功利主義

用戶評論 (總計6條)

•   　　J. J. C. Smart wrote in his work An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics, “We shall use ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ to appraise choices on account of their actual success in promoting the general happiness…” (Smart, p. 322) We can conclude that he thinks that an action is morally right if that action increases the total happiness; wrong if that action decreases the total happiness. I will offer objections. In this paper, I am going to talk about the quantity and quality of happiness, and describe what absurd situation may Smart’s utility theory lead us without having other intrinsically valuable thing except for happiness. Finally I will argue happiness is merely an emotion; and freedom has intrinsic value.
  　　
  　　Smart divided Utilitarianism into three categories (p. 314). The first one is Bentham’s theory, which focuses solely on quantity of happiness. The second one is Moore’s theory, which thinks certain states of mind also have intrinsic value, whether they bring happiness or not. The third one is Mill’s theory, which distinguishes qualities of different happiness. Smart critics Moore’s theory and does not think some states of mind have intrinsic value. I disagree with him. If we assume certain states of mind or any other thing does not have intrinsic good, we are going to do something that we can hardly think those are morally right based on utilitarian theory.
  　　
  　　Happiness is about quality and quantity. If we can calculate happiness, we can also convert quality into quantity. For example, writing a poem gives you 5 units of happiness; watching TV for a while also gives you 5 units of happiness. However, the quality is different; let us assume they have different coefficients A and B. Then it turns out to be, A×5 ＆ B×5, if writing a poem has higher quality, then A is bigger than B, we should write a poem instead of watching TV.
  　　
  　　Under the presupposition that no other things except happiness itself have intrinsic value, we actually can convert all happiness into numbers no matter what are their qualities. Imagine a situation like that: I put a man into Colosseum, fight a beast, put the live show on Internet and tell everyone this is from a film. The man dead at last, he has no friends or relatives, no one will be sad. The coefficient of death is high, and quantity of happiness is negative; the coefficient of each audience is low, since watching a man fighting beasts does not have so much quality I assumed, the quantity of happiness is positive, however, there are millions of people watched it and received happiness. According to the principle of Smart, when the happiness gained by audiences is larger than the happiness loss by that man, force a man fight a beast is morally right. We can hardly agree with this. So we can say that there is something more than happiness which has intrinsic value.
  　　
  　　People may say that put a man into Colosseum fight a beast decrease the total happiness in the long run, because it will influence the whole circumstances of society. My reply is that what if it will not? I told people this is not real; then, it will not corrupt morality of the society. And the numbers of audiences who receives happiness is too large. We cannot deny the possibilities that eventually the total happiness increased.
  　　
  　　When we sacrifice one—without corrupting morality or some deep devices of the society—in order to increase the total happiness of a certain group, something absurd can take place. Happiness is an emotion, thus it has strong subjectivity—the standard of happiness for each sentient being changes hugely. Our perceptual system, preferences, taste and experiences influence happiness we gain or loss. What’s more, when a man is biologically or mentally abnormal—like a man with pedophilia—he can gain huge happiness from something we think harms the personal liberty, we can hardly think his action is right.
  　　
  　　Let’s think of another example, a man has a strange hobby that he loves entering people’s house without permissions, he does this and it gains a huge happiness. He gets in the house without breaking anything—he will find an unlocked window—and he can make sure there is nobody in the house. In short words, his action made the total happiness increases. I do not think his action is right, because he violates property rights. And property rights are derived from the liberty of each individual.
