whenever she lets slip a vulgar expression in a moment of nervousness, excuses herself by exclaiming, “I believe I am becoming an existentialist.” So it appears that ugliness is being identified with existentialism. That is why some people say we are “naturalistic,” and if we are, it is strange to see how much we scandalise and horrify them, for no one seems to be much frightened or humiliated nowadays by what is properly called naturalism. Those who can quite well keep down a novel by Zola such as La Terre are sickened as soon as they read an existentialist novel. Those who appeal to the wisdom of the people – which is a sad wisdom – find ours sadder still. And yet, what could be more disillusioned than such sayings as “Charity begins at home” or “Promote a rogue and he’ll sue you for damage, knock him down and he’ll do you homage”? We all know how many common sayings can be quoted to this effect, and they all mean much the same – that you must not oppose the powers that be; that you must not fight against superior force; must not meddle in matters that are above your station. Or that any action not in accordance with some tradition is mere romanticism; or that any undertaking which has not the support of proven experience is foredoomed to frustration; and that since experience has shown men to be invariably inclined to evil, there must be firm rules to restrain them, otherwise we shall have anarchy. It is, however, the people who are forever mouthing these dismal proverbs and, whenever they are told of some more or less repulsive action, say “How like human nature!” – it is these very people, always harping upon realism, who complain that existentialism is too gloomy a view of things. Indeed their excessive protests make me suspect that what is annoying them is not so much our pessimism, but, much more likely, our optimism. For at bottom, what is alarming in the doctrine that I am about to try to explain to you is – is it not? – that it confronts man with a possibility of choice. To verify this, let us review the whole question upon the strictly philosophic level. What, then, is this that we call existentialism?
  　　Most of those who are making use of this word would be highly confused if required to explain its meaning. For since it has become fashionable, people cheerfully declare that this musician or that painter is “existentialist.” A columnist in Clartes signs himself “The Existentialist,” and, indeed, the word is now so loosely applied to so many things that it no longer means anything at all. It would appear that, for the lack of any novel doctrine such as that of surrealism, all those who are eager to join in the latest scandal or movement now seize upon this philosophy in which, however, they can find nothing to their purpose. For in truth this is of all teachings the least scandalous and the most austere: it is intended strictly for technicians and philosophers. All the same, it can easily be defined.
  　　The question is only complicated because there are two kinds of existentialists. There are, on the one hand, the Christians, amongst whom I shall name Jaspers and Gabriel Marcel, both professed Catholics; and on the other the existential atheists, amongst whom we must place Heidegger as well as the French existentialists and myself. What they have in common is simply the fact that they believe that existence comes before essence – or, if you will, that we must begin from the subjective. What exactly do we mean by that?
  　　If one considers an article of manufacture as, for example, a book or a paper-knife – one sees that it has been made by an artisan who had a conception of it; and he has paid attention, equally, to the conception of a paper-knife and to the pre-existent technique of production which is a part of that conception and is, at bottom, a formula. Thus the paper-knife is at the same time an article producible in a certain manner and one which, on the other hand, serves a definite purpose, for one cannot suppose that a man would produce a paper-knife without knowing what it was for. Let us say, then, of the paperknife that its essence – that is to say the sum of the formulae and the qualities which made its production and its definition possible – precedes its existence. The presence of such-and-such a paper-knife or book is thus determined before my eyes. Here, then, we are viewing the world from a technical standpoint, and we can say that production precedes existence.
  　　When we think of God as the creator, we are thinking of him, most of the time, as a supernal artisan. Whatever doctrine we may be considering, whether it be a doctrine like that of Descartes, or of Leibnitz himself, we always imply that the will follows, more or less, from the understanding or at least accompanies it, so that when God creates he knows precisely what he is creating. Thus, the conception of man in the mind of God is comparable to that of the paper-knife in the mind of the artisan: God makes man according to a procedure and a conception, exactly as the artisan manufactures a paper-knife, following a definition and a formula. Thus each individual man is the realisation of a certain conception which dwells in the divine understanding. In the philosophic atheism of the eighteenth century, the notion of God is suppressed, but not, for all that, the idea that essence is prior to existence; something of that idea we still find everywhere, in Diderot, in Voltaire and even in Kant. Man possesses a human nature; that “human nature,” which is the conception of human being, is found in every man; which means that each man is a particular example of a universal conception, the conception of Man. In Kant, this universality goes so far that the wild man of the woods, man in the state of nature and the bourgeois are all contained in the same definition and have the same fundamental qualities. Here again, the essence of man precedes that historic existence which we confront in experience.
  　　Atheistic existentialism, of which I am a representative, declares with greater consistency that if God does not exist there is at least one being whose existence comes before its essence, a being which exists before it can be defined by any conception of it. That being is man or, as Heidegger has it, the human reality. What do we mean by saying that existence precedes essence? We mean that man first of all exists, encounters himself, surges up in the world – and defines himself afterwards. If man as the existentialist sees him is not definable, it is because to begin with he is nothing. He will not be anything until later, and then he will be what he makes of himself. Thus, there is no human nature, because there is no God to have a conception of it. Man simply is. Not that he is simply what he conceives himself to be, but he is what he wills, and as he conceives himself after already existing – as he wills to be after that leap towards existence. Man is nothing else but that which he makes of himself. That is the first principle of existentialism. And this is what people call its “subjectivity,” using the word as a reproach against us. But what do we mean to say by this, but that man is of a greater dignity than a stone or a table? For we mean to say that man primarily exists – that man is, before all else, something which propels itself towards a future and is aware that it is doing so. Man is, indeed, a project which possesses a subjective life, instead of being a kind of moss, or a fungus or a cauliflower. Before that projection of the self nothing exists; not even in the heaven of intelligence: man will only attain existence when he is what he purposes to be. Not, however, what he may wish to be. For what we usually understand by wishing or willing is a conscious decision taken – much more often than not – after we have made ourselves what we are. I may wish to join a party, to write a book or to marry – but in such a case what is usually called my will is probably a manifestation of a prior and more spontaneous decision. If, however, it is true that existence is prior to essence, man is responsible for what he is. Thus, the first effect of existentialism is that it puts every man in possession of himself as he is, and places the entire responsibility for his existence squarely upon his own shoulders. And, when we say that man is responsible for himself, we do not mean that he is responsible only for his own individuality, but that he is responsible for all men. The word “subjectivism” is to be understood in two senses, and our adversaries play upon only one of them. Subjectivism means, on the one hand, the freedom of the individual subject and, on the other, that man cannot pass beyond human subjectivity. It is the latter which is the deeper meaning of existentialism. When we say that man chooses himself, we do mean that every one of us must choose himself; but by that we also mean that in choosing for himself he chooses for all men. For in effect, of all the actions a man may take in order to create himself as he wills to be, there is not one which is not creative, at the same time, of an image of man such as he believes he ought to be. To choose between this or that is at the same time to affirm the value of that which is chosen; for we are unable ever to choose the worse. What we choose is always the better; and nothing can be better for us unless it is better for all. If, moreover, existence precedes essence and we will to exist at the same time as we fashion our image, that image is valid for all and for the entire epoch in which we find ourselves. Our responsibility is thus much greater than we had supposed, for it concerns mankind as a whole. If I am a worker, for instance, I may choose to join a Christian rather than a Communist trade union. And if, by that membership, I choose to signify that resignation is, after all, the attitude that best becomes a man, that man’s kingdom is not upon this earth, I do not commit myself alone to that view. Resignation is my will for everyone, and my action is, in consequence, a commitment on behalf of all mankind. Or if, to take a more personal case, I decide to marry and to have children, even though this decision proceeds simply from my situation, from my passion or my desire, I am thereby committing not only myself, but humanity as a whole, to the practice of monogamy. I am thus responsible for myself and for all men, and I am creating a certain image of man as I would have him to be. In fashioning myself I fashion man.
  　　This may enable us to understand what is meant by such terms – perhaps a little grandiloquent – as anguish, abandonment and despair. As you will soon see, it is very simple. First, what do we mean by anguish? – The existentialist frankly states that man is in anguish. His meaning is as follows: When a man commits himself to anything, fully realising that he is not only choosing what he will be, but is thereby at the same time a legislator deciding for the whole of mankind – in such a moment a man cannot escape from the sense of complete and profound responsibility. There are many, indeed, who show no such anxiety. But we affirm that they are merely disguising their anguish or are in flight from it. Certainly, many people think that in what they are doing they commit no one but themselves to anything: and if you ask them, “What would happen if everyone did so?” they shrug their shoulders and reply, “Everyone does not do so.” But in truth, one ought always to ask oneself what would happen if everyone did as one is doing; nor can one escape from that disturbing thought except by a kind of self-deception. The man who lies in self-excuse, by saying “Everyone will not do it” must be ill at ease in his conscience, for the act of lying implies the universal value which it denies. By its very disguise his anguish reveals itself. This is the anguish that Kierkegaard called “the anguish of Abraham.” You know the story: An angel commanded Abraham to sacrifice his son; and obedience was obligatory, if it really was an angel who had appeared and said, “Thou, Abraham, shalt sacrifice thy son.” But anyone in such a case would wonder, first, whether it was indeed an angel and secondly, whether I am really Abraham. Where are the proofs? A certain mad woman who suffered from hallucinations said that people were telephoning to her, and giving her orders. The doctor asked, “But who is it that speaks to you?” She replied: “He says it is God.” And what, indeed, could prove to her that it was God? If an angel appears to me, what is the proof that it is an angel; or, if I hear voices, who can prove that they proceed from heaven and not from hell, or from my own subconsciousness or some pathological condition? Who can prove that they are really addressed to me?
  　　Who, then, can prove that I am the proper person to impose, by my own choice, my conception of man upon mankind? I shall never find any proof whatever; there will be no sign to convince me of it. If a voice speaks to me, it is still I myself who must decide whether the voice is or is not that of an angel. If I regard a certain course of action as good, it is only I who choose to say that it is good and not bad. There is nothing to show that I am Abraham: nevertheless I also am obliged at every instant to perform actions which are examples. Everything happens to every man as though the whole human race had its eyes fixed upon what he is doing and regulated its conduct accordingly. So every man ought to say, “Am I really a man who has the right to act in such a manner that humanity regulates itself by what I do.” If a man does not say that, he is dissembling his anguish. Clearly, the anguish with which we are concerned here is not one that could lead to quietism or inaction. It is anguish pure and simple, of the kind well known to all those who have borne responsibilities. When, for instance, a military leader takes upon himself the responsibility for an attack and sends a number of men to their death, he chooses to do it and at bottom he alone chooses. No doubt under a higher command, but its orders, which are more general, require interpretation by him and upon that interpretation depends the life of ten, fourteen or twenty men. In making the decision, he cannot but feel a certain anguish. All leaders know that anguish. It does not prevent their acting, on the contrary it is the very condition of their action, for the action presupposes that there is a plurality of possibilities, and in choosing one of these, they realize that it has value only because it is chosen. Now it is anguish of that kind which existentialism describes, and moreover, as we shall see, makes explicit through direct responsibility towards other men who are concerned. Far from being a screen which could separate us from action, it is a condition of action itself.
  　　And when we speak of “abandonment” – a favorite word of Heidegger – we only mean to say that God does not exist, and that it is necessary to draw the consequences of his absence right to the end. The existentialist is strongly opposed to a certain type of secular moralism which seeks to suppress God at the least possible expense. Towards 1880, when the French professors endeavoured to formulate a secular morality, they said something like this: God is a useless and costly hypothesis, so we will do without it. However, if we are to have morality, a society and a law-abiding world, it is essential that certain values should be taken seriously; they must have an a priori existence ascribed to them. It must be considered obligatory a priori to be honest, not to lie, not to beat one’s wife, to bring up children and so forth; so we are going to do a little work on this subject, which will enable us to show that these values exist all the same, inscribed in an intelligible heaven although, of course, there is no God. In other words – and this is, I believe, the purport of all that we in France call radicalism – nothing will be changed if God does not exist; we shall rediscover the same norms of honesty, progress and humanity, and we shall have disposed of God as an out-of-date hypothesis which will die away quietly of itself. The existentialist, on the contrary, finds it extremely embarrassing that God does not exist, for there disappears with Him all possibility of finding values in an intelligible heaven. There can no longer be any good a priori, since there is no infinite and perfect consciousness to think it. It is nowhere written that “the good” exists, that one must be honest or must not lie, since we are now upon the plane where there are only men. Dostoevsky once wrote: “If God did not exist, everything would be permitted”; and that, for existentialism, is the starting point. Everything is indeed permitted if God does not exist, and man is in consequence forlorn, for he cannot find anything to depend upon either within or outside himself. He discovers forthwith, that he is without excuse. For if indeed existence precedes essence, one will never be able to explain one’s action by reference to a given and specific human nature; in other words, there is no determinism – man is free, man is freedom. Nor, on the other hand, if God does not exist, are we provided with any values or commands that could legitimise our behaviour. Thus we have neither behind us, nor before us in a luminous realm of values, any means of justification or excuse. – We are left alone, without excuse. That is what I mean when I say that man is condemned to be free. Condemned, because he did not create himself, yet is nevertheless at liberty, and from the moment that he is thrown into this world he is responsible for everything he does. The existentialist does not believe in the power of passion. He will never regard a grand passion as a destructive torrent upon which a man is swept into certain actions as by fate, and which, therefore, is an excuse for them. He thinks that man is responsible for his passion. Neither will an existentialist think that a man can find help through some sign being vouchsafed upon earth for his orientation: for he thinks that the man himself interprets the sign as he chooses. He thinks that every man, without any support or help whatever, is condemned at every instant to invent man. As Ponge has written in a very fine article, “Man is the future of man.” That is exactly true. Only, if one took this to mean that the future is laid up in Heaven, that God knows what it is, it would be false, for then it would no longer even be a future. If, however, it means that, whatever man may now appear to be, there is a future to be fashioned, a virgin future that awaits him – then it is a true saying. But in the present one is forsaken.
  　　As an example by which you may the better understand this state of abandonment, I will refer to the case of a pupil of mine, who sought me out in the following circumstances. His father was quarrelling with his mother and was also inclined to be a “collaborator”; his elder brother had been killed in the German offensive of 1940 and this young man, with a sentiment somewhat primitive but generous, burned to avenge him. His mother was living alone with him, deeply afflicted by the semi-treason of his father and by the death of her eldest son, and her one consolation was in this young man. But he, at this moment, had the choice between going to England to join the Free French Forces or of staying near his mother and helping her to live. He fully realised that this woman lived only for him and that his disappearance – or perhaps his death – would plunge her into despair. He also realised that, concretely and in fact, every action he performed on his mother’s behalf would be sure of effect in the sense of aiding her to live, whereas anything he did in order to go and fight would be an ambiguous action which might vanish like water into sand and serve no purpose. For instance, to set out for England he would have to wait indefinitely in a Spanish camp on the way through Spain; or, on arriving in England or in Algiers he might be put into an office to fill up forms. Consequently, he found himself confronted by two very different modes of action; the one concrete, immediate, but directed towards only one individual; and the other an action addressed to an end infinitely greater, a national collectivity, but for that very reason ambiguous – and it might be frustrated on the way. At the same time, he was hesitating between two kinds of morality; on the one side the morality of sympathy, of personal devotion and, on the other side, a morality of wider scope but of more debatable validity. He had to choose between those two. What could help him to choose? Could the Christian doctrine? No. Christian doctrine says: Act with charity, love your neighbour, deny yourself for others, choose the way which is hardest, and so forth. But which is the harder road? To whom does one owe the more brotherly love, the patriot or the mother? Which is the more useful aim, the general one of fighting in and for the whole community, or the precise aim of helping one particular person to live? Who can give an answer to that a priori? No one. Nor is it given in any ethical scripture. The Kantian ethic says, Never regard another as a means, but always as an end. Very well; if I remain with my mother, I shall be regarding her as the end and not as a means: but by the same token I am in danger of treating as means those who are fighting on my behalf; and the converse is also true, that if I go to the aid of the combatants I shall be treating them as the end at the risk of treating my mother as a means. If values are uncertain, if they are still too abstract to determine the particular, concrete case under consideration, nothing remains but to trust in our instincts. That is what this young man tried to do; and when I saw him he said, “In the end, it is feeling that counts; the direction in which it is really pushing me is the one I ought to choose. If I feel that I love my mother enough to sacrifice everything else for her – my will to be avenged, all my longings for action and adventure then I stay with her. If, on the contrary, I feel that my love for her is not enough, I go.” But how does one estimate the strength of a feeling? The value of his feeling for his mother was determined precisely by the fact that he was standing by her. I may say that I love a certain friend enough to sacrifice such or such a sum of money for him, but I cannot prove that unless I have done it. I may say, “I love my mother enough to remain with her,” if actually I have remained with her. I can only estimate the strength of this affection if I have performed an action by which it is defined and ratified. But if I then appeal to this affection to justify my action, I find myself drawn into a vicious circle.
  　　Moreover, as Gide has very well said, a sentiment which is play-acting and one which is vital are two things that are hardly distinguishable one from another. To decide that I love my mother by staying beside her, and to play a comedy the upshot of which is that I do so – these are nearly the same thing. In other words, feeling is formed by the deeds that one does; therefore I cannot consult it as a guide to action. And that is to say that I can neither seek within myself for an authentic impulse to action, nor can I expect, from some ethic, formulae that will enable me to act. You may say that the youth did, at least, go to a professor to ask for advice. But if you seek counsel – from a priest, for example you have selected that priest; and at bottom you already knew, more or less, what he would advise. In other words, to choose an adviser is nevertheless to commit oneself by that choice. If you are a Christian, you will say, consult a priest; but there are collaborationists, priests who are resisters and priests who wait for the tide to turn: which will you choose? Had this young man chosen a priest of the resistance, or one of the collaboration, he would have decided beforehand the kind of advice he was to receive. Similarly, in coming to me, he knew what advice I should give him, and I had but one reply to make. You are free, therefore choose, that is to say, invent. No rule of general morality can show you what you ought to do: no signs are vouchsafed in this world. The Catholics will reply, “Oh, but they are!” Very well; still, it is I myself, in every case, who have to interpret the signs. While I was imprisoned, I made the acquaintance of a somewhat remarkable man, a Jesuit, who had become a member of that order in the following manner. In his life he had suffered a succession of rather severe setbacks. His father had died when he was a child, leaving him in poverty, and he had been awarded a free scholarship in a religious institution, where he had been made continually to feel that he was accepted for charity’s sake, and, in consequence, he had been denied several of those distinctions and honours which gratify children. Later, about the age of eighteen, he came to grief in a sentimental affair; and finally, at twenty-two – this was a trifle in itself, but it was the last drop that overflowed his cup – he failed in his military examination. This young man, then, could regard himself as a total failure: it was a sign – but a sign of what? He might have taken refuge in bitterness or despair. But he took it – very cleverly for him – as a sign that he was not intended for secular success, and that only the attainments of religion, those of sanctity and of faith, were accessible to him. He interpreted his record as a message from God, and became a member of the Order. Who can doubt but that this decision as to the meaning of the sign was his, and his alone? One could have drawn quite different conclusions from such a series of reverses – as, for example, that he had better become a carpenter or a revolutionary. For the decipherment of the sign, however, he bears the entire responsibility. That is what “abandonment” implies, that we ourselves decide our being. And with this abandonment goes anguish.
  　　As for “despair,” the meaning of this expression is extremely simple. It merely means that we limit ourselves to a reliance upon that which is within our wills, or within the sum of the probabilities which render our action feasible. Whenever one wills anything, there are always these elements of probability. If I am counting upon a visit from a friend, who may be coming by train or by tram, I presuppose that the train will arrive at the appointed time, or that the tram will not be derailed. I remain in the realm of possibilities; but one does not rely upon any possibilities beyond those that are strictly concerned in one’s action. Beyond the point at which the possibilities under consideration cease to affect my action, I ought to disinterest myself. For there is no God and no prevenient design, which can adapt the world and all its possibilities to my will. When Descartes said, “Conquer yourself rather than the world,” what he meant was, at bottom, the same – that we should act without hope.
  　　Marxists, to whom I have said this, have answered: “Your action is limited, obviously, by your death; but you can rely upon the help of others. That is, you can count both upon what the others are doing to help you elsewhere, as in China and in Russia, and upon what they will do later, after your death, to take up your action and carry it forward to its final accomplishment which will be the revolution. Moreover you must rely upon this; not to do so is immoral.” To this I rejoin, first, that I shall always count upon my comrades-in-arms in the struggle, in so far as they are committed, as I am, to a definite, common cause; and in the unity of a party or a group which I can more or less control – that is, in which I am enrolled as a militant and whose movements at every moment are known to me. In that respect, to rely upon the unity and the will of the party is exactly like my reckoning that the train will run to time or that the tram will not be derailed. But I cannot count upon men whom I do not know, I cannot base my confidence upon human goodness or upon man’s interest in the good of society, seeing that man is free and that there is no human nature which I can take as foundational. I do not know where the Russian revolution will lead. I can admire it and take it as an example in so far as it is evident, today, that the proletariat plays a part in Russia which it has attained in no other nation. But I cannot affirm that this will necessarily lead to the triumph of the proletariat: I must confine myself to what I can see. Nor can I be sure that comrades-in-arms will take up my work after my death and carry it to the maximum perfection, seeing that those men are free agents and will freely decide, tomorrow, what man is then to be. Tomorrow, after my death, some men may decide to establish Fascism, and the others may be so cowardly or so slack as to let them do so. If so, Fascism will then be the truth of man, and so much the worse for us. In reality, things will be such as men have decided they shall be. Does that mean that I should abandon myself to quietism? No. First I ought to commit myself and then act my commitment, according to the time-honoured formula that “one need not hope in order to undertake one’s work.” Nor does this mean that I should not belong to a party, but only that I should be without illusion and that I should do what I can. For instance, if I ask myself “Will the social ideal as such, ever become a reality?” I cannot tell, I only know that whatever may be in my power to make it so, I shall do; beyond that, I can count upon nothing.