  　　
  　　I want to argue now that happiness is not the only thing has intrinsic value. Smart describes happiness like this, “For a man to be happy he must, as a minimal condition, be fairly contented and moderately enjoying himself for much of the time… a long-term concept…” (p. 318) We can conclude that happiness does not equal to the ultimate desirable thing we want. When I introspect, I know I desire personal freedom more than enjoyment in the long run. I can bear unhappiness rather than losing personal freedom. People may say that I weigh personal freedom more, then, I am actually enjoying myself with that preference. My reply is that Smart wrote it is absurd to call a man who is in pain ‘happy’ (p. 318). People who said that actually broaden the definition for happiness, thus it is easy to become a tautology. When you define happiness as everything we ultimately desire in premise, and since only what we ultimately desire has the intrinsic value, then, of course there is only happiness has intrinsic value. Then we can actually call a man who is in pain ‘happy’, that’s not what Smart means I believe.
  　　
  　　Freedom does have intrinsic value; think of an example, a book named A Brave New World written by Aldous Huxley, describes a totalitarian society that humans are biologically changed. In this society, no freedom at all, however everyone is happy. (Huxley) Because as I said before that our perceptual system and preferences influence happiness we gain or loss. Then, if our perceptual system and preferences controlled by rulers with high technology, they can make us happy without any freedom. It shares similarities with the electrode operator example. Smart writes that the reason he is hesitate to call the electrode operator ‘happy’ because happiness includes a certain state we are right now (p. 317). I do not think Smart make it clear at this point. When we are going to be biologically changed, the total happiness for us in the long run will actually increase a huge amount. But we refuse that changed is not because of happiness, it is because we desire freedom more than just being happy and enjoying ourselves. Freedom, as a thing has intrinsic value, is a better standard to judge the action than the concept of happiness. It is more objective.
  　　
  　　I have considered several absurd situations that Smart’s utility theory can lead us to and I argue that happiness is not a good standard when we try to judge the intrinsic value. Finally I tried to prove that freedom has intrinsic value and we should act in accord with it.
  　　
  　　Reference:
  　　1. Huxley, Aldous. Brave New World,. New York: Harper & Bros., 1946. Print.
  　　
  　　去年寫的，算是我人生中第一篇哲學(xué)paper，有些不滿意的地方，懶得改了，趁著今天重讀斯瑪特，發(fā)上來玩玩。
  　　
•   　　提煉一下，斯瑪特提到打破規(guī)則對自身道德敗壞影響的考量的時候我突然笑了，去年寫文章的時候想破腦袋，把行為者賦予了一個酒醉的狀態(tài)，妄圖取消打破規(guī)則的情況下自身道德敗壞的影響。做這個總結(jié)是為了為寫論文做鋪墊。
  　　
  　　1. 區(qū)別：行為功利主義把道德規(guī)則看做經(jīng)驗法則，規(guī)則功利主義把道德規(guī)則提高到了經(jīng)驗法則之上，成為了行動道德評判的標準。
  　　
  　　2. 規(guī)則功利主義把行動直接訴諸后果的兩種情況：（1）規(guī)則矛盾（2）無規(guī)則
  　　
  　　3. 理想功利主義（G.E. Moore, J. S. Mill）向快樂功利主義的坍塌：質(zhì)僅僅是量的大小差別，或者是邊際功效的遞減差別。
  　　
  　　4. 規(guī)則功利主義向行為功利主義的坍塌：小概率事件的發(fā)生
  　　 a. 規(guī)則功利主義的行為影響論：當小概率事件發(fā)生之后，如果打破規(guī)則，所造成的影響可能會是（1）社會的（2）自身的，但當這種影響不存在或者小于增益的時候，規(guī)則功利主義就會向行為功利主義坍塌。
  　　 b. 這種造成的影響如果要在舉例中徹底消除的話，還是很難，盡管可以用一個類似與“醉酒”的例子來消除4a2中對自身道德的腐壞。
  　　 c. 實際上行為功利主義不用考慮打破規(guī)則的影響，因為其計算本身就涵蓋了打破規(guī)則的影響。而規(guī)則功利主義實際上是在說：“影響始終大于益處?！睂τ谶@種說法，可以用4b中的特殊例子反駁，不過到了這種地步，實在不難發(fā)現(xiàn)規(guī)則功利主義只是規(guī)則崇拜，因為坍塌現(xiàn)象只需要大于等于一的額外情況發(fā)生即可。
  　　
  　　5. 行為功利主義與道德規(guī)則
  　　 a. 在行為功利主義的話語中：道德規(guī)則/經(jīng)驗法則/普遍道德意識是同一回事。
  　　 b. 普遍道德意識的弱點：由于邏輯混亂可能導(dǎo)致的迷信和實際上的道德墮落。
  　　 c. 行為功利主義訴諸行為功利主義訴諸道德規(guī)則/經(jīng)驗法則/普遍道德意識的情況：（1）時間限制 （2）涉及自身導(dǎo)致偏見可能性的情境
  　　 d. 行為功利主義在實然上的表征由于5c1和5c2，通常是道德規(guī)則式的。
  　　 e. 所以當一個人常常訴諸道德規(guī)則，不能推導(dǎo)出他是一個規(guī)則功利主義者。
  　　
  　　6. 譴責與表揚是實然上的詞語，好或壞是應(yīng)然上的詞語，在行為功利主義的體系里，譴責或表揚與好或壞沒有必然聯(lián)系。
  　　
  　　7. 自己補充：規(guī)則功利主義小概率事件后如何答復(fù)：（1）行為影響論（2）通過提出另一個矛盾的規(guī)則如2（1）然后訴諸直接結(jié)果，然而這樣也會自動導(dǎo)致和行為功利主義的同化，因為兩者都訴諸直接結(jié)果了。（3）而當小概率事件沒有發(fā)生，作為經(jīng)驗法則的道德規(guī)則也自動最好化了結(jié)果。這樣一來在7（1）失效的情況下，7（2）和7（3）的結(jié)果也是同化，和承認小概率事件導(dǎo)致了坍塌性一致。所以我們可以說，他倆其實是一回事兒！
•   　　很難很難買到。書本身很好，兩個人各說一半。斯馬特和威廉斯各說一半。我個人贊同前者，盡管后者從學(xué)術(shù)聲望上而言要知名得多。
•   這本書真正有價值的地方是Williams的objection。。。
•   @比卡超 bw的我只記得那個negative responsibility了。。。
•   這書翻得實在太爛，這兩天正在看英文本。

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