  　　Quietism is the attitude of people who say, “l(fā)et others do what I cannot do.” The doctrine I am presenting before you is precisely the opposite of this, since it declares that there is no reality except in action. It goes further, indeed, and adds, “Man is nothing else but what he purposes, he exists only in so far as he realises himself, he is therefore nothing else but the sum of his actions, nothing else but what his life is.” Hence we can well understand why some people are horrified by our teaching. For many have but one resource to sustain them in their misery, and that is to think, “Circumstances have been against me, I was worthy to be something much better than I have been. I admit I have never had a great love or a great friendship; but that is because I never met a man or a woman who were worthy of it; if I have not written any very good books, it is because I had not the leisure to do so; or, if I have had no children to whom I could devote myself it is because I did not find the man I could have lived with. So there remains within me a wide range of abilities, inclinations and potentialities, unused but perfectly viable, which endow me with a worthiness that could never be inferred from the mere history of my actions.” But in reality and for the existentialist, there is no love apart from the deeds of love; no potentiality of love other than that which is manifested in loving; there is no genius other than that which is expressed in works of art. The genius of Proust is the totality of the works of Proust; the genius of Racine is the series of his tragedies, outside of which there is nothing. Why should we attribute to Racine the capacity to write yet another tragedy when that is precisely what he did not write? In life, a man commits himself, draws his own portrait and there is nothing but that portrait. No doubt this thought may seem comfortless to one who has not made a success of his life. On the other hand, it puts everyone in a position to understand that reality alone is reliable; that dreams, expectations and hopes serve to define a man only as deceptive dreams, abortive hopes, expectations unfulfilled; that is to say, they define him negatively, not positively. Nevertheless, when one says, “You are nothing else but what you live,” it does not imply that an artist is to be judged solely by his works of art, for a thousand other things contribute no less to his definition as a man. What we mean to say is that a man is no other than a series of undertakings, that he is the sum, the organisation, the set of relations that constitute these undertakings.
  　　In the light of all this, what people reproach us with is not, after all, our pessimism, but the sternness of our optimism. If people condemn our works of fiction, in which we describe characters that are base, weak, cowardly and sometimes even frankly evil, it is not only because those characters are base, weak, cowardly or evil. For suppose that, like Zola, we showed that the behaviour of these characters was caused by their heredity, or by the action of their environment upon them, or by determining factors, psychic or organic. People would be reassured, they would say, “You see, that is what we are like, no one can do anything about it.” But the existentialist, when he portrays a coward, shows him as responsible for his cowardice. He is not like that on account of a cowardly heart or lungs or cerebrum, he has not become like that through his physiological organism; he is like that because he has made himself into a coward by actions. There is no such thing as a cowardly temperament. There are nervous temperaments; there is what is called impoverished blood, and there are also rich temperaments. But the man whose blood is poor is not a coward for all that, for what produces cowardice is the act of giving up or giving way; and a temperament is not an action. A coward is defined by the deed that he has done. What people feel obscurely, and with horror, is that the coward as we present him is guilty of being a coward. What people would prefer would be to be born either a coward or a hero. One of the charges most often laid against the Chemins de la Liberté is something like this: “But, after all, these people being so base, how can you make them into heroes?” That objection is really rather comic, for it implies that people are born heroes: and that is, at bottom, what such people would like to think. If you are born cowards, you can be quite content, you can do nothing about it and you will be cowards all your lives whatever you do; and if you are born heroes you can again be quite content; you will be heroes all your lives eating and drinking heroically. Whereas the existentialist says that the coward makes himself cowardly, the hero makes himself heroic; and that there is always a possibility for the coward to give up cowardice and for the hero to stop being a hero. What counts is the total commitment, and it is not by a particular case or particular action that you are committed altogether.
  　　We have now, I think, dealt with a certain number of the reproaches against existentialism. You have seen that it cannot be regarded as a philosophy of quietism since it defines man by his action; nor as a pessimistic description of man, for no doctrine is more optimistic, the destiny of man is placed within himself. Nor is it an attempt to discourage man from action since it tells him that there is no hope except in his action, and that the one thing which permits him to have life is the deed. Upon this level therefore, what we are considering is an ethic of action and self-commitment. However, we are still reproached, upon these few data, for confining man within his individual subjectivity. There again people badly misunderstand us.
  　　Our point of departure is, indeed, the subjectivity of the individual, and that for strictly philosophic reasons. It is not because we are bourgeois, but because we seek to base our teaching upon the truth, and not upon a collection of fine theories, full of hope but lacking real foundations. And at the point of departure there cannot be any other truth than this, I think, therefore I am, which is the absolute truth of consciousness as it attains to itself. Every theory which begins with man, outside of this moment of self-attainment, is a theory which thereby suppresses the truth, for outside of the Cartesian cogito, all objects are no more than probable, and any doctrine of probabilities which is not attached to a truth will crumble into nothing. In order to define the probable one must possess the true. Before there can be any truth whatever, then, there must be an absolute truth, and there is such a truth which is simple, easily attained and within the reach of everybody; it consists in one’s immediate sense of one’s self.
  　　In the second place, this theory alone is compatible with the dignity of man, it is the only one which does not make man into an object. All kinds of materialism lead one to treat every man including oneself as an object – that is, as a set of pre-determined reactions, in no way different from the patterns of qualities and phenomena which constitute a table, or a chair or a stone. Our aim is precisely to establish the human kingdom as a pattern of values in distinction from the material world. But the subjectivity which we thus postulate as the standard of truth is no narrowly individual subjectivism, for as we have demonstrated, it is not only one’s own self that one discovers in the cogito, but those of others too. Contrary to the philosophy of Descartes, contrary to that of Kant, when we say “I think” we are attaining to ourselves in the presence of the other, and we are just as certain of the other as we are of ourselves. Thus the man who discovers himself directly in thecogito also discovers all the others, and discovers them as the condition of his own existence. He recognises that he cannot be anything (in the sense in which one says one is spiritual, or that one is wicked or jealous) unless others recognise him as such. I cannot obtain any truth whatsoever about myself, except through the mediation of another. The other is indispensable to my existence, and equally so to any knowledge I can have of myself. Under these conditions, the intimate discovery of myself is at the same time the revelation of the other as a freedom which confronts mine, and which cannot think or will without doing so either for or against me. Thus, at once, we find ourselves in a world which is, let us say, that of “inter-subjectivity”. It is in this world that man has to decide what he is and what others are.
  　　Furthermore, although it is impossible to find in each and every man a universal essence that can be called human nature, there is nevertheless a human universality of condition. It is not by chance that the thinkers of today are so much more ready to speak of the condition than of the nature of man. By his condition they understand, with more or less clarity, all the limitations which a priori define man’s fundamental situation in the universe. His historical situations are variable: man may be born a slave in a pagan society or may be a feudal baron, or a proletarian. But what never vary are the necessities of being in the world, of having to labor and to die there. These limitations are neither subjective nor objective, or rather there is both a subjective and an objective aspect of them. Objective, because we meet with them everywhere and they are everywhere recognisable: and subjective because they are lived and are nothing if man does not live them – if, that is to say, he does not freely determine himself and his existence in relation to them. And, diverse though man’s purpose may be, at least none of them is wholly foreign to me, since every human purpose presents itself as an attempt either to surpass these limitations, or to widen them, or else to deny or to accommodate oneself to them. Consequently every purpose, however individual it may be, is of universal value. Every purpose, even that of a Chinese, an Indian or a Negro, can be understood by a European. To say it can be understood, means that the European of 1945 may be striving out of a certain situation towards the same limitations in the same way, and that he may reconceive in himself the purpose of the Chinese, of the Indian or the African. In every purpose there is universality, in this sense that every purpose is comprehensible to every man. Not that this or that purpose defines man for ever, but that it may be entertained again and again. There is always some way of understanding an idiot, a child, a primitive man or a foreigner if one has sufficient information. In this sense we may say that there is a human universality, but it is not something given; it is being perpetually made. I make this universality in choosing myself; I also make it by understanding the purpose of any other man, of whatever epoch. This absoluteness of the act of choice does not alter the relativity of each epoch.
  　　What is at the very heart and center of existentialism, is the absolute character of the free commitment, by which every man realises himself in realising a type of humanity – a commitment always understandable, to no matter whom in no matter what epoch – and its bearing upon the relativity of the cultural pattern which may result from such absolute commitment. One must observe equally the relativity of Cartesianism and the absolute character of the Cartesian commitment. In this sense you may say, if you like, that every one of us makes the absolute by breathing, by eating, by sleeping or by behaving in any fashion whatsoever. There is no difference between free being – being as self-committal, as existence choosing its essence – and absolute being. And there is no difference whatever between being as an absolute, temporarily localised that is, localised in history – and universally intelligible being.
  　　This does not completely refute the charge of subjectivism. Indeed that objection appears in several other forms, of which the first is as follows. People say to us, “Then it does not matter what you do,” and they say this in various ways.
  　　First they tax us with anarchy; then they say, “You cannot judge others, for there is no reason for preferring one purpose to another”; finally, they may say, “Everything being merely voluntary in this choice of yours, you give away with one hand what you pretend to gain with the other.” These three are not very serious objections. As to the first, to say that it does not matter what you choose is not correct. In one sense choice is possible, but what is not possible is not to choose. I can always choose, but I must know that if I do not choose, that is still a choice. This, although it may appear merely formal, is of great importance as a limit to fantasy and caprice. For, when I confront a real situation – for example, that I am a sexual being, able to have relations with a being of the other sex and able to have children – I am obliged to choose my attitude to it, and in every respect I bear the responsibility of the choice which, in committing myself, also commits the whole of humanity. Even if my choice is determined by no a priori value whatever, it can have nothing to do with caprice: and if anyone thinks that this is only Gide’s theory of the acte gratuit over again, he has failed to see the enormous difference between this theory and that of Gide. Gide does not know what a situation is, his “act” is one of pure caprice. In our view, on the contrary, man finds himself in an organised situation in which he is himself involved: his choice involves mankind in its entirety, and he cannot avoid choosing. Either he must remain single, or he must marry without having children, or he must marry and have children. In any case, and whichever he may choose, it is impossible for him, in respect of this situation, not to take complete responsibility. Doubtless he chooses without reference to any pre-established value, but it is unjust to tax him with caprice. Rather let us say that the moral choice is comparable to the construction of a work of art.
  　　But here I must at once digress to make it quite clear that we are not propounding an aesthetic morality, for our adversaries are disingenuous enough to reproach us even with that. I mention the work of art only by way of comparison. That being understood, does anyone reproach an artist, when he paints a picture, for not following rules established a priori. Does one ever ask what is the picture that he ought to paint? As everyone knows, there is no pre-defined picture for him to make; the artist applies himself to the composition of a picture, and the picture that ought to be made is precisely that which he will have made. As everyone knows, there are no aesthetic values a priori, but there are values which will appear in due course in the coherence of the picture, in the relation between the will to create and the finished work. No one can tell what the painting of tomorrow will be like; one cannot judge a painting until it is done. What has that to do with morality? We are in the same creative situation. We never speak of a work of art as irresponsible; when we are discussing a canvas by Picasso, we understand very well that the composition became what it is at the time when he was painting it, and that his works are part and parcel of his entire life.
  　　It is the same upon the plane of morality. There is this in common between art and morality, that in both we have to do with creation and invention. We cannot decide a priori what it is that should be done. I think it was made sufficiently clear to you in the case of that student who came to see me, that to whatever ethical system he might appeal, the Kantian or any other, he could find no sort of guidance whatever; he was obliged to invent the law for himself. Certainly we cannot say that this man, in choosing to remain with his mother – that is, in taking sentiment, personal devotion and concrete charity as his moral foundations – would be making an irresponsible choice, nor could we do so if he preferred the sacrifice of going away to England. Man makes himself; he is not found ready-made; he makes himself by the choice of his morality, and he cannot but choose a morality, such is the pressure of circumstances upon him. We define man only in relation to his commitments; it is therefore absurd to reproach us for irresponsibility in our choice.
  　　In the second place, people say to us, “You are unable to judge others.” This is true in one sense and false in another. It is true in this sense, that whenever a man chooses his purpose and his commitment in all clearness and in all sincerity, whatever that purpose may be, it is impossible for him to prefer another. It is true in the sense that we do not believe in progress. Progress implies amelioration; but man is always the same, facing a situation which is always changing, and choice remains always a choice in the situation. The moral problem has not changed since the time when it was a choice between slavery and anti-slavery – from the time of the war of Secession, for example, until the present moment when one chooses between the M.R.P. [Mouvement Republicain Poputaire] and the Communists.
  　　We can judge, nevertheless, for, as I have said, one chooses in view of others, and in view of others one chooses himself. One can judge, first – and perhaps this is not a judgment of value, but it is a logical judgment – that in certain cases choice is founded upon an error, and in others upon the truth. One can judge a man by saying that he deceives himself. Since we have defined the situation of man as one of free choice, without excuse and without help, any man who takes refuge behind the excuse of his passions, or by inventing some deterministic doctrine, is a self-deceiver. One may object: “But why should he not choose to deceive himself?” I reply that it is not for me to judge him morally, but I define his self-deception as an error. Here one cannot avoid pronouncing a judgment of truth. The self-deception is evidently a falsehood, because it is a dissimulation of man’s complete liberty of commitment. Upon this same level, I say that it is also a self-deception if I choose to declare that certain values are incumbent upon me; I am in contradiction with myself if I will these values and at the same time say that they impose themselves upon me. If anyone says to me, “And what if I wish to deceive myself?” I answer, “There is no reason why you should not, but I declare that you are doing so, and that the attitude of strict consistency alone is that of good faith.” Furthermore, I can pronounce a moral judgment. For I declare that freedom, in respect of concrete circumstances, can have no other end and aim but itself; and when once a man has seen that values depend upon himself, in that state of forsakenness he can will only one thing, and that is freedom as the foundation of all values. That does not mean that he wills it in the abstract: it simply means that the actions of men of good faith have, as their ultimate significance, the quest of freedom itself as such. A man who belongs to some communist or revolutionary society wills certain concrete ends, which imply the will to freedom, but that freedom is willed in community. We will freedom for freedom’s sake, in and through particular circumstances. And in thus willing freedom, we discover that it depends entirely upon the freedom of others and that the freedom of others depends upon our own. Obviously, freedom as the definition of a man does not depend upon others, but as soon as there is a commitment, I am obliged to will the liberty of others at the same time as my own. I cannot make liberty my aim unless I make that of others equally my aim. Consequently, when I recognise, as entirely authentic, that man is a being whose existence precedes his essence, and that he is a free being who cannot, in any circumstances, but will his freedom, at the same time I realize that I cannot not will the freedom of others. Thus, in the name of that will to freedom which is implied in freedom itself, I can form judgments upon those who seek to hide from themselves the wholly voluntary nature of their existence and its complete freedom. Those who hide from this total freedom, in a guise of solemnity or with deterministic excuses, I shall call cowards. Others, who try to show that their existence is necessary, when it is merely an accident of the appearance of the human race on earth – I shall call scum. But neither cowards nor scum can be identified except upon the plane of strict authenticity. Thus, although the content of morality is variable, a certain form of this morality is universal. Kant declared that freedom is a will both to itself and to the freedom of others. Agreed: but he thinks that the formal and the universal suffice for the constitution of a morality. We think, on the contrary, that principles that are too abstract break down when we come to defining action. To take once again the case of that student; by what authority, in the name of what golden rule of morality, do you think he could have decided, in perfect peace of mind, either to abandon his mother or to remain with her? There are no means of judging. The content is always concrete, and therefore unpredictable; it has always to be invented. The one thing that counts, is to know whether the invention is made in the name of freedom.
  　　Let us, for example, examine the two following cases, and you will see how far they are similar in spite of their difference. Let us take The Mill on the Floss. We find here a certain young woman, Maggie Tulliver, who is an incarnation of the value of passion and is aware of it. She is in love with a young man, Stephen, who is engaged to another, an insignificant young woman. This Maggie Tulliver, instead of heedlessly seeking her own happiness, chooses in the name of human solidarity to sacrifice herself and to give up the man she loves. On the other hand, La Sanseverina in Stendhal’s Chartreuse de Parme, believing that it is passion which endows man with his real value, would have declared that a grand passion justifies its sacrifices, and must be preferred to the banality of such conjugal love as would unite Stephen to the little goose he was engaged to marry. It is the latter that she would have chosen to sacrifice in realising her own happiness, and, as Stendhal shows, she would also sacrifice herself upon the plane of passion if life made that demand upon her. Here we are facing two clearly opposed moralities; but I claim that they are equivalent, seeing that in both cases the overruling aim is freedom. You can imagine two attitudes exactly similar in effect, in that one girl might prefer, in resignation, to give up her lover while the other preferred, in fulfilment of sexual desire, to ignore the prior engagement of the man she loved; and, externally, these two cases might appear the same as the two we have just cited, while being in fact entirely different. The attitude of La Sanseverina is much nearer to that of Maggie Tulliver than to one of careless greed. Thus, you see, the second objection is at once true and false. One can choose anything, but only if it is upon the plane of free commitment.
  　　The third objection, stated by saying, “You take with one hand what you give with the other,” means, at bottom, “your values are not serious, since you choose them yourselves.” To that I can only say that I am very sorry that it should be so; but if I have excluded God the Father, there must be somebody to invent values. We have to take things as they are. And moreover, to say that we invent values means neither more nor less than this; that there is no sense in life a priori. Life is nothing until it is lived; but it is yours to make sense of, and the value of it is nothing else but the sense that you choose. Therefore, you can see that there is a possibility of creating a human community. I have been reproached for suggesting that existentialism is a form of humanism: people have said to me, “But you have written in your Nausée that the humanists are wrong, you have even ridiculed a certain type of humanism, why do you now go back upon that?” In reality, the word humanism has two very different meanings. One may understand by humanism a theory which upholds man as the end-in-itself and as the supreme value. Humanism in this sense appears, for instance, in Cocteau’s story Round the World in 80 Hours, in which one of the characters declares, because he is flying over mountains in an airplane, “Man is magnificent!” This signifies that although I personally have not built aeroplanes, I have the benefit of those particular inventions and that I personally, being a man, can consider myself responsible for, and honoured by, achievements that are peculiar to some men. It is to assume that we can ascribe value to man according to the most distinguished deeds of certain men. That kind of humanism is absurd, for only the dog or the horse would be in a position to pronounce a general judgment upon man and declare that he is magnificent, which they have never been such fools as to do – at least, not as far as I know. But neither is it admissible that a man should pronounce judgment upon Man. Existentialism dispenses with any judgment of this sort: an existentialist will never take man as the end, since man is still to be determined. And we have no right to believe that humanity is something to which we could set up a cult, after the manner of Auguste Comte. The cult of humanity ends in Comtian humanism, shut-in upon itself, and – this must be said – in Fascism. We do not want a humanism like that.
  　　But there is another sense of the word, of which the fundamental meaning is this: Man is all the time outside of himself: it is in projecting and losing himself beyond himself that he makes man to exist; and, on the other hand, it is by pursuing transcendent aims that he himself is able to exist. Since man is thus self-surpassing, and can grasp objects only in relation to his self-surpassing, he is himself the heart and center of his transcendence. There is no other universe except the human universe, the universe of human subjectivity. This relation of transcendence as constitutive of man (not in the sense that God is transcendent, but in the sense of self-surpassing) with subjectivity (in such a sense that man is not shut up in himself but forever present in a human universe) – it is this that we call existential humanism. This is humanism, because we remind man that there is no legislator but himself; that he himself, thus abandoned, must decide for himself; also because we show that it is not by turning back upon himself, but always by seeking, beyond himself, an aim which is one of liberation or of some particular realisation, that man can realize himself as truly human.
  　　You can see from these few reflections that nothing could be more unjust than the objections people raise against us. Existentialism is nothing else but an attempt to draw the full conclusions from a consistently atheistic position. Its intention is not in the least that of plunging men into despair. And if by despair one means as the Christians do – any attitude of unbelief, the despair of the existentialists is something different. Existentialism is not atheist in the sense that it would exhaust itself in demonstrations of the non-existence of God. It declares, rather, that even if God existed that would make no difference from its point of view. Not that we believe God does exist, but we think that the real problem is not that of His existence; what man needs is to find himself again and to understand that nothing can save him from himself, not even a valid proof of the existence of God. In this sense existentialism is optimistic. It is a doctrine of action, and it is only by self-deception, by confining their own despair with ours that Christians can describe us as without hope.
  　　________________________________________
  　　Further Reading: Simone De Beauvoir Archive | Marxism & Ethics | Ethics of Ambiguity, de Beauvoir 1947 | Marxist Humanism | Marxists Internet Archive
  　　Jean-Paul Sartre Archive | Value_of_Knowledge
  　　
•   　　前段時(shí)間有人聽說我過得好像還不錯(cuò)，于是對我大加贊美，美其名曰：咸魚翻身。可我覺得咸魚就是咸魚，翻身了還是咸魚。不知道他是贊美還是挖苦，只好告訴自己，在咸魚圈可沒有你的位置，笑。細(xì)細(xì)品嚼斯賓諾莎的思想：“自由人最少想到死，他的智慧不是關(guān)於死的默念，而是對於生的沉思?！彼囊簧矎氐椎貙?shí)踐了這句格言，對死亡一直十分平靜面對。X在五年前對我說：“你知道薩特嗎？不，你不知道，直到你意識到你的存在?！盭帶我走進(jìn)了薩特的世界，存在主義讓我的思維和意識發(fā)生巨大的轉(zhuǎn)變。之后對于人生的思考便成了一種既具體又抽象的概念，存在主義曾一度將我?guī)蚪^望的深淵，忽視了存在的意義，變得極端，導(dǎo)致對絕大多事產(chǎn)生厭惡，存在主義認(rèn)為存在的過程，就是死亡的過程，從而認(rèn)為‘存在’即‘不存在’的悲觀主義結(jié)論。直到X引導(dǎo)我由意識形態(tài)的邊緣拉回現(xiàn)實(shí)生活，而這種悲觀情緒已經(jīng)深深刻入思維和意識。那到底什么是存在呢？存在主義既反應(yīng)了對資本主義的反感和厭惡，又強(qiáng)調(diào)個(gè)人主義和主觀唯心主義，我不否認(rèn)存在主義在‘自由’的框架下美化悲觀主義哲學(xué)，這種悲觀的處事態(tài)度會帶給我們更多的思考。
  　　
  　　等我們上完學(xué)，去找一份薪金微薄的工作，承擔(dān)一部分社會責(zé)任、義務(wù)，買車買房，我們相信等我們結(jié)了婚，有了孩子，生活會更美好。等有了孩子，又因?yàn)樗麄儾粔虼蠖鵁溃氲人麄兇笮r(shí)，我們就會開心了?？傻人麄冮L大了，還是不行，於是又相信等他們再長大一些，幸福會來。之后我們的孩子便會做每個(gè)人一生總要做幾件事情，找工作、遇到他或者她、然后買一套稱之為家的房子。這時(shí)我們的人生已經(jīng)立秋了，再過幾年就要退休了，這些束縛本身就是生活的障礙。而這些在我們生命里遭遇的各種幸與不幸，快樂與痛苦，淚水與掌聲，構(gòu)成了我們的存在。
  　　
  　　存在主義以自我為中心，尊重他人的生活，崇尚個(gè)性自由。存在主義認(rèn)為，個(gè)人價(jià)值高于一切，個(gè)人與社會永遠(yuǎn)是分離對立的。倘若被某些事情羈絆，存在的本身就會變得毫無意義，尼采認(rèn)為：生命中最強(qiáng)烈、最高的意志并不存在于只是要求生存下去的斗爭中，而是存在于斗爭的意識之中，存在于強(qiáng)力意志之中。在某些追求的過程中，不可避免地會掉入虛空，隨即失去價(jià)值。而薩特認(rèn)為：‘他人即地獄’，在薩特看來，他人乃是一個(gè)客體存在，這種客體不同于物，他不但存在，而且對‘我’本身構(gòu)成威脅，因?yàn)樵谒南鄬χ校覍λ旧硪彩恰铩?。我們的存在首先要出于自我存在，周圍的他人作為客體存在，若存在于他人客體的存在，即存在于自我存在的客體不存在；若存在于他人客體的不存在，則存在于自我不存在客體的存在。我相信這些存在主義理論會不斷完善并且作為追逐獨(dú)立意識自由而永遠(yuǎn)延續(xù)下去，相信最近的東西和最遠(yuǎn)的東西，相信不完全的真理，在十字路口找到救贖，相信存在和虛無。
  　　
  　　
  　　對于存在主義有興趣的各位我推薦存在主義相關(guān)及擴(kuò)展閱讀著作：
  　　
  　　《存在于虛無》、《惡心》、《鼠疫》、《變形記》、《母豬女郎》。
  　　
  　　存在是一個(gè)旅程，而死亡是終點(diǎn)站。所以，
  　　
  　　去愛吧，就像不曾受過傷一樣；
  　　跳舞吧，像沒有人會欣賞一樣；
  　　唱歌吧，想沒有人會聆聽一樣；
  　　工作吧，像是不需要金錢一樣；
  　　生活吧，就像今天是末日一樣。
•   　　 認(rèn)為這書通俗易懂的人估計(jì)是已經(jīng)啃過了《存在與虛無》了。反正我覺得一上來就想通過這個(gè)小冊子來了解薩特的思想絕對不是一條正路。書的前半部分《存在主義是一種人道主義》其實(shí)只占了81頁中的26頁，1946年的東西和后半部分1980年的訪談堆在一起，顯然不是薩特的本意。不僅僅是因?yàn)樗_特晚年想法的巨大轉(zhuǎn)變，更因?yàn)楹蟀氩糠值脑L談，看起來僅僅是糾纏于一些細(xì)枝末節(jié)的概念和薩特所或參與或經(jīng)歷或研究過的種種實(shí)實(shí)在在的社會現(xiàn)實(shí)，而且往往是想到哪兒說到哪兒，沒什么條理。甚至萊維在很多時(shí)候都呈現(xiàn)出比薩特強(qiáng)烈得多的談話欲望，這讓這個(gè)訪談多少有點(diǎn)兒奇怪。
  　　 另外我想說的是，薩特說的“人道主義”總讓我覺得和我們平時(shí)理解中的人道主義是兩碼事，存在主義不把人當(dāng)成手段甚至不把人當(dāng)成目的這一特點(diǎn)并不能用我們平時(shí)理解的人道主義來概括，用“人本主義”可能更貼切。我想這可能是翻譯或是中西文化差異造成的誤會，正如翻譯所說，所謂的“負(fù)責(zé)”的原意可能更接近“表態(tài)”。
  　　 最后，從兩篇序言可以看到兩位譯者對薩特的感情有著鮮明的差異。前者冷靜得出奇（也因此有了裝逼的嫌疑），后者周煦良卻對薩特飽含贊美之情。兩相比較，頗值得玩味。
  　　
•   　　這些天又仿佛到了喪失敘述能力的時(shí)候了。斷續(xù)地看了寫書，也懶得寫書評，其實(shí)哪是書評，不過是些細(xì)屑的雜侃。但這種心情也消卻了。生活還算美好，總是能遇上些不錯(cuò)的朋友，然而那些離別的愁緒總是在相聚時(shí)便開始醞釀。思想飄忽不定，反復(fù)沉浮，呈現(xiàn)一種游離狀。我樂意將它當(dāng)成是青春的原貌。雖然這種說法有點(diǎn)矯情。
  　　
  　　前幾天看了薩特的《存在主義是一種人道主義》，覺得這是可以裝逼的一本書，便暗暗決定一定要多少寫點(diǎn)什么。其實(shí)這不過是篇比較短的論文，用詞通俗明了，才有興致一直讀完。薩特是我很推崇的一個(gè)哲學(xué)家，他的觀點(diǎn)我相當(dāng)欣賞，雖說他堅(jiān)持無神論，而我是泛神論者，但說到底也沒什么區(qū)別。?？略f，這世界上可能沒有哲學(xué)，只有哲學(xué)家。但薩特的哲學(xué)觀基本能使我欣然接受，大抵是它契合了這個(gè)時(shí)代、社會以及個(gè)人思想諸如此類的東西。
  　　
  　　因?yàn)閿⑹龅姆α?，所以只好概括下他的觀點(diǎn)。存在主義的核心思想，就在于自由承擔(dān)責(zé)任的絕對性質(zhì)。人在存在主義者眼中是不能下定義的，因?yàn)樵谝婚_頭人是什么都說不上。他所以說得上是往后的事，那時(shí)候他就會是他認(rèn)為的那種人了。人性是沒有的，因?yàn)闆]有上帝提供一個(gè)人的概念。人除了自己認(rèn)為并愿意成為的那樣之外，什么都不是。這就是存在主義的第一原則。人只是在企圖成為什么時(shí)才取得存在。我們找不到任何為自己辯解或者推卸責(zé)任的方法。我們只是孤零零一個(gè)人，無法自解。由是，人們必須為之承擔(dān)責(zé)任，而且不僅僅是對自己的個(gè)性負(fù)責(zé)，還得對所有人負(fù)責(zé)。
  　　
  　　在閱讀中，不時(shí)有醍醐灌頂豁然開朗的感覺。你決定成為什么樣的人，你在別人眼中是什么樣的人，都要看你的行動，而你的行動是由你自己的意愿決定，而不是受天性所限。雖說基因?qū)π愿窕蛟S的確有一定影響，但后天因素顯然更重要。哎，在許多人眼中，我都是一副好學(xué)生乖乖女的模樣。雖然我經(jīng)常曠掉不喜歡的課，在考試的時(shí)候還故意挑試卷的刺，有時(shí)還會做些常人匪夷所思的事。我自然不以為自己是好學(xué)生，但似乎也不夠叛逆。我的思想有時(shí)可以很激進(jìn)，但行動上總感覺被什么東西牽絆著。有時(shí)真感覺自己什么都不是，什么也做不好，沒有一件可以引以為豪達(dá)到極致的東西，心中還總為那些該做卻沒做的事情后悔著。他人的批評，即便是隱藏的不滿，都成為道道疤痕烙在我的心上。為此，可以低落許久。也許，還是因?yàn)樽约和昝乐髁x吧。何必活得這么累。享受當(dāng)下就好了。
•   　　 要評價(jià)一個(gè)人，追溯其所處環(huán)境及動機(jī)是必要的。環(huán)境即為限制，而動機(jī)說明了一個(gè)人曾想要成為一個(gè)什么樣的人。〔薩特說：“任何一個(gè)人類意圖都表現(xiàn)為企圖超過這些限制，或者擴(kuò)大這些限制，不然就是否定這些限制，或者使自己適應(yīng)這些限制?！保?br /> 　　 因?yàn)橛辛诉@樣的梳理，任何一個(gè)人的結(jié)果都可以被理解了，同時(shí)沒有任何一個(gè)結(jié)果會不可理解。但理解歸理解，評價(jià)一個(gè)人卻是要依著結(jié)果，讓那人為這結(jié)果負(fù)責(zé)。既然最終還是依著結(jié)果來評價(jià)一個(gè)人，之前的那些梳理又有何用呢？
  　　 首先，對于除己之外的人。由于是可追溯的，便有助于我們了解在結(jié)果之前是如何環(huán)環(huán)相扣，也就可以像亞里士多德所講，借此引起恐懼——也就是在梳理的過程中，讓自己仿佛躬親了一次，以作借鑒。
  　　 其次，對于自己。因?yàn)榱私獾皆u價(jià)終歸是一件事后的事，所以在每一次行動之前，都要想清楚周遭的環(huán)境如何，自己到底想成為什么樣的人、到底如何選擇（注意：不選擇也是種選擇）。
  　　 總之，人會，而且要，為自己的行動負(fù)責(zé)。因?yàn)橐?fù)責(zé)，所以在行動之前審慎考量。因?yàn)橐?fù)責(zé)、要審慎考量，所以會負(fù)責(zé)。
  　　
  　　
•   　　 這大概是講存在主義最好懂的一本書。雖然遠(yuǎn)不是終點(diǎn)，卻提供了一個(gè)可供參考的起點(diǎn)。五年前，我曾把這篇訪談的梗概梳理了一下，希望也能成為接近這本書的起點(diǎn)。
  　　 人的“存在先于本質(zhì)”，這是薩特提出的第一個(gè)命題。薩特舉例說 ，裁紙刀的存在，是因?yàn)槭紫仍诠そ车念^腦中有一個(gè)裁紙刀的本質(zhì)，對裁紙刀這樣的物來說，本質(zhì)先于存在。如果說上帝腦中先有人的本質(zhì)，然后才造出了人，那我們當(dāng)然可以說對人而言，也是本質(zhì)先于存在。這也是有神論的一貫看法。但是如果人先有本質(zhì)，后有存在，那么人可能擁有的自由就很有限了。因?yàn)楸举|(zhì)不是由人決定，而人的存在必須服從本質(zhì)。從自由的角度出發(fā)，存在主義自然而然的提出了“存在先于本質(zhì)”這一第一原則。需要說明的是，人存在本身是不自由的。英文中出生是“be born”，用的是被動語態(tài)，也就是說人沒有選擇是否出生，是否開始存在的自由。但當(dāng)人已經(jīng)存在的時(shí)候，人就有了選擇的自由（不過人沒有不選擇的自由, 因?yàn)椴贿x擇本身就是一種選擇）。薩特認(rèn)為，當(dāng)人做出自由選擇時(shí)，人的本質(zhì)就在選擇中得到了體現(xiàn)。正因?yàn)檫@種選擇是自由，“人就要對自己是怎樣的人負(fù)責(zé)”。但是這種責(zé)任是沉重的，人不僅僅要對“自己的個(gè)性負(fù)責(zé)”， 還要對“所有的人負(fù)責(zé)”。因?yàn)椤耙粋€(gè)人應(yīng)當(dāng)永遠(yuǎn)捫心自問，如果人人都照你這樣做，那將是什么情形?！边@種道德判定模式，顯然是受康德的影響。但薩特不是那個(gè)先將上帝殺死，然后又讓上帝復(fù)活的康德，他指出了這種為所有人負(fù)責(zé)的痛苦。因?yàn)闆]有上帝，因?yàn)槿说谋举|(zhì)是由人自己決定的。我們無法說一種行動比另一個(gè)行動更好。人是自由，但同時(shí)也是孤零零的。沒有任何一種價(jià)值體系可以用來參照。薩特舉了一個(gè)例子，說一個(gè)士兵面臨是撫養(yǎng)母親還是上前線保衛(wèi)祖國的兩難選擇。不論哪一種選擇，在薩特看來都是可以的，都是道德的。但我們也可以換一個(gè)角度說，不論哪一種選擇，都是不道德的。這正是人生的絕望處境。對于這種絕望，薩特的回答是“我們應(yīng)當(dāng)不懷著希望行動?！?br /> 　　 薩特認(rèn)為他的哲學(xué)是一種“嚴(yán)峻的樂觀主義”，嚴(yán)峻來自承擔(dān)責(zé)任的痛苦，樂觀因?yàn)槿说淖杂伞?br /> 　　
  　　 2004年3月16日
•   　　鄙人實(shí)踐發(fā)現(xiàn)存在主義利用好了能給人以輕松灑脫和斗志昂揚(yáng)的感覺，在此把存在主義的主要觀點(diǎn)和自己的認(rèn)識糅合在了一起，思維狹隘暫且羅列這么多。望更多人能“存在一點(diǎn)，勝人一籌”。
  　　
  　　-----
  　　1.存在先于本質(zhì)：
  　　
  　　“不是其所是，是其所不是。”在行動未投向未來之前，你什么都不是，當(dāng)然，你也可以什么都是。
  　　
  　　你的意義被投向未來，你的人生將超越理性：過去不可解釋，未來不可預(yù)測，但是眼前的這一刻，卻是具體的、可以把握的。
  　　
  　　別人說你成不了大器，或許是因?yàn)樗€未成為其想要成為的大器。除了你自己之外，別讓別人決定你將會是什么。
  　　
  　　-----
  　　2.自由意志的選擇：
  　　
  　　“沒有懦弱的心、肺或者大腦，懦弱也并非天生，一個(gè)人之所以懦弱，是因?yàn)樗ㄟ^自己的行動成為了一個(gè)懦夫，世界上沒有懦弱的氣質(zhì)這樣?xùn)|西，懦弱是一個(gè)人后天為其行動負(fù)責(zé)后的結(jié)果，是其自由意志的選擇。”
  　　
  　　在你沒死之前，不要說“我愛你愛到可以為你去死”，請用行動證明你的情感，因?yàn)椤半x開愛的行動是沒有愛的”。
  　　
  　　如果為某事、某人甚至自己感到惡心，那么恭喜你，你還沒有麻木，你還有自由需要開辟。
  　　
  　　自由永遠(yuǎn)是一項(xiàng)重罪，沒有全然無謂的自由。有人選擇了它，卻被判刑；有人逃避了，卻成就了他人的自由。
  　　
  　　所有的快樂不過一瞬、所有的悲傷都斗不過流年。一切都會過去，甚至是愛。追求只是在加速失去。
  　　
  　　有時(shí)候，放棄意味著自由。
  　　
  　　-----
  　　3.荒謬的世界：
  　　
  　　“存在的過程，就是死亡的過程?！?br /> 　　
  　　你永遠(yuǎn)不知道將來有什么在等著你，你的未來，永遠(yuǎn)是一片有待填補(bǔ)的空白。
  　　
  　　既然不知將得到何物，也就無所謂失去，面對未來種種巧合和意外，面對人性難以預(yù)知的責(zé)難，靜候，將是最好的選擇。
  　　
  　　丑陋、貪婪和自私深藏在人的內(nèi)心，有的心知肚明，有得渾然不知，有得矢口否認(rèn)。人的價(jià)值，總會在面對誘惑的一瞬間被決定。
  　　
  　　每個(gè)人都在選擇自由，每個(gè)人都在為自己而活，你我彼此彼此，何必偽裝，何必借口；何必抱怨，何必強(qiáng)求？
  　　
  　　所謂文明源自對人類本性的壓抑，原始的私念、欲念被迫變相的釋放，我們的文明受傷了，而且將會傷的越來越重。
  　　
  　　-----
  　　4.他人就是地獄：
  　　
  　　如果你和你的戀人痛苦的在一起只是因?yàn)閯e人習(xí)慣看到你們這樣，最后你也會習(xí)慣于這樣去看別人。
  　　
  　　你以為穿著一身名牌別人就會對你另眼相待，其實(shí)，他們更在乎今天晚上去哪家餐廳吃飯。
  　　
  　　“一旦自由在一個(gè)人的靈魂里爆發(fā)了，申明（身份認(rèn)同）對這個(gè)人也無能為力了?！?br /> 　　
  　　在你未了解自己之前，你永遠(yuǎn)只能通過別人的眼睛來看待自己。關(guān)鍵是，人永遠(yuǎn)不可能了解自己，我們也就永遠(yuǎn)只能活在別人的評價(jià)之中。
  　　
  　　如果你想做成一件事，就必須要做一百件你不想做的事。
  　　
  　　這是個(gè)人人都必經(jīng)的地獄，你可以選擇擺脫，但在此之前，你必須學(xué)會走出自己的世界，學(xué)會和無關(guān)的人相處。經(jīng)歷這個(gè)地獄，是為了能讓你從容的走進(jìn)天堂。
  　　
  　　-----
  　　5.責(zé)任與道義：
  　　
  　　你既然選擇要成為你，就必須為令你成為你的行動負(fù)責(zé)。
  　　
  　　這個(gè)世界不是所有可能存在的世界中最好的一個(gè)，你我都有責(zé)任。
•   　　存在感於意識中是你感覺自己存在的存在和他人存在於客體的不存在。若存在於他人客體的存在，即存在於自己存在的客體的不存在，若存在於他人客體的不存在，即存在於自己不存在的客體存在。
  　　
  　　看起來很重要，又好像不是，人不過是宇宙中的一粒微塵。既然還活著，就讓自己快樂些，別被那些無聊的人和事牽絆，我們沒有必要刻意在意別人的看法和觀點(diǎn)，當(dāng)你意識到自己的主體存在，也就認(rèn)清了他人的客體存在，而不必把自己當(dāng)作客體存在，一切應(yīng)是為你而轉(zhuǎn)而變的，你就是你的宇宙，因?yàn)槟愫臀乙粯?，都會死很久?br /> 　　
  　　別太把自己當(dāng)人，更別把自己當(dāng)個(gè)人物似的，拜托，看在上帝的份兒上。
•   　　中午偶看電視，新聞頻道每周日十二點(diǎn)半播每周質(zhì)檢報(bào)告，顯然食品質(zhì)量問題已播不勝播，在中國這樣一造假大國，質(zhì)檢的片子永遠(yuǎn)不會倒閉，今天的主題是生活質(zhì)量，以及全民運(yùn)動狀況，質(zhì)檢結(jié)果就倆字兒：不足。中國人的文化里就是缺啥補(bǔ)啥，不足就要補(bǔ)足，接著就是各大專家教授學(xué)者權(quán)威一一露面，各顯擺活，苦口婆心連哄帶嚇，告訴全國人民，你們要趕快運(yùn)動啊，再不運(yùn)動就要像柴鈴說的那樣這個(gè)國家要亡了這個(gè)民族要完了，專家們把運(yùn)動器材店老板想說而沒能力說的全給說了。
  　　
  　　
  　　我對這期節(jié)目只有一個(gè)想法，中國人太好為人師了，又太自以為聰明了，這個(gè)問題不能深解，只能意會，歸根到底還是文化屬性問題，而對于浸泡在這個(gè)社會里的人來說，又是文化如來不容思議，大家看到想到，一切理所當(dāng)然。文化層面不是短期能解決的，冰凍三尺非一日之寒，三尺之冰非一朝可溶，何況沉積了兩千多年的文化。中國缺的從來不是人，死掉十億，還比美國加日本多，還是超級大國。中國不怕死人，怕不死人。就像敖博說的，多殺幾個(gè)沒問題，多死幾個(gè)當(dāng)放屁。
  　　
  　　
  　　中國歷來深陷愚昧的封建文化中不可自拔，都是文化惹的禍。放眼前兩百年，群體愚昧的一塌糊涂，素質(zhì)低得無以復(fù)低，而自以為是好為人師甚至好為人導(dǎo)師的個(gè)體卻層出不窮。林則徐要救中國，曾國藩要保國家，緊接著洪秀全孫中山汪精衛(wèi)秋瑾陳獨(dú)秀林昭張志新，甚至白白嫩嫩的柴鈴都要救中國，都要當(dāng)總指揮，翻看中國近現(xiàn)代史，你會看到無數(shù)自以為是自以為師的人。
  　　
  　　
  　　中國不是因?yàn)闆]救才沒救，而是因?yàn)橛辛诉@么多想救它的人而沒救。中國真的不需要救，這個(gè)國家這個(gè)民族怎么折騰也亡不了，只要那些喜歡當(dāng)總指揮的人不帶頭折騰就好。中國人需要的是好好賺錢，自由競爭，多為社會積累財(cái)富，而不是什么鍛煉身體。中國需要優(yōu)化國民素質(zhì)，需要貧富差距，要大亂，求大治。三十多年沒亂了，也該亂亂了。多死一批人沒關(guān)系，中國不需要人道主義。中國需要時(shí)間。
•   　　后一篇談話完全沒讀懂，我的基礎(chǔ)太差之故。
  　　前一篇基本能明白。再次感覺到哲學(xué)的不確定和自由。存在主義可以被人指責(zé)悲觀，但薩特也可以找理由說其實(shí)質(zhì)樂觀，各說各有理。所以我們更得有自己的判斷力了。
•   　　我思固我在.
  　　我們在中國式唯物主義里浸淫久了,正常的哲學(xué)思考會受限制.而唯心的一些理論也很難接受.作為唯心一面的存在主義,是唯心論里最精彩,最有思考學(xué)習(xí)價(jià)值的思想.應(yīng)該多讀,多看,多想.
  　　其實(shí)存在主義,也只是一種思想,它本身也有很多不同的主張,不同人可以有不同的理解,
  　　
  　　思想不應(yīng)該像共產(chǎn)黨的教條,框起來,不準(zhǔn)動!
  　　思想是應(yīng)該多面的,積極的思考.
•   　　因?yàn)槟阈袆?，所以你是?br /> 　　 ------談《存在主義是一種人道主義》
  　　
  　　 你是否意識到自我的存在？
  　　 當(dāng)然，這一問題對于大多數(shù)人來說是不存在的。我是某某，我是學(xué)生，我是某某的兒女?？墒窃谒_特看來，一旦你把自己說成為某一客觀的東西，那你自己的異化就開始了?！八思吹鬲z”，社會關(guān)系成了你自我異化的根源。倘若你覺得自己是存在的，那你只能算得上“自在”的存在。難道你只能是某一社會關(guān)系的指稱嗎？若是這樣，那你自己已被歸結(jié)為由他人限定的一種既定的社會角色。而你自己只把自己當(dāng)作這一對象化的客體，那你不是在“自欺欺人”嗎？
  　　 可你究竟是誰？
  　　 你就是你，其他的什么也不是。你唯有保持自我的主體性，站在對象之外通過自由地選擇，對自己的對象虛無化、否定，把這一對象化從它的混沌一團(tuán)的自在背景中呈現(xiàn)出來。這時(shí)你才具有超越對象的能力，而這種能力也就是人所獨(dú)具的。薩特就會對你說，你現(xiàn)在是“自為”的存在著了。你的存在總是先于你的本質(zhì)。你唯有通過你的選擇，你的行動才能表現(xiàn)出你的本質(zhì)。你不應(yīng)讓自己陷入某一社會關(guān)系中，不應(yīng)讓自己為某種思想所左右，包括你現(xiàn)在正在接觸的存在主義。先前的你是荒誕的、偶然的存在，對自身之外的整個(gè)存在是一種混沌的、未分化的體驗(yàn)，可現(xiàn)在你自覺了，有意識了。
  　　可你又該如何選擇？
  　　 你的選擇會是順其自然，隨波逐流的嗎？如果是，那你依然“不存在”。也許你會問，“當(dāng)我在用自己的價(jià)值觀和性格來決定我的選擇以突顯我的主體性時(shí)，我的價(jià)值觀和性格不也已經(jīng)受到環(huán)境的影響了嗎？”一個(gè)嬰兒剛他開始啼哭的時(shí)候，他已經(jīng)意識到了自我的存在，而這樣的存在要比所謂的“理性”的存在更符合“自為”的存在。當(dāng)你在思考并做出選擇之前，你是否意識到自己需要思考思考本身呢？為什么？嬰兒的認(rèn)知比你現(xiàn)在更原初。當(dāng)你在反思之時(shí)，你是否要進(jìn)行“反思之前的我思”呢？存在主義者會告訴你，是的，你需要。唯有清除一切現(xiàn)成的觀念，你才能真正站在對象之外進(jìn)行自由的選擇。這時(shí)你的選擇才是主動的，自為的，有意識的。
  　　 你的一切就是你的行動給予的。而我們是由我們自己所造就的。當(dāng)我們明白了我們自己的本來面目之后，我們選擇的行動就要擔(dān)負(fù)起我們成為我們自己的責(zé)任。把全人類的命運(yùn)交付到人類自己的手上。我們不僅要為自己做出選擇，也為全人類做出了選擇。這或許是示范的作用，也可稱之為這種示范所帶來的擴(kuò)散的影響。在人們的眼里，眾人的選擇都是擇優(yōu)的，因而在他們的心里就有了暗示。你的選擇似乎在告訴著他人，“人就應(yīng)該如此?！蹦汨T就了自己，也鑄就了人。
  　　 存在主義是否是一種對人生采取無所作為的絕望態(tài)度的觀望哲學(xué)？不?！皬氖乱患虑槎淮嬖谑裁聪Ｍ！蹦惆阉侥钊继涂?，只留下一種精神，一種只成為你自己的精神，這樣你才能寧靜致遠(yuǎn)。那生命的意義何在？我想，應(yīng)該是生生不息。人生的意義就在于挖掘出蘊(yùn)含于自己體內(nèi)的潛質(zhì)，只有這些潛質(zhì)才能讓你成為你自己。人就在于其特殊性，所有的人都應(yīng)該努力地表現(xiàn)自己與眾不同的特殊個(gè)性。那我們又該如何讓潛質(zhì)成就我們自己？賦予選擇以行動吧。潛質(zhì)是存在于我們的體內(nèi)，但你不給予它表現(xiàn)的話它就是不存在的。我們何必去羨慕一個(gè)人的天才，而那天才又是沒有被表現(xiàn)出來的呢？唯有實(shí)際行動是可靠的，所謂的希望就是那遙不可及的燭光。這是悲觀嗎？不。倘若說悲觀主義要比樂觀主義更深刻的話，那只是因?yàn)樗f的樂觀是盲目的而已。而一種謹(jǐn)慎的樂觀難道不能給予人以信心嗎？存在主義就如此?？蛇@會因?yàn)樘岢珎€(gè)人的主體性而蔑視任何社會組織嗎？不。因?yàn)槿吮仨氉鞒龅赖逻x擇才能成為他自己，而這是環(huán)境給他的壓力。人的選擇必須是能夠承擔(dān)其行動責(zé)任的選擇，如此便可以把別人的自由當(dāng)作自己的自由來追求。我們就可以在高呼發(fā)現(xiàn)自我的同時(shí)依然存在于這個(gè)社會。給予人自為的意識，教人謹(jǐn)慎而樂觀地行動，存在主義成為了人道主義。
  　　 在這個(gè)物質(zhì)至上、崇尚標(biāo)準(zhǔn)化的時(shí)代，你是否已感受到自己有機(jī)械化的傾向。假如我們把人看作是那完整的人、那奧林匹亞山下的健身者，那你是否會發(fā)現(xiàn)自己只是處在一個(gè)動物到人的過渡地帶？假如應(yīng)試的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)屏蔽了你的人性，橫流的物欲激發(fā)了你的獸性，那你又何曾存在？發(fā)現(xiàn)自己吧，然后行動。
  　　
•   　　 一般這類哲學(xué)書籍，我選擇在入睡前閱讀，可以幫助睡眠。不過這本并不是那么難懂，所以差點(diǎn)沒睡著！
  　　 讓.保羅.薩特是存在主義的代表人物，他寫這本書，給自己和他的存在主義樹了一塊碑，告訴基督教徒和信仰馬克思主義的共產(chǎn)黨，它是如何不同于它們。作為在法國興起的一種新的哲學(xué)詮釋，難免受到當(dāng)?shù)琅蓜e的拉攏和諷刺。獨(dú)樹一幟就是這本書想要達(dá)到的目的。
  　　 存在主義認(rèn)為，人選擇成為自己想成為的類型的人。同時(shí)為這種選擇對自己和他人負(fù)責(zé)。 證明這個(gè)獨(dú)樹一幟的見解，薩特也避免不了談?wù)摰阶杂?，情感，人性等糾纏千年的問題，他不停的和海德格爾和上帝的理論做比較，目的在于批駁對存在主義的三項(xiàng)誤解和批評。其一，存在主義被批評為主觀主義。其二，并不是人人的選擇都一樣。其三，人的選擇并不會存在實(shí)際的意義。他認(rèn)為存在主義是一種人道主義。
  　　 這樣的論證很有啟發(fā)意義，不奇怪它能在美國風(fēng)行并且影響至今。他所指出的人道主義指的是人始終處在自身之外，人靠把自己投出去并消失在自身之外而使人存在；人是靠追求超越的目的才得以存在。既然人是這樣超越自己，而且只在超越自己這方面掌握客體，他本身就是他超越的中心。這種構(gòu)成人的超越性（不是如超越上帝，而是超越自己）和主觀性（人不是關(guān)閉在自身以內(nèi)，而是處在人的宇宙）的關(guān)系。
  　　 有人說，社會是你想象的那樣。其實(shí)不然，社會是我們努力的那樣，超越自己，就能得到更超越的社會。
  　　 本書后半部分是薩特接受采訪的記錄，關(guān)于他各個(gè)分論點(diǎn)和論據(jù)的進(jìn)一步解釋。可以慢慢等想不通的時(shí)候查閱。
  　　
•   嗯就是。你說得對。我還是這個(gè)樣子覺得的
•   嗯，共鳴？一致？思想碰撞出的火花？
  我想摳個(gè)鼻子·········
•   光“聽任”這段就很有問題 薩特什么時(shí)候鼓勵人遇到問題求助“道德標(biāo)桿”了？他鼓勵人遵從自己的內(nèi)心自由選擇
•   看到那里“人也越不出人的主觀性”，存在主義似乎一下子變成了道德哲學(xué)，囧死死死死囧我了
  ==============
  不過這種轉(zhuǎn)型似乎也是合情合理的，想想歌德是一位多么有德行的人啊
•   恩，梳理得很清晰
•   請重新分析一遍，
•   思路很清楚，明白一點(diǎn)
•   很好，有多明白了一點(diǎn)。。。原文還是挺晦澀的，不能完全理解。。。
•   不完全呢，你只是分析了這篇文章的開頭部分。后面還有三個(gè)問題，以及三個(gè)回答，這讓我很困惑。他要論述的是存在主義我懂，可是原文里的答案不是很明了，求賜教~~
•   很多人執(zhí)著于薩特說的為自己的自由負(fù)責(zé)，其實(shí)這個(gè)可以簡單地理解為承受自己自由選擇的后果，只是一個(gè)簡單推理罷了。薩特之所以特意提出來正是體現(xiàn)了人道主義的一面——純自由是人類社會化的天敵，這個(gè)問題本該在社會學(xué)中提出，而不是基礎(chǔ)哲學(xué)里。
•   請問一下您是怎樣理解“存在先于本質(zhì)”的呢？謝謝?。?！
•   剪刀的本質(zhì)是什么？剪東西嗎
•   這本書我看了前20頁就是你寫的這些內(nèi)容，后面都沒必要看是嗎
•   其實(shí)大家也可以去看一看英文原版的，句子不難，內(nèi)容需要自己細(xì)細(xì)的想一下就可以了。。。。
•   LZ是把基督教的存在主義和無神論的存在主義搞混了來解釋的吧，在這本書中，作者是無神論的存在主義者。剪刀的例子，是基督教的存在主義關(guān)于本質(zhì)先于存在的解讀。用這個(gè)來解釋無神論的存在主義，走遠(yuǎn)了你。
•   不錯(cuò)。我雖然也看過這本書，但沒有寫出這么多的總結(jié)
•   寫著玩的，只是給自己個(gè)提醒，我心理問題挺嚴(yán)重的。呵呵。
•   我曾有一段時(shí)間能夠靜下來看書，那時(shí)發(fā)現(xiàn)，
  把看過的內(nèi)容總結(jié)下來，能夠更好的幫助理解。
•   這個(gè)問題已經(jīng)困擾我很久了，我看書看著看著思緒就飄了，人是靜了，腦子卻靜不下來。而且我做事一直不分緩急，該看的書不看，不該看的瞎看。要是看著看著突然想做啥事了，就又會立馬急著想去做，無論多大點(diǎn)事兒。呵呵。
•   有沒有試過：把想到的事情記下來到一個(gè)地方，然后看看重要程度和緊急程度排一個(gè)時(shí)間，然后繼續(xù)手頭的事情？
  有一本書分析這個(gè)問題很不錯(cuò)，叫做《高效能人士的 七個(gè)習(xí)慣》，雖然是一本暢銷勵志書，但是在這個(gè)問題上有些有趣的見識
•   嗯，這書聽說過，回頭去看看，謝謝啦。
•   “所謂文明源自對人類本性的壓抑，原始的私念、欲念被迫變相的釋放，我們的文明受傷了，而且將會傷的越來越重。 ”
  看得出你對弗洛伊德有相當(dāng)程度的了解，可是弗洛伊德的理論也有他的局限性。我認(rèn)為一個(gè)人對人性的理解構(gòu)成了此人價(jià)值觀的最核心部分，這個(gè)問題相當(dāng)重要，絲毫含糊不得。按照精神分析社會文化學(xué)派對不同文化下的人性的研究，所謂人的本性其實(shí)相當(dāng)程度的依賴于人所處的社會文化環(huán)境的。推薦你去了解下弗洛姆的《為自己的人》《人類的破壞性剖析》。每個(gè)人都有他自己的心理問題的，只是很多人都把這事壓抑了。非常不幸我壓抑失敗了。
  哦。對了。薩特那本《存在與虛無》你看懂了么？
  郁悶啊，我看不懂啊。要理解存在主義，似乎要先熟悉現(xiàn)象學(xué)，要熟悉現(xiàn)象學(xué)，似乎要先了解康德，要了解康德，似乎先要... 到頭來就回到了泰勒斯啦！
•   弗洛伊德就非常重視童年時(shí)期的經(jīng)歷，回頭想想真的性格、處世態(tài)度和方式，都是從那會兒就養(yǎng)成了，人想要刻意的改變自己，與這種性格抗?fàn)帲筋^來還是敗給了自己。
  薩特也有點(diǎn)這個(gè)意思，他覺得環(huán)境在壓制人的選擇，也就是壓制人成為自己想成為的那個(gè)人。。。所以這可能也是這種抗?fàn)帟粺o視的原因了。。。有時(shí)候人必須順應(yīng)社會，順應(yīng)自然，把某些自由的權(quán)利交給國家，國家才能給你諸如安全等權(quán)利。。。換到人身上，也是如此，就是要順應(yīng)那個(gè)最真實(shí)的自己。。。
  說實(shí)話薩特那個(gè)《存在與虛無》我沒看懂，因?yàn)榻?jīng)?？匆粫壕蜁灹?。就一直處于“想看”的狀態(tài)，有人評論說我未看先評不負(fù)責(zé)任，我也認(rèn)了。畢竟是真沒看懂。
  要看懂的話，了解其他哲學(xué)流派是必須的，很明顯存在主義里有精神分析、懷疑論、經(jīng)驗(yàn)主義的感覺。。。要真正追溯的話，估計(jì)就只能追溯到蘇格拉底了。。。呵呵。哲學(xué)我不是很懂的，而且邏輯思維不夠，我看不懂是正常的。。。
  其實(shí)最重要的，還是自己去感受生活，去觀察人際關(guān)系。這個(gè)是直接的體驗(yàn)，真理不是文字本身，有時(shí)是無法間接體驗(yàn)的。真理也不能被贊同，只有明白與不明白。。。
  廢話多了。。。見諒。。最近想的也比較多。哎。挺折騰的。
•   反正我覺得那些我們以為是自由的選擇，是完全出于個(gè)人意愿的選擇，其實(shí)也沒有擺脫環(huán)境的干系，里面肯定夾雜了環(huán)境里的是非觀念、道義規(guī)則，不管我們承不承認(rèn)，從出生起無論是被動的還是主動的選擇，都有環(huán)境背景潛移默化的影響。。。
  所以最好的方法，就是不去刻意追求自由，讓自由自由的光顧，不然就會出現(xiàn)用正確的思想，做錯(cuò)誤的事這種情況。。。
  謝謝您的推薦，弗洛姆的書我回頭去看，但不是現(xiàn)在，我已經(jīng)走火入魔了，頭痛失眠有一陣時(shí)間了，我?guī)缀跏欠艞壛丝佳性趯で蠼饷撝?，后來才發(fā)覺，刻意尋求解脫就永遠(yuǎn)無法解脫。。等我有能力做到不帶任何目的、理想、觀念去全然投入一件事的時(shí)候，再看吧，不然又要頭疼了。。。呵呵
•   ...
  你覺得你面臨著一個(gè)怎樣的問題？
•   說來話長。。。
  http://www.douban.com/review/2920630/
•   自由是不會自己跑過來跳到你的口袋的。自由絕對是對人努力的一個(gè)獎賞。
  不過我看你似乎需要相當(dāng)長的一段休息的時(shí)間...
  good luck！
•   嗯，呵呵，謝謝，我昨天沒看任何書，第一次全神貫注去觀察周圍的生活，好多了，頭一遭睡滿6小時(shí)。呵呵。
•   不同的體系如果發(fā)生沖突的話，是需要耐心去理順的，要不然真的會精神分裂。所以一定要注意循序漸進(jìn)，把毛料編順當(dāng)，一腳一腳的將它們踩在腳下。
•   嗯，真好，謝謝你~
•   哲學(xué)書籍，不管是存在主義還是虛無主義，都不會增加你的存在感，相反會減少你的存在感。
  因?yàn)檎軐W(xué)的高度概括性和總結(jié)性，概念性的東西一定比實(shí)體性的多的多 。找到百度知道這個(gè)答案不錯(cuò)，真覺得找不到自己的存在感，扇自己幾耳光就知道了。前提是不要故意自我麻痹
•   存在主義里是不存在精神分析成份的，存在主義與弗洛伊德理論有天然不可共存的成份。
•   看 吉爾伯茶和dawn的對話（包括http://book.douban.com/review/2920630/里面的），感覺很有意思啊，3年以后了，不知道你們現(xiàn)在又處于一種什么樣的狀況？
  同樣的這些問題，每代人都在經(jīng)歷啊。
  我也比較認(rèn)可存在主義的哲學(xué)（其實(shí)只是聽別人說起，然后看了一點(diǎn)點(diǎn)薩特的書），關(guān)于弗洛伊德的那個(gè)理論，我也是受益匪淺，慢慢回想自己的童年，發(fā)現(xiàn)自己現(xiàn)在的種種狀況就大都可以理解了，也無需，或者說很難以至于不該去改變，順從這么多年形成的習(xí)慣，依據(jù)這特質(zhì)去選擇，也可以很好。
•   暈了。。。
•   我的天啊，不要告訴我薩特整本書，18塊呢，都在這么繞~~~~~~
  那我花18塊買了書，還要花81塊找到回來的路！！
•   不是 這是我的個(gè)人看法。。。
•   　中國不是因?yàn)闆]救才沒救，而是因?yàn)橛辛诉@么多想救它的人而沒救。
  頂你，呵呵
•   折騰乃生命之本?？﹥浩司筒挥谜垓v了。
  你愿意折騰什么大亂殺人，借此優(yōu)化國民素質(zhì)增大貧富差距競爭累積財(cái)富之類亂七八糟是其實(shí)是沒問題的。什么時(shí)候你咯屁了也不用折騰了。
  人家沒死也想折騰著鍛煉身體追求人道其實(shí)也是沒問題的，咯屁了還是就不鬧騰了。
  你需要時(shí)間。你更需要人道主義。
•   這本書不太適合你，你應(yīng)該看《我的奮斗》。
•   LS正解。
•   無知啊~我思固我在是存在主義嗎????
•   倘若說悲觀主義要比樂觀主義更深刻的話，那只是因?yàn)樗f的樂觀是盲目的而已。而一種謹(jǐn)慎的樂觀難道不能給予人以信心嗎？存在主義就如此。
•   樂平的課？
•   發(fā)現(xiàn)自己，然后行動
•   不盲目行動，有自由意識的行動，你才是你，還要點(diǎn)智慧。
•   請問LZ學(xué)的是什么專業(yè)那個(gè)大學(xué)?。课腋呷厴I(yè)后也想寫這樣的作業(yè)= =
•   行動創(chuàng)造世界

